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Chitral Gilgit Agency PDF Print E-mail
Free Balawaristan - Old secret documents
Simla,Sialkot.
18th December, 193
PERSONAL AND PRIVATE
I have just had a long P&P letter from Crichton about various maters, the most important concerning Hunza. Crichton tells me he is a little worried about things there as there seems to be a certain amount of Shia-Nomel trouble brewing. The Mir says it is being stirred up by Shia mischief-makers; some say Jamal Khan the Mir’s son is at the back of it, and other that Nagar is responsible, and so on. The Mir is perplexed.
There is no doubt that he is severely handicapped by the long delay in his investiture Durbar, which is being held up the “Sanad” difficulty. Crichton is of the opinion, and I him, that until the formal Durbar takes is regarded by his people and ……………. wish to believe this. The Mir’s feelings seem to be that if he does anything drastic and creates turmoil in the State, he will not be confirmed; if he does nothing and allows things to go too far, again he will be blamed and the consequences will be similar. Once he is properly installed, he and every one will feel that he is firmly in the saddle and that no amount of petty mischief will unsent him and his confidence will be restored.
2. I know perfectly well the difficulty about the Sanad, but now that federation is on the shelf and not likely to reappear in the same form, the Sanad would not seem to require such drastic modification as was originally thought necessary. I would urge therefore that this question be settled as soon as possible. It would to course not be possible for the Political Agent to install the Mir in a formal Durbar without a Sanad, for naturally the Kashmir would never recognize such a guided ceremony.
Personal and Private.
I am writing without the book as the files are in Srinagar, hence this P&P letter to point out the desirability of an early decision.
O.K. Caroe Esq. C.I.E.
Secretary External Affairs Dept.
New Delhi.

(Confidential).
No. 1359 F.
From, The Secretary to the Government of India,
To, The Resident in Kashmir.
Foreign Dept. Shimla, the 15th September 1891
Sir,
I am directed to forward a copy of a memorandum prepared by Lieutenant-Colonel A. Durand regarding the measures necessary to strengthen the position at Gilgit, and giving his views on the political situation.
2. The proposals contained in this memorandum, which relate to the frontier garrison, have been considered and generally approved by the Governor-General in Council; and I am to invite your active co-operation, as well as that of the Kashmir Darbar, in bringing into effect the several measures which the Governor-General in Council has decided should now be undertaken.
3. The following matters demand immediate attention, viz. –
1. The increase of the British Agency Guard by 200 Gurkhas from India;
2. The dispatch to Gilgit of two guns of a native mountain battery ;
3. The removal to the Bunji and Chhalt forts, or other positions selected by Lieutenant-Colonel Durand, of the Kashmir battery now in Gilgit. The guns will be carried by the battery mules, which will then be sent back to Kashmir, so as to lessen the number of animals to be fed in the country beyond Astor ;
4. The equipment of the Kashmir mountain battery, now at Jammu, with 7-pounder guns, in view to its being sent next year in a state of efficiency to Gilgit ;
5. The increase of the British Agency staff by one engineer officer, one artillery officer and eight infantry officers, bringing the total number of officers in the Gilgit Agency, including the Surgeon, but excluding the officers with the Gurkha detachment, up to 15;
6. The possibility of direct telegraphic connection between Gilgit and Srinagar ; 7. The deputation to Chitral, before the cold weather sets in, of Lieutenant Manners-Smith, who will remain there for the winter ; and his relief at Gilgit, as a temporary measure, by Captain W.H.M. Stewart, Assistant to the Resident in Kashmir.
8. The appointment, on Rs. 40 a month, of a Persian munshi to accompany Lieutenant Manners-Smith ; and the increase of the secret service grant of the Gilgit Agency to an extent compatible with the altered condition of affairs.
4. With regard to the first, second and fifth items, you have received intimation by telegram that the dispatch of the Gurkhas, the guns and the British officers has already been ordered. The names of the officers selected, and the terms of their employment, will be supplied to you in due course. The British Agent will carry out the re-distribution of the guns of the battery now in Gilgit, and the equipment of the battery at Jammu will be attended to by the Chief Inspection Officer* without delay. With respect to the telegraph line the Public Works Department have been asked$ to depute an officer to report on the question of the construction of a line as proposed, and I am to request that, on his arrival in Kashmir, he may be given all the assistance possible to enable him to carry out his instructions. As regards the deputation of Lieutenant Manners-Smith, and the time when Captain Stewart can be dispatched to Gilgit, I am to request you to issue the needful orders. The Government of India is of opinion that no change need be made in the pay and position of either of these officers. Captain Stewart, though placed for a time under the orders of the British Agent at and he need not start until after the conclusion of His Excellency the Viceroy’s visit to Kashmir. During the winter months, Captain Stewart’s duties can be carried on by Captain Evans Gordon, on his coming down from Ladak. With regard to the Persian munshi, I an to authorize you to entertain a man on the pay named, advancing him the needful sums of traveling expenses and Rs. 150 for outfit. The Government of India will await your proposal as to the extent to which the secret service grant should be increased.
5. The above orders dispose of paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of Lieutenant -Colonel Durand’s memorandum. Upon the remainder the Government of India desire to receive any observations you may wish to make.
I have the honour to be,
SIR,
Your most obedient Servant.
(Sd.) II. M. DURAND,
Secretary to the Government of India
________________

(Confidential)
No. 1360 F.
A copy of the foregoing and of its enclosures is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department.
By Order, &c.,
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT
SIMLA
The 15th September 1891.
(Sd.) W.J. Cuningham,
Deputy Secretary to the Government of India.
