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| Free Balawaristan - Old secret documents |
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This is an un-paraphrased version of a Secret cypher (typex) message and the text must first be paraphrased if it is essential to communicate it to persons outside British and United States Government Services. Inward Telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office ALLOTTED TO POLITICAL DEPARTMENT CYPHER (TYPEX) FROM : INDIA (H.C.) D. NEW DELHI, 1.35 a.m., 10th January 1948 R. 00.5 a.m., 10th January 1948 ______________ IMMEDIATE NO. 47. TOP SECRET MILSIT. Reference my telegram 1550 MILSIT. Following is fresh report for the period 1st January – 7th January on the military situation in Jammu and Kashmir obtained by my Military Adviser from Indian Army. His report BEGINS: 1. General. The enemy continues to build up his forces on all fronts, and is showing signs of becoming restive, especially in the Punch and Naushahra areas. 2. Uri. Apart from one unsuccessful enemy attack put in against out positions south of Uri, no other incident of Major importance has been reported from this area. Our patrols and artillery, however, continue to engage all hostile ectgivities. 3. Punch. Our troops attacked and captured an enemy- held position north of Punch on 1st January. A total of 400 casualties are reported to have been inflicted on the raiders in this area the same day. Movement of small parties have been observed north west and south of Punch. Hostile sniping of our positions in this area, continue. 4. Naushahre Beri Patan, Approximately 4,000 raiders …………medium machine guns, attacked Naushahra…………..12.00 hours on 6th January. This is the first ………………enemy during day time , and probably indicates that, the knowledge of his superiority in numbers, he is gaining confidence . The attack were repulsed. The raiders have failed to dislodge our troops from their positions in Naushahra area after repeated attacks, and attempts to infiltrate. The enemy is reported to be using 3.7 howitzers, and has been seen with a rangefinder. On the other hand, (? Pakistan) troops have been patrolling this area in strength, and have inflicted a number of casualties on the raiders. 5. Jammu. A concentration of approximately 8,ooo raiders are reported to b e in the border villages of South West of Jammu in Pakistan territory. The raiders, based in Sialkot, are of the opinion that by the second week of January 1948 they will be in Jammu. The build-up of raiders in the Sialkot-Shakargarh area has been going on for approximately three weeks. 6. Gilgit. The Gilgit Agency is now reported to be firmly in the hands of Pakistan. One Raka Babar Khan is said to be the new Governor of Gilgit, and Colonel Hasson Khan previously Captain in the S.F. is reported to be in command of the Gilgit forces, which consists of Gilgit scouts and Muslim soldiers of the State Army. As the total strength of the Gilgit forces is said to be 18,000m it is presumed that some outside elements from Chilas- Dar-Chitral and others adjoining frontier may also be present. Bunji is the main H.Q. of the Gilgit forces, whose forward elements have rreached Rondu. Several British and Pakistan Army officers are reported to be present in Gilgit. Activity by Royal Pakistan Air Force has been recently reported over Rondu (48 miles E.S.E. of Gilgit) and Chilas (36 miles S.S.W. of Gilgit). On December 47 (sic) two Tempests, were observed over Chilas, and one of them piloted by Sqadron Leader Ibrahim khan R.P.A.F. crashed in the area. The column……….. Srinagar on 19th December consisting or two .S.F. companies that held up in Sonemarg – Baltal area owing to heavy snowfall on the ………….The columns has now returned to Srinagar as the ………..Report. ENDS. TOP SECRET. Copy to .................. ADDENDUM TO HOTES OF A HEETING HELD HITTING RESIDENCE AT 1100 HOURS CH 4 HARCH 1949 TO DISCUSS THE GILGIT SITUATION. The following should be added as additional paragraphs POSITION OF HUNZA AND NAGAR 11. It was decided that the action should be taken to notify to UNCIP the accession of the Mirs of Hunza and Nagar as it was hoped to include them in the plebiscite area. VISIT OF UNCIP TO GILGIT. 12. It was decided that he objection should be raised to UNCIP or a Sub-Commission thereof visiting Gilgit if they so wished. DISTRIBUTION :- Copy No. 1. HPM & HMD. 2. HM FA & CR 3. Secy, Ministry of States. 4. Air Commandant 5.-8. Secy JSCC. 9. DHO, GHO. 10-11 UNCLO (Mr. Ayub) 12. C-IN-C Pakarmy. 13. Def Secy. Inward Telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office ALLOTTED TO POLITICAL DEPARTMENT (B) CYPHER (O.T.P.) D.T. FROM: GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN. D. Karachi 4.50 a.m., 7th March, 1948. R. 2.0 a.m., 7th March, 1948 MOST IMMEDIATE No. 778. TOP SECRET. Private and Personal from Prime Minister, Pakistan, to Prime Minister United Kingdom. 