MEMORANDUM
1. The last Russian move on the Pamirs seems to necessitate our strengthening our position at Gilgit, and in order to arrive at this result I would propose the following steps :- 2. First, the bringing of Hunza and Nagar under complete control. To do this it is in my opinion necessary, as has been often pointed out, to build a proper fort at Chalt, and to improve the road to that place from Gilgit. This should be undertaken about the end of the coming October when the rivers are falling. (Subjection of Hunza and Nagar) 3. The step will lead to protests on the part of Hunza and Nagar, which should I think be met, or indeed forestalled, by the plain declaration that Government will no longer tolerate the existing condition of things of both Hunza and Nagar that we do not wish to interfere with form of their Government, but that we mean to exercise complete control over them, to make roads into their country, and to place troops or officers in Hunza and Nagar if it seems advisable to us. 4. At the least sign of opposition to our wishes, I think a small force should cross the frontier and subdue both States. This I believe to be a matter of no great difficulty. 5. Once these States are in our hands, the question of their future treatment arises; Nagar can be neglected; it has no outlet to on Gilgit or Kashmir. I should improve the road leading through the country, destroy the forts and fortified positions, and possibly disarm the people. Uzr Khan, the eldest surviving son of the present Raja, must be removed, and the most likely successor acknowledged. Nothing more need, I think, be done perhaps if would be advisable to put a native agent into the country.
6. The Hunza question is more serious. Hunza exercise some shadowy rights over the Tagdumbash and Sarikul, and has direct dealings with the Chinese in Kashgar, & c. The present Raja is absolutely untrustworthy. He has broken every stipulation of his agreement with us, has levied blackmail in Kashgar in return or abstaining from raiding the Yarkand road, has received Chinese officials in his country, has invited the Russians into it: during the late trouble is June last he sent to Kashgar and to the Russians, asking for help against us; in a letter received by me at Chalt, he distinctly claimed to be dependent on China. In subsequent letters he certainly changed his tone on this point, but he is utterly false. He and his Wazir must be removed; the son, a boy of five, might be recognized as Raja and put under the guardianship of the late Raja’s Wazir, now a refugee in Chitral, who hates the present Raja and Wazir with a deadly hatred, and who moreover has a large following in the country.
7. Whether permanently to occupy the country remains to be considered. Chhalt is 30 miles from Gilgit, and Hunza some 40 miles on, so that an outpost in Hunza would be rather far away. Possibly the best thing to do would be to leave during all next winter and spring a small force under a British officer in the country. But no definite conclusion can safely be come to beforehand. 8. The second thing I would suggest is that a British officer from the Agency at Gilgit should winter in Chitral. The importance of Chitral is such that, if there is any question of Russian attack, it is in my opinion essential to have an officer there. I would propose sending Mr. Manners-Smith there as soon as the Hunza-Nagar business is settled, replacing him by Captain Stewart from Kashmir. (Chitral.)
9. It is necessary, I think, for the safety of the British Agency to increase the guard of our own troops by 200 men, and I trust that Gurkhas may be sent. It may not be out of place to point out that, in my original scheme for holding Gilgit, I asked for 500 irregulars, and Government fully agreed to my views. Financial considerations have prevented the Darbar from finding this body, which perhaps is as well, for irregular Pathans would not be much to be trusted. Their place however must be filled in order that in case of trouble with Hunza and Nagar the Shinaki tribes, the Gilgit force may be able to deal satisfactorily with it. Two hundred of our own men will make us safe so far as local risings are concerned. (Increase of Agency Guard.)
10. The guns we have with the Kashmir Mountain Battery are very old brass guns, and I think should be replaced at once by 7-pounder guns of two hundred pounds. There are some I believe at Rawalpindi and I think four guns with ammunition and material complete should be sent up at once on transport mules. An officer of the Punjab Frontier Force Battery might take them up with a small detainment for loading and unloading on the march. The mules could return before the passes close, but I think a certain number might be kept. The mules we have are not good enough for the guns and heaviest loads. As this arrangement involves hurried re-armament of the batter at Gilgit just before it may be called upon to act in the field, might not a way out of the difficulty be found by recalling the Kashmir Battery or at all events half of it, and replacing it for this winter by two guns from a native mountain battery at Abbotabad ? (Guns.)
11. A telegraph line should, in my opinion, be opened at once to Gilgit from Srinagar. This will necessitate laying an underground wire over the Zojila for some miles. I think an officer of the Telegraph Department should be sent up, directly it is known how many miles of insulated wire are wanted, taking what material is necessary, and lay the line, and then going down the Indus Valley by Skardu open the line between that place and Bunji. From there to Gilgit we have a line.
12. The Gilgit force, which is practically under the command of the British Agent, is a brigade consisting of three regiments of infantry and a mule battery, which is responsible for the safeguard of the frontier; it is cut off from all help from India for seven or eight months of the year, and is liable to find itself engaged in hostilities at any moment. The Agency Staff on whom devolves the instruction of these troops in peace and their leading in war consists of three combatant inadequacy. Fortunately for us there was then no fighting; had there been, as I expected, actual hostilities with Hunza and Nagar, the Shinaki tribes would almost to a certainty have joined in. With only one assistant, one was away on duty in India, I could not have controlled such a rising satisfactorily. It would have involved fighting at Bunza and Ramghat at the one end of the line, and in Hunza and Nagar at the other, and the scenes of action would have been eighty miles apart. It is courting disaster to be so short handed. Were the regiments those of our own Bengal army, no one would for a moment contemplate the possibility of leaving them alone on a frontier under their native officers; how much more therefore is it necessary to increase the Agency Staff when the discipline, drill and recruiting of the Kashmir regiments is considered. In order to place the Kashmir troops on such a footing that it would be safe to take them into the field, I think it is imperatively necessary to increase the Agency Staff to the numbers below :-
British Agent - 1
Assistant in Chitral - 1
Engineer Officer - 1
Artillery Officer - 1
Infantry Officers - 10*
Total - 14
With this number of officers in addition to placing the Kashmir troops in a state of efficiency, we could organize to a certain extent the auxiliary levies of Punyal and Chitral. The former formed part of the force I moved to the frontier in June, but their value was much lessened by the fact that, owing to my small staff, I had been unable to give them any training.
13. The above proposals only aim at putting the Agency on a sound footing as regards obtaining information of Russian movements, establishing our authority up to the Hindu Kush and stopping any movements across our frontier by small bodies similar to those now on the Pamirs. If the Russians advanced in force, the Gilgit troops would be unable to hold their own. They could not at present stand up against Russian regulars for a moment, and given a certain complement of British officers they could not be expected to hold the frontier without help from British India. This I understand has always been contemplated.

A. Durand, Lt. Col.
British Agent at Gilgit.
SIMLA:
The 4th Sept. 1891.
This gives three officers per infantry regiment and one staff officer. I would include in this number the Political Assistant at Gilgit, who should always be a trained Political Officer, and would take charge during the balance of the British Agent, as Mr. Manners-Smith now does. It will be remembered that General Sir William Lockhart asked
..................
19 British Officers, when submitting proposals for the establishment of the British Agency at Gilgit.

MEMORANDUM
1. The reasons which seem to necessitate our taking in hand and settling the Hunza and Nagar question are two-fold.
2. Firstly - The Chiefs of Hunza and Nagar especially the former, owing to their isolation, and the natural difficulties of their country, have the most exaggerated idea of their own power and importance. This has led them to assume a tone of insolence in dealing with Kashmir, and since they have been brought in contact with the officers of the Supreme Government towards the latter, which has up to the present time received but slight checks. Their independent position, and the numerous defeats which they have inflicted on Kashmiri troops in past days, have given them a fictitious importance in the eyes between them and the Shin tribes of the Indus valley, who look to Hunza and Nagar for support in case of any attack on Shinaki by the British Government. The Chiefs have, therefore, the power at any time of raising disturbances in rear of Gilgit, and of bringing about an attack on our line of communications at Ramghat, at present the weakest link in our line, and on Bunji.
3. Until the Chiefs of Hunza and Nagar have been brought into complete subjection, and have felt or realized our power, their attitude will always remain the same, and they will be a cause of constant anxiety and of possible disturbance on the frontier. 4. Secondly – The Hunza Chief has for some time past been intriguing with China and Russia. In view of the Russian position on the Pamirs, it is impossible to regard such conduct with indifference. For unless completely under our control, he might, and most likely would, introduce a Russian force into Hunza within a few marches of Gilgit, on the least disagreement with us. 5. The justification for subduing Hunza, - Nagar which has no outlet to the north need not here to considered, - is a double one. In the first place it may be argued that the Chief has broken every one of his agreements with us, in return for the fulfillment of which he receives a subsidy from the British Government and that we are therefore fairly entitled to punish him. His agreement with us is to abstain from raiding on the Yarkand road, to exclude foreigners from his State, not to allow Chinese officials to interfere in the internal affairs of Hunza, and t give free passage to British officers. In direct contravention o his engagements he has received Chinese officials in Hunza, has invited Russian officials to enter (Captain Grombehevsky showed Captain Younghusband letters from the Chief to this effect in 1889), has extorted black mail through his representative in Kashgar under threats of raiding the trade route, and has called on the Chinese and Russian to aid him against us. In June last when the Kashmir troops were on the frontier at Chhalt, he collected his tribesmen to attack them. Twice his force was on the point of starting, and he was only dissuaded from carrying out his intention by the Nagar Chief holding aloof. He openly, in a letter received in June last, proclaimed his allegiance to China, and his trust in the support of Chinese troops against us. Finally his disloyal attitude was clearly emphasized by his declining to pass letters through his country, for Captain Younghusband either to or from Gilgit, by the extreme discourtesy of his messengers in Kashgar who refused to pay their respects to Captain Younghusband, and by the reported issue of orders to murder Raja Kushwakth Khan, an employee of British Agency, who had been sent in June on a mission to the Pamirs. This conduct alone would justify us in moving troops into hi country, and in bringing him to complete subjection.
6. In the second place, putting aside all question of misconduct, punishment and the like, there remains the fact that the Russians have now advanced to the crest of the passes of the Hindu Kush. Under these circumstances we clearly must place ourselves in such a position as will enable us effectually to stop their further advance. For this purpose it is necessary that we should have real control of the country to our north up to the crest of the passes of the Hindu Kush. This has always been recognized in Chitral on the west, and lately in Ladakh on the east, and the establishment of a similar control over Hunza is only a consistent application of the general principle. Hunza is a “feudatory” of ours, as has been distinctly ruled more than once by Her Majesty’s Government, and receives a subsidy in return for which it has undertaken to exclude all foreigners. We have therefore a right to demand that the Raja should loyally co-operate with us in our preparations to safeguard the passes. If the Raja assumes a doubtful or actively disloyal attitude, we should be clearly justified in over riding his opposition, and in making such arrangements as seem desirable, if necessary by force.
7. If the Chinese mean to assert their claims to the Pamirs, and we desire to support them, our control over Hunza proper, i.e. that part of the country south of the Hindu Kush, should be a support to the Chinese Government. It will show that we are decisively insisting on the claim which we have always advanced that our frontier is the Hindu Kush, that it thus marches at this point with theirs, here the Tagdumbash Pamir, and that we are thus blocking out the Russians from a broken flank in their frontier line. It should also give them a moral stimulus for standing to their ground on the Pamirs.
8. Under these circumstances them, what I would propose is as follows :- (1) To move troops at the end of October to Chalt, improve the road between that place and Gilgit, and build a small fort at Chalt.
(2) To write at the same time to the Chiefs of Hunza and Nagar, saying nothing about their former misconduct, but informing them that, as the Russians hav now advanced to the Hindu Kush, it is necessary for their safety and that of Kashmir, as their States are within our border, that we should now have free access to their territory, in order that we may make all requisite arrangements for holding the lime of frontier. They should be told that there is no intention to interfere in the form of their Government, but that these arrangements will of necessity include the making of such roads as will enable us, in case of emergency, to throw British troops rapidly into the passes of the Hindu Kush. That in the case of Nagar, we must make a practicable mule-road as far as Nagar itself, Chhalt to Hunza, and so much further as seems necessary, possibly to Gircha – a point where the roads from the Kilik Mintaka and Shimshal passes join; finally that as tributaries of the British Government, they will be expected to give any aid in their power. 9. If the Chiefs refuse to allow the roads to be made, they should be informed that there is no question of their having any choice in the matte, that the roads must be made and that unless they instantly comply with our demands, troops will enter the country and the roads will be constructed in spite of them.