2. Sir Mohamed Zafrullah Khan has informed me about the talks he had recently with you and with some of your colleague in London. He tells me he got the impression that His Majesty’s Government are now thinking of revising the position that they had taken regarding neutral administration and withdrawal of the Indian Army from Kashmir. He has added that His Majesty’s Government now seems inclined to acquiesce in India’s proposal to leave Abdullah in power through they might perhaps ask for the inclusion of a Moslem Conference Leader in the Ministry. 3. Let me tell you that the leader of the Moslem Conference will not agree to serve under Abdullah as a leader or so-called Prime Minister. You ought to realize by now that Abdullah has been a quisling and a puppet of the Congress for the last 15 years and now of the Government of India. Besides letting me impress upon you that so long as the Indian troops remain on the soil of Kashmir a settlement cannot be brought about. So long as Sheikh Abdullah in one garb or other remains the head of the present administration or regime with Indian troops behind him plebiscite would be a farce. If the British Government recede or depart from the stand already taken up by their spokesman recently at the Security Council, which, in my opinion, does no more than /bare Inward Telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office Kashmir Dist. ALLOTTED TO POLITICAL DEPARTMENT (B) D.T. CYPHER (TYPEX) FROM: U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN INDIA D. NEW DELHI, 18.50 hours, 12th March 1948 R. 23.20 hours, 12th March 1948 Important No.619. TOP SECRET. My telegram No. 610 I finished my round of Kearney’s colleagues (mentioned in paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 592) by seeing the Belgian Ambassador this morning. 2. He had been, he said, in favour of a solution for Kashmir along the lines of independence even before Kearney had brought the matter up. He had from the beginning considered that Kashmir might be handled in a way analogous to Luxemburg. The advantages were obvious and the Prince de Ligne did not waste much time in going over them as he assumed that I was fully informed. He knew, he said, from his conversations with Nehru that a solution along the lines of independence would be acceptable to the Indian Government. He was also sure that the present Government could not face a diplomatic reverse at Lake Success, and it was therefore vital to find now some way in which they could agree to a solution without loss of face. In fact he went further and foresaw Nehru replaced by Patel and extremist elements, among them the Sikhs who would insist on war with Pakistan. 3. If asked him what the foreign relations of an independent Kashmir would be with the rest of the world. He replied that it was vital to see that these relations could in no way be that he had replied to the Mirs that Pakistan was considering the matter and that they must wait for a reply and must not act hastily. He said he wanted to act in full sense of his responsibility as a member of the Commonwealth and was in great doubt what to do. 4. Clearly you cannot use this information, or disclose your knowledge of it, but if the question should arise in any other manner you would no doubt suggest that Pakistan might after prior information to India send a force under its direct control to help keep order and protect Hunza and Nagir and at the same time explain to the Mirs the A difficulty of accepting formal accessions at this stage of the United Nations deliberations. 5. It looks as if the Mirs are trying to force Pakistans bands and /or Pakistan to force ours. Copy to: P.S. to Prime Minister P.S. to Minister of Defense P.S. to Chancellor of Exchequer F.O. Telegraph Section (15 copies) F.O. Mr. Mason W.o. (M.O.2.) (2 copies) CRO (A) M. Costley White CRO(B) Gen. Scoores (2 copies to B.G.S.) Mr. Turnbull Mr. A.H.Joyce Mr. Curson (U.N.O. New York) Mr. Gibson Sir W.Jenkin Mr. Walsh Atkins Outward Telegram from Commonwealth relations Office POLITICAL DEPARTMENT (B) Dist. I Pol.435/48 Kashmir Dist. CYPHER (TYPEX) To: U.K. HIGH COMMISSIOER IN PAKISTAN (SENT: 15.00 hours, 15th March, 1948.) _____________ IMMEDIATE No. 518 TOP SECRET Personal for Grafftey – Smith. Mr. Cordon walker has reported to the Secretary of State information given to him under pledge of absolute secrecy by Liaat Ali Khan on 23rd February. Though this was intended for Secretary of State and Prime Minister only we feel you should be aware of it. Actually Mohamed Ali said something of the same kind to General Scoones in New York. 2. Liaqat said that last November the two semi-independent Mirs of Hunza and Nagir in Gilgit Agency signed and application for accession to Pakistan. Liaqat stalled and sent an official to contact them. On 22nd February he received a telegram to say they were disappointed not to have received an official answer from Pakistan and that if their accession were not accepted they would accede to Russia. In reply to Gordon Walkers question. Liaqat said there are Muslims the other side of the Frontier under Russian rule. ……………. Expressed his gratitude for the information and ……….. Liaqat that what he did was his own affair. He agree …… it was