10. In this case, or in the case of the Hunza and Nagar Chiefs collection their forces with a view of preventing the construction of the Chalt Fort, I think an immediate move should be made across the frontier, and all opposition broken down. It would then be advisable to depose the ruler of Hunza, and to substitute his son, a boy of five or six years old, under the guidance of the ex-Wazir of Hunza, now a refugee in Chitral, who is ready to throw in his lot with us. Uzr Khan, the eldest surviving son of the Raja of Nagar, who is extremely badly disposed towards us, should also be removed from Nagar, and one of the younger sons of the Raja, or one of his grandsons, recognized as the heir. Steps should then be taken to establish a system of guarding the passes, and certain positions might be prepared for defence. It would probably be unnecessary to do more than this. In the case of Nagar, it may be necessary to remove Uzr Khan even if no resistance is offered. He is dangerous to the ruling Chief, who would be glad to get rid of him.

A. DURAND, - Lt. Col.,
British Agent at Gilgit,
Simla,
The 14th Sept. 1891.
From the Government of India in the foreign and Political Department, demi official letter no. D-6187-35, dated the 31st December 1935 (recd. The 4th January 1936).
_________________

In this connection attention is solicited to S. Nos. (11) and (12) or corrs. in the marginally noted file. As the Trans-Indus portion of the Gilgit Wazarat over which civil and military administration has been assumed by the viceroy and Governor-General of India is on a lease for a fixed period of 60 years, and of it 1 specifically provided in article 1 of the agreement that the said territory shall continue to be included within the dominions of H.H. the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, the portion in question should certainly be shown as a leased enclave inside Kashmir State territory as suggested in Para 3 of Colonel Campbell’s letter to the Government of India, dated the 25th November 1935. The Government of India may be informed accordingly. A copy of Mr. Caroe’s letter under consideration, together with our reply thereto, may be forwarded to the Political Agent, Gilgit, for information. Two drafts submitted for approval.
From the Political Agent, Gilgit
……………….
letter no. 596/38 , dated 2nd / 4th February, 1935. ___________

In this connection kindly see S. Nos. (93), (94) & (95) in F.No. 9-C of 1935. Under Article 2 of the Gilgit Agreemen of 1935, Kashmir flag flies in Gilgit throughout the year. Two State flags which were supplied by the Kashmir Government in 1935, have become worn out. The P.A. Gilgit has requested the Kashmir Government may be ask to supply two more. Draft submitted for approval.
Copy of a letter from the Director, Map Publican Survey of India. Calcutta, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, New Delhi, No. 3515/S., dated the 25th November 1935.
__________

Subject :- Gilgit
__________

1. With reference to Notification no. 452-X, dated the 1st August 1935. I have the honour to refer you to your letter no. F 71-X/28, dated the 18the December 1938 and to enquire whether the portion of the Gilgit Wazarat over which civil and military administration has been assumed should continue to be shown on Survey of India maps as being in Kashmir State or should be included in Gilgit agency, which for the purposes of our mapping, we treat as a separate province. 2. Apart from the small tracts leased from or assigned by Indian States to the Government of India for use as cantonments we have no parallel case which might form a precedent. The civil and criminal jurisdiction and all other powers of administration in the Quetta District and Niabats and the Bolan Pass were ceded to the British Government by the Khan of Kalat under an agreement dated the 8th June 1883 and these areas are treated as being parts of the Province of Baluchistan in which they fall. But in these two cases the cession is for an indefinite period whereas in the case of the Gilgit sub-division the lease is for a fixed term and it is specifically provided that the said territory shall continue to be included within the dominions of H.H. the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir.
3. If you do not consider that the Quetta District and
…………………..
should be treated as precedents, then the Gilgit and Bolan Pass should be treated as precedents, then the Gilgit sub-division can be shown as a leaded enclave inside
……………………………
territory in the same way as Bangalore
………………… …………………………………

Confidential
No. F. 9-C/35
From,
Lieutenant Colonel L.E. Lang, C.I.E., M.C., Resident in Kashmir.
To,
The Secretary to the Government of India,
In the External Affairs Department,
Simla.
Dated Srinagar, the 10th May 1937.
Sir,
I have the honour to refer to the correspondence ending with telegram from the Government of India in the late Foreign and Political Department, No. 891, dated the 5th April 1935, on the subject or ratification of the Agreement in regard to the taking over by the Government of India of the administration of that portion of the Gilgit Wazarat which lies beyond the right bank of the river Indus.
2. The Kashmir Government have asked that the birthday of the Shri Yuvraj of Kashmir may be observed in Gilgit with the same customary honours as are observed in other parts of the State. I would strongly recommend the request of the Kashmir Government. I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient servant
Lieutenant Colonel
Resident in Kashmir

MEMORANDUM ON THE FUTURE OF THE GILGIT AGENCY
INTRODUCTION
The Gilgit Agency has now been in existence for forty years. When it was founded in 1889 the conditions were entirely different from these of the present time. A marked change in the attitude of the Kashmir State towards the existing political arrangements in the Agency has made it necessary that the whole position should be carefully examined and that an attempt should be made to find a solution of the local difficulties which have unfortunately been of frequent occurrence since 1922. In this memorandum it is proposed first to give the history of the Gilgit Agency secondly to explain the nature of the difficulties which have arisen and finally to suggest a solution which it is hoped will be equally satisfactory to the imperial Government, the Kashmir State and the local political authority.
Section I.
The History of the Agency
2. The early history of the tract of country now known as the Gilgit Agency is veiled in obscurity. The locus classicus is Chapter XIX of Drew’s monumental work. “The Jammu and Kashmir Territories” published in 1875. All subsequent writers have founded their observations on that chapter and I have been unable to find any other author who has thrown any fresh light on the subject.
In 1842 the Sikhs, who then ruled Kashmir, entered the Gilgit Wazarat at the request of Karim Khan, brother of the Raja of Gilgit whose life had been taken, and kingdom usurped, by Gauhar Aman of Yasen. Before that date the history of Gilgit had been for about thirty years a confusing series of invasions, usurpations and murders, of which it would be unprofitable and useless to give details in this memorandum. The Sikhs defeated Gauhar Aman and established themselves in Gilgit. Gauhar Aman however turned, and himself defeated the Sikhs with great loss. Reinforcements were sent up at once but before they arrived negotiations were entered into, “with the strange result that it was agreed that the Sikhs should hold Gilgit and that Gauhar Aman should give his daughter in marriage to Nathu Shah, the commander of the Sikhs” Karim Khan was installed as Raja of the tract of country which is now the Gilgit Tahsil but the Sikhs remained and the real power passed from the hands of the nominal ruler.
3. In 1846 the British armies had broken the Sikh power and the treaty of Amritsar was signed, in accordance with which Kashmir (which of course included Gilgit) was transferred to Maharaja Gulab Singh. Thus the Jammu Ruling Family came into possession of Gilgit. But the Maharaja held it only for six years. In 1852 it was reconquered by the people of Yasen under their chief, Gauhar Aman and was held by them till 1860 when Gauhar Aman’s death and local intrigues enable the Maharaja to recover it. During these eight year the Maharaja’s troops had held the line of the Indus but they now advanced beyond Gilgit and penetrated as far as Yasen which they took. It was however no part of their plan, to hold it, and after a few days they retired to Gilgit. Desultory hostilities continued till 1863 when the Kashmir troops again invaded Yasen and subdued it with great severity, a complete and lasting defeat which finally cowed the Yasen leaders. The State forces indeed at once retired to their old boundary but for a few years Yasen was in some sense tributary, that is, the chiefs sent their agents to Jammu with presents and were anxious to keep on good terms with the Maharaja. The next disturbance was in 1866, when the Gilgit authorities found the State of Hunza such a thorn in the side that they marched upon it. They were however compelled to retreat and this sign of weakness roused the whole country. The tribes collected from all sided and besieged Gilgit fort; but melted away at the approach of from all sides and besieged Gilgit fort; but melted away at the approach of reinforcement from Kashmir. The State forces thereupon embarked on a punitive expedition into the Darel Valley. The principal Darelis made their submission and the Kashmir force retired. Since that time the Kashmir troops except for a few unimportant reverses, have maintained themselves without serious opposition and have consolidated the power of the State throughout the Gilgit Wazarat. Beyond the frontier of the Wazarat the political control of the Kashmir State was only nominal and it was not until the Gilgit Agency was re-established that the political districts realizing that the power of the Imperial Government was behind the State, were brought under effective military control. It will be seen later that even after the arrival of the Imperial representative Hunza and Nagar risked one last challenged and that they were not subdued until they had been defeated in battle by a mixed force of Imperial and State force led by British officers.
4. Nothing of any particular political importance occurred for nearly a decade after the disturbances of 1866 described in the previous paragraph. Early in 1873 however the Government of India received information from the Maharaja that the Russians were trying to establish themselves at Sarikol; and that they had made overtures to one of his subjects, who had been trading in Yarkand, designed apparently to open negotiations with the Kashmir Darbar. This was the first intimation of the Russian menace which was for many years to loom large and to stimulate the watchful interest of the Government of India on events in the Hindu Kush and beyond it.
5. It was because of this ever present menace that in 1876 the Government of India determined to acquire through the Maharaja of Kashmir “an efficient control over the passes of the Hindu Kush between the eastern confines of Afghanistan and the North Western Frontier of Kashmir”. It was anticipated that the Maharaja, supported by the British Government would be able to gain in this country sufficient influence and control to enable the Government of India “in course of time of make such political and military arrangements as will effectually command the passes of the Hindu Kush.
6. Negotiations were therefore opened with the Kashmir State for the posting of a political officer at Gilgit “for the purpose of obtaining information as to the progress of events beyond the Kashmir frontier”. The Viceroy conducted these negotiations personally with the Maharaja who readily agreed to the proposal but asked for assurances that the political officer should exercise “no interference in any affair affecting trade or my administration, or any matte regarding my subjects, officials and servants”. In a kharita dated the 22nd December 1876 to the Maharaja Lord Lytton gave the assurances asked for. He added “I beg frankly to reassure Your Highness that the appointment has been proposed by me solely with a view to extend the influence and strengthen the power of Your Highness’ Government on the frontier and in no wise to weaken the authority or lower the dignity of your rule, which it is the wish, as well as the interest, of the British Government to support and uphold.
7. Captain J. Biddulpa was accordingly appointed in the 22nd September 1877 “Officer on Special duty at Gilgit”, and his letter of instructions contained inter alia, the following sentences. “The duty with which ……………………. Charges is to endeavor with the co-operation of His …………………………… Your Highness officials, to collect and furnish reliable intelligence ……. the progress of events beyond the Kashmir frontier * * * * * You will endeavour, in consultation with the Kashmir authorities, to cultivate friendly relations with the tribes beyond the border in view to bringing them gradually unde the control and influence of Kashmir; but you will on no account interfere with the internal administration of the Maharaja’s territories or encourage complaints against his Government.”
8. Captain Biddulph’s appointment was not a success. In a few weeks he found himself surrounded by a network of local intrigues. He was apparently quite unable to cope with such tactics and he seems to have been grievously wrong in his judgment of the character and capacity of the chiefs and other with whom he came in contact. He visited Chitral and other places of local importance and wrote voluminous reports, but his efforts to establish peace and confidence proved vain. Towards the end of October 1880 a serious tribal rising took place in the Agency. Pahlwan Bahadur ruler of Yasen, and father of the present Governor of that district, aided by Hunza attacked the fort of Sherkilla, 24 miles from Gilgit. Captain Biddulph accompanied the Kashmir troops to the relief of this fort, but the force was threatened with the cutting of its communications and had to retreat to Gilgit where it was invested (and Captain Biddulph with it) by Pahlwan Bahadur. He however raised the siege a few days later on hearing that his own State of Yasen had been seized behind his back by Nizam-ul-Mulk of Chitral. The disturbances then subsided and Captain Biddulph was ordered to return to India, his place being taken as a temporary measure by Colonel Tanner.