unthinkable that Russia should get …………… the Indian side of the Frontier. Liaqat said This is an unparaphrased version of a Secret cipher (typex) message and the text must first be paraphrased if it is essential to communicate it to persons outside British and United States Government services. Inward Telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office Allotted to Political Department (B) Kashmir A D.I. CYPHER (TYPEX) FROM: HIGH COMMISSIONER IN PAKISTAN D. Karachi, 17.15 hours, 18th March 1948 R. 15.00 hours, 18th March 1948 IMMEDIATE No. 263 TOP SECRET Personal from Grafftey Smith. Your telegram No. 518. I am grateful for this information which confirms indications I had already received although I had not previously heard of introduction of Russian theme by Mirs of Hunza and Nagir. This is undoubtedly intended by them as blackmail. Reason given me for delay in accepting their accession has been Pakistan’s anxiety to avoid aggravating difficulties of Kashmir problem by accepting accession of two states which have hitherto been under suzerainty of Maharajah of Kashmir. 2. Pakistan Prime Minister is of course aware that no territory under Russian rule is literally contiguous to either Hunza or Nagir and that acession to Russia would involve the Mirs in complications with China and/or Afghanistan, through whose territories their communications with Russia must pass. I find it difficult to believe that Liaquat has taken this threat very seriously, but I know that Mirs displeasure at Pakistan’s apparent reluctance to accept their offers of accession has caused some anxiety here and that the Pakistan Government would gladly placate them by accepting accession were it not for their anxiety to avoid adding fuel to Kashmir fire. 3. If opportunity offers I will put suggestion here that India should be given prior intimation of Pakistan’s Telegram No. 1174 from Foreign Office to U.K.Del. New York (c) independent Kashmir might also open way for China to pursue her claims in Gilgit Agency; (e) in general we do not see how if Kashmir once voted for independence her rulers would be held to any promises previously made that India and Pakistan should control her foreign relation. 3. The independence solution is not reviving support in any quarter at Lake Success. 4. You may in your discussions with your colleagues discourage Kearney’s idea on above lines, but without disclosing source of information contained in Karachi telegram No. 127 or your information about Communist contacts of Sheikh Abdullah and his Ministers or paragraph 2(C) above. Ends. OUTWARD TELEGRAM [This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on] Cypher/OTP DIPLOMATIC (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YOUK (To United Kingdom delegation to the United Nation) No. 1174 16th March,1948 D. 2.35 a.m. 17th March, 1948 IMMEDIATE TOP SECRET Personal from Carter for Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. My immediately preceding telegram. Following is proposed reply to New Delhi :-- Begins : Your telegram No. 619 paragraph 6. It is clear from Karachi telegram No. 127 of 3rd February that Pakistan would not agree to establishment of an independent Kashmir and there is therefore no hope of Kearney’s proposal providing basis for agreed settlement. It would mean confirmation of Maharaja as Ruler and establish sheikh Abdullah more firmly in power and so long as they remain Pakistan could hope to have little say in affairs of the State. Introduction of Independence as a third choice in the plebiscite would confuse the issue and thus reduce the chance of plebiscite going in Pakistan’s favour in Muslim majority areas. Pakistan would deeply resent a maneuver which they would compare to the attempt to introduce idea of autonomous Pathanistan into referendum in the N.W.F.P. Last Summer. 2. Apart from this we would not regard independence as satisfactory solution on merits because:-- (a) respective positions of India and Pakistan as joint guarantors of state’s independence and custodians of its external relations would be ill-defined and would provide fresh battle-ground, for demonstration of their mutual suspicions. Kearney’s hope that these joint responsibilities would bring two Dominions together is surely quite baseless given their present temper. (b) Recognition of Kashmir as separate international entity would open path for soviet intrigue including establishment of soviet diplomatic mission at Srinagar. Even semi-independence would provide rulers of Kashmir with opportunities for flirting with Russia while neutralising India-Pakistan control by playing one Dominion off against the other. Sheikh Abdullah has Communist contacts. Some of his Ministers are said to be Communists and many Communists from India have recently visited State. It seems important that Kashmir should be part of either India or Pakistan so that one or the other would have undoubted right to intervene without delay or argument to stop any Communist Coup d’etat; This is an unparaphrased version of a secret cypher (typex) message and the text must first be paraphrased if it is essential to communicate it to persons outside British and United States Government Services. Inward Telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office DIST.I. ALLOTTED TO POLITICAL DEPARTEMENT (B) KASHMIR DISTRIBUTION CYPHER (TYPEX) FROM : U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN PAKISTAN RPD. TO: U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN INDIA NO. 172 D. Karachi, 19.00 hours, 23rd March, 1948. R. 18.00 hours, 23rd March, 1948 IMPORTANT No. 285. TOP SECRET Your telegram 1007 to New Delhi. Kashmir. Pakistan Prime Minister raised with me this morning matter of Chinese draft resolution on Kashmir. He spoke on familiar lines about impossibility of implementing such a solution of Kashmir dispute which could not be pressed on tribesmen and other Muslim elements in Kashmir as guaranteeing a fair plebiscite. He repeated that an impartial civil administration and an impartiality controlled military force were essential of those now fighting against the Indian troops were to be persuaded to lay down their arms. 2. Liaquat Ali Khan deplored the presentation of this draft resolution by the president of the Security Council because he thought it would make it much more difficult for both parties to agree and certainly more difficult for India to make concessions. He was distressed that an impression had been given that this resolution represented the upshot of conversations between the President and the two Dominion Delegation and reflected some sort of an agreed compromise. He obviously suspects that the terms of the Chinese resolution had, in fact, been drafted under pressure from Delhi with the connivance of H.M.G. and other Security Council powers. I told that too apparent that Kearney has not grasped the rigidity with both India and Pakistan approach the subject of Sheikh Abdullah. That Kearney has in no way considered the Pakistan case is only too clear from his wishful thinking with regard to Zaffrullah and the Chinese resolution. In short his activities here and his proposal would appear to have been dictated largely with the end in view of removing from Canada any odium that may accrue as a result of what India might consider to be an adverse decision in the Security Council, His anxiety that India should in no way be given any grounds for criticism of great Britain and his own country remains as strong as ever. He would however appear to have given up his previous advocacy of a solution along the lines of independence for the time being at any rate. Copies to: P.S. to Prime Minister P.S. to Minister of Defense P.S. to Chancellor of Exchequer F.O. Telegraph Section (15 copies) F.O. Mr. Mason W.O. (M.O.2.) (2 copies) CRO (A) Mr. Costley white CRO (B) Gen. Scoones (2 copies to B.G.S.) Mr. Turnbull Mr. A.H.Joyve Mr. Curson (U.N.O. New York) Mr. Gibson Sir W.Jenkin Mr. Walsh Atkins This is an unparaphrased version of a secret cypher (typex) message and the text must first be paraphrased if it is essential to communicate it to persons outside British and United States Government Services. Inward Telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office ALLOTTED TO POLITICAL DEPARTEMENT (B) KASHMIR DISTRIBUTION CYPHER (TYPEX) FROM : U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN PAKISTAN REPTD. TO: U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN INDIA NO. 177 D. Karachi, 3.30 p.m. hours, 26th March, 1948. R. 3.10 p.m hours, 26th March, 1948 IMPORTANT No. 294. TOP SECRET General Gracey, C-in-C Pakistan Army, has informed me confidentially of negotiations now proceeding between himself and GENERAL Bucher, C-in-C Indian Army, which although they appear Gilbertian against the background of the present inter-domination dispute about Kashmir, seem to offer real promise of a very great reduction in existing tensions if the politicians on both sides are prepared to give them their blessing. 2. These discussions at C-in-C level seem to have proceeded from General Bucher’s indication to his opposite number in Pakistan that he had no wish to pursue an offensive into what is effectively Azad Kashmir controlled territory, i.e. the Mirpur and Poonch sector. General Gracey thereofre proposed an agreement, with which Sardar Mohammed Ibrahim, the Azad Kashmir leader, has willingly associated himself, under which the Azad Kashmir forces will give safe conduct to the Indian Army forces now beleaguered in Poonch, and to considerable non-Muslim elements in the town, to withdraw to territory now controlled by the Indian Army. In return, General Bucher appears to have undertaken (a) that the forces withdrawing from Poonch should not damage the town before leaving it and (b) that present irresponsible bombing by Indian Air Force, which geovisit();  <img src="http://visit.webhosting.yahoo.com/visit.gif?us1204313792" alt="setstats" border="0" width="1" height="1">geovisit();<img src="http://visit.webhosting.yahoo.com/visit.gif?us1218612272" alt="setstats" border="0" width="1" height="1">
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