9. The crisis at Gilgit gave an opportunity of reconsidering the existing policy. It was felt that no useful purpose would be served by maintaining the appointment, as none of the objects with which it had been made had been attained. Captain Biddulph therefore did not go back to Gilgit and Colonel Tanner was withdrawn in July 1881. The Agency had been in existence nearly four years. When the decision to withdraw was communicated to the Maharaja it was made clear to him that the Government of India reserved to itself “full discretion to send back a British Officer to Gilgit, if this should hereafter appear desirable.
10. The withdrawal of the Gilgit Agency marked not so much a change of policy as a change of plan. And the gist of the plan was “to leave the local management of affairs on the Northern frontiers in the hands of the Kashmir Darbar, at the same time requiring them to keep us accurately informed of the course of events in that direction, and to consult the British Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir on matters affecting the relations of Kashmir with any of the neighboring States. 11. For four years matters remained in this condition. The next event of importance occurred in 1885 when the Hunza-Nagir forces attacked Nomal, a for 17 miles off Gilgit. They were repulsed but not without loss to the State troops. Meanwhile the Russian menace was again causing grave apprehension to the Empire and it was felt that a more again satisfactory settlement of the Hindu-Kush country must be undertaken. Colonel Lockhart was therefore sent with a mission to Gilgit, which penetrated as far as Kafiristan and successfully collected a vast quantity of important strategic and political information. One of the recommendations made by Colonel Lockhart was that the Gilgit Agency should be re-established.
12. In October 1887 the Resident in Kashmir was informed that Colonel Lckhart’s conclusions had been accepted and that in the opinion of the Government of India the time had come for establishing on the North West Frontier of Kashmir and effective political control which would enable the Government of India to watch the passes of the Hindu Kush and country beyond, and a military organization sufficient both to control the Chiefships over the border, and also to check, in the event of war with Russia any demonstration towards the passes not backed by a respectable force. To secure these results it was thought that the Gilgit Agency must in some shape be restored. 13. As a preliminary measure Captain Algerhon Durand was, with the full consent of the Maharaja dispatched to Gilgit in July 1888 to report on the local situation, which was at that time somewhat delicate, as the Kashmir troops had just been driven out of Chaprot a fort in Nagir territory, by the combined forces of Hunza and Nagir. These forces had subsequently advanced and were besieging Nomal. (Shortly after theis the Hunza-Nagir forces retired of their own accord, and Chaprot was re-occupied by the State troops). Captain Durand spent the summer of 1888 in Gilgit and Chitral. He returned in November and submitted a voluminous report entitled “The present Military Position in Gilgit”. This report was forwarded to the Home Government in May 1889 with a recommendation for the re-establishment of the Gilgit Agency. The Government of India said “The advance of Russia up to the frontier of Afghanistan, and the great recent development of her military resources in Asia, have admittedly increased the necessity for strengthening every point in our line of defence, and among the points requiring special attention are the northern passes of the Hindu Kush, which afford a difficult but not impracticable route for a force large enough to cause much excitement, if nothing worse, in Kashmir and among the tribes of Bajaur. We cannot afford to disregard this risk. Further we can not afford to permit any foreign power to establish in time of peace its influence in the country, and there are indications that not only the Russians but also the Afghans and Chinese have of late attempted to tamper with some of the small chiefships in this quarter which are feudatories of Kashmir. We can not permit such attempts to continue, and the sooner we take steps to prevent them the easier it will be to do so.”
* * * * The Kashmir Army is being organized, and we hope before long to have within the State a force of about 4000 well disciplined and well armed troops, instead of the useless rabble which has hitherto been maintained. Altogether there are many strategical frontier, and many circumstances which seem to assure us that we may with reasonable certainty count upon a favourable result” 14. In May 1889 the Kashmir Darbar was officially informed by the Resident of the intention of re-establishing the Agency. The proposal was gladly accepted by the State and Raja Amar Singh, Prime Minister in as letter informed the Resident as follows :-
I have the pleasure to enclose the accompanying copy of a Resolution passed unanimously on the subject of defending the Northern Frontier of Cashmere, and would, with your permission, supplement it by detailing briefly the reasons which have induced the State Council to approach Government with an application that the Kashmir Darbar may be allowed to bear the entire cost of the scheme in contemplation of Government. You are aware that the Kashmir Darbar has all along been unswerving in its loyalty and attachment to the British Crown-and being an important Frontier State it is incumbent on it to help the Paramount Power by at least defending its own frontier – and I dare say you will impress on the Government of India, that the present application unostentatiously pretends to prove indeed our sentiments of loyalty and an earnestness to co-operate with the means within our reach for the common cause of defending the British Empire from foreign aggression” The Government of India warmly thanked the Darbar for this offer but said that they would not throw upon the State the charge of the political officer’s pay. 15. The Home Government sanctioned the proposals of the Government of India and Captain Durand was selected to re-establish the Agency. He arrived in Gilgit on the 21st July 1889.
16.
………..
unnecessary to say much more about the history of the Agency, ……… of its existence there have been vicissitudes, petty wars, ……………… but peace has now for many years been firmly established …………about the country. The last occasion when there was a serious out-break was in 1891 when the Mirs of Hunza and Nagir were informed that the Government of India intended to open up their country by the construction of roads. This aroused their suspicions and they assumed a hostile attitude and threatened the fort of Chalt. A force advanced from Gilgit consisting of 12 British officers and 1,131 rank and file of whom almost exactly half were Kashmir troops. The Hunza and Nagir forces were defeated. The rebellious Mir of Hunza fled to Turkestan and the present ruler was set up in his stead, while the eldest son of the Mir of Nagir who had been actively concerned in the hostilities was deported to Kashmir as a political prisoner. 17. The designation of the political officer at Gilgit was changed in November 1896 from “British Agent at Gilgit” to “Political Agent in Gilgit”.

Section -II
Description of the component parts of the Agency with some account of each.
18. The Gilgit Agency now includes:-
(1) The Gilgit Wazarat which is made up of the Tahsil of Gilgit and the Niabat of Astor.
(2) The Punial Jagir.
(3) The States of Hunza and Nagir.
(4) The Governorships of Yasen, Koh-Ghizar and Ishkoman.
(5) The republican communities of Chilas.
(6) A region of independent territory.
19. The Gilgit Wazarat : - The history of the Wazarat of Gilgit has already been given in Section 1 above. It is Kashmir State territory and is governed by a State official of the rank of Wazir-i-Wazarat. A regular land revenue system is in force and there is in fact. Nothing except the presence of the Political Agent to distinguish it from the many other settled districts of the State. An account of the relations between the Political Agent and the Kashmir State officials will be given later. It is a subject of some importance.
20. Punial : - Eighteen miles above Gilgit the Punial district begins. The district has a length of 33 miles up the main valley and 18 miles up the Ishkoman valley, which joins the main valley from the North. It contains the villages which go to make up the Jagir of Khan Bahadur Raja Muhammad Anwar Khan, who belongs to the Burshe family of the Khushwakts. In some former century, one Shah Burush was appointed Governor of Punial by his brother, the Khushwakt Mehtar. The records on the point are vague but it would appear that the Burshe almost at once repudiated the suzerainty of the elder branch. Gauhar Aman, Mehtar of Yasen, possessed himself of Punial in 1841, but after his death his son was driven out of the country by the troops of the Maharaja who restored the district to its former and rightful rulers. Punial continued to be a bone of contention between the rulers of Gilgit and Yasen, but finally in 1860 it came into the possession of the Maharaja of Kashmir who in return for services rendered in the wars which finally established State rule on the right bank of the Indus, conferred the district in Jagir on Raja Isa Bahadur. Raja Isa Bahadur was succeeded by his on Raja Muhammad Akbar who rendered great services to Captain Durand. In 1904 however he abetted the murder of two of his subjects. He was tried by the Wazir-i-Wazarat of Gilgit and was found guilty. The Government of India with the concurrence of the State, deprived him of the Jagir. He was interned in Kashmir and was succeed by his son, Mohammad Anwar Khan during whose minority the estate was managed by Raja Sifat Bahadur. Mohammad Anwar Khan’s minority came to an end in 1917. 21. Though Punial is a Jagir, pure and simple (it is hereditary and goes by primogeniture, and the Jagirdar also possesses another Jagir in the Kashmir valley itself) in practice State officials do not interfere in its administration and all ordinary cases are dealt with by the Jagirdar. Cases of murder are referred for decision to a Jirgah under the presidency of the Political Agent, appeals against such decisions being forwarded to the Resident in Kashmir who sends them on to the Kashmir Government for final orders. This arrangement has the authority of the Kashmir Government who have the right to apply what criminal procedure they think fit to the district.
22. No tribute is paid by Punial to the State. The Governor receives a subsidy of Rs. 1,600 from the State. During the minority the balance of the revenue after satisfying local needs was paid to the State. The Jagirdar used to receive on behalf of the Maharaja the annual tribute of 4 tolas and 2 mashas of gold dust paid by the inhabitants of the independent district of Darel. The procedure was changed some years ago, when Darel came into possession of the late Raja Pukhton Wali, and the tribute is now received by the Political Agent to be paid into the State treasury at Gilgit. The Jagirdar still receives a nominal tribute of salt from Darel payable to himself. 23. Hunza and Nagir – The States of Hunza and Nagir are of ancient origin. The rulers are said to be descended from twin brothers who lived about the end of the fifteenth century. Hemmed in by lofty mountains they are proud of the independence they have always maintained, and they present the spectacle of a race probably living under almost the same conditions now as their forefather did centuries ago. The Sikh and Dogra Governors of Gilgit found their most troublesome enemies in Hunza, against which country they never gained a single success. Hunza raids against Gilgit villages were incessant, till, in revenge, an expedition was organized in 1848 by Nathu Shah, the first Sikh Governor of Gilgit. Falling into an ambuscade Nathu Shah and Karim Khan, the Raja of Gilgit, were both slain and their army defeated with serious loss.
24. Nagir was always more friendly to Kashmir than Hunza and on several occasions helped the State forces against its rival. About 1867 Nagir began to pay small tribute to a Maharaja receiving in return a yearly subsidy of Rs. 3,000. In 1869 the Hunza Raja sent an agent to Srinagar to open friendly relations. The agent was well received, and Hunza arranged to pay a yearly tribute of two horses, two hounds and twenty ounces of gold dust. The Kashmir Darbar at this time agreed to pay to Hunza a subsidy of Rs. 2,000 a year.
25. It would be tedious to trace the details of the constant squabbles and bickerings which continued with very little cessation between the Gilgit Governors, the Political Officers, and the Rulers of the two States up to 1891. It is necessary to mention only that in 1879 Lord Lytton’s Government, when addressing the Secretary of State on the affairs of this portion of the frontier, said “Our officers in Kashmir will be instructed to discourage and counteract all tendencies of the Kunjot Chiefs (i.e. the Rulers of Hunza and Nagir) towards acknowledgement of any superior authority other than that of the Kashmir Ruler”. Again in 1882 after the withdrawal of the first Gilgit Agency, when it was found that the Kashmir Darbar had failed to acquaint the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir fully with events in Hunza and Nagir, a remonstrance against this neglect stated the views of the Governor General in Conneil as follows :-
“Under the treaty of 1846 the British Government is responsible for the protection of Kashmir and the Government of Kashmir on the other hand, acknowledges British supremacy and engaged to submit to the arbitration of the British Government in cases of dispute with neighboring powers. Moreover when the Political Officer at the Gilgit was withdrawn, it was intimated to the Maharaja in the Viceroy’s letter of 18th June 1881, that the Government of India would expect His Highness to refer to them, through the Officer on Special Duty, all questions of importance connected with his external relations. It cannot therefore, be disputed that the Government of India has a material interest in His Highness relations with the States on his frontier, and that the Maharaja is bound by his engagements to refer to the Governor-General in Council before he adopts any line of action calculated to excite hostile feelings among those States”.
26. The expedition against Hunza and Nagir which took place in 1891 has been briefly described in paragraph 16 above. As a result of that expedition the two States were entirely subdued and opportunity was taken to define quite clearly what the relations of the Rulers of Hunza and Nagir to the State and the British Government were in future to be. They both accepted Sanads from His Highness the Maharaja in which His Highness stated that “with the approval and authority of the Governor-General in Council”, he had resolved to appoint them Rajas of Hunza and Nagir, respectively. The Sanads went on to recite :-
“The chiefship will be hereditary in your family and will descent in the direct line of primogeniture, provided that in each case the succession is approved by the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir for the time being and by the Government of India. * * * * Further you are informed that the permanence of the grant conveyed by this Sanad will depend upon the ready fulfillment by you and your successors of all orders given by the Jammu and Kashmir State, with regard to the conducts of relations between the State of Nagir/Hunza and the states and tribes adjoining it, the administration of your territory, the construction of roads through your country, the composition of such troops as you may be permitted to retain, and any other matters in which the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir for the time being may be pleases to intervene. Be assured that so long as your house is loyal to the State of Jammu and Kashmir and to this Sanad, you and your successors will enjoy favour and protection.
27. By the same Sanads an annual tribute was imposed on Hunza of 16 tolas and 5 mashas of gold, and on Nagir of 17 tolas and 1 masha. This tribute is presented to the Political Agent, Gilgit, at the annual Jalsah Darbar in the spring and is carried down to Srinagar by representatives of the Mirs. The Maharaja gives return presents. The Hunza and Nagir Mirs enjoy annual subsidies of Rs 4000 each, Rs 2500 of which is paid by the Government of India and Rs 1500 by the Kashmir State. No interference is exercised either by the Political Agent or the Gilgit Wazir-i-Wazarat in the internal administration of the two States. In external affairs the Mirs are expected to consult the Political Agent.
28. The Mir of Hunza sends an annual present to the Chinese authorities in Kashgar and receives a present in exchange. He also had certain rights of cultivation in the Raskam. Valley and levies certain grazing fees in the Taghdumbash Pamir, both of which places are in Chines Turkestan. There is a long history attached to Hunza’s relations with China and the Home Government and the Government of India have always displayed particular interest in this question, which is regarded as the special concern of the Imperial Government. It should be mentioned that at the installation ceremony of the present Mir of Hunza in 1892 two Chinese envoys attended the Darbar as honoured guests of the Government of India.
The Governorships of Yasen, Koh-Ghizar and Ishkoman.
29. Up till 1895 the tract of country which now include Yasen, Koh-Ghizar and Ishkoman formed a part of the State of Chitral and was generally ruled by a separate Mehtar subordinate to the Ruler of Chitral itself. The history of the political relations between Kashmir and Chitral is so voluminous and difficult that a book could easily be written on the subject. It is beyond the scope of this memorandum and all that need be said about it is that in 1876 Aman-ul-Mulk. Mehtar of Chitral at the suggestion of the Government of India sought the protection of Kashmir and in the following year an agreement was signed between the two States (with the approval of the Government of India) which served to protect Chitral ……. Afghan aggression. In Section I above it has been related how Gauhar Aman, ruler of Yasen, which then comprised not only the district of that name but also Koh, Ghizar and Ishkoman drove the State troops out of Gilgit and held it for eight years; how after the death of Gauhar Aman, the Kashmir State forces re-took Gilgit and penetrated as far as Yasen, where however they stayed only a short time; how the State troops again invaded Yasen in 1863 and after subduing it retired immediately; how in 1889 Pahlwan Bahadur the ruler of Yasen, led a tribal rising against Gilgit and actually invested the fort; and how he was compelled to raise the siege almost at once because his own district of Yasen had been seized behind his back by the son of Aman-ul-Mulk, Mehtar of Chitral.
30. Pahlwan Bahadur never revored Yasen, but was murdered while in exile in Tangir. With the consent of the Mahraja in his capacity of suzerain of Chitral, Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk partitioned the territory of Yasen between Muhammad Wali, to whom was given Ghizar and Mir Aman who obtained Yasen. This was in 1881. The next few years present a bewildering spectacle of intrigues usurpations, flight and murders. The rulers of these districts or States were left more or less alone to work out their own affairs. Aman-ul-Mulk died in 1892 and there were no less than three Mehtars of Chitral in the next three years. In 1895 there was a grave disturbance which culminated in the British Agent and his escort being besieged in Chitral fort. The siege was raised by the Chitral relief column and the present Mehtar, Shuja-ul-Mulk, was placed on the gadhi of Chitral in the name of the Maharaja of Kashmir as his immediate suzerain, and with the authority and approval of the Government of India. Recent events had forced the Government of India to reconsider the extent of country over which the Mehtar should hold away. It was realized that the circumstances of the Katur country (or Chitral proper) and the Khushwakt tracts (i.e. the districts of Yasen, Kush, Ghizar, Ishkoman and Mustuj) differed materially and the Khushwaktis had frequently declared to the British Agent at Gilgit their desire to have no more Mehtars over them, and to come under the direct management of the Gilgit Agency. In these circumstances the Government of India decided that the Mehtar’s direct control should not extend beyond the Katur country as hitherto understood, and that the British Agent at Gilgit should on behalf of the Kashmir State, appoint and pay the Governors of the Khushwakt country and that their relations should be direct with him. In 1897 it was decided to separate Chitral up to the Shandur and Darkot passes (which included Mustuj) from the Gilgit Agency and to add it to the charge of the Political Agent for Dir and Swat. When the North West Frontier Province was formed in 1902 this Agency, was incorporated in it, and the connection between Chitral and the Kashmir Residency ceased.
31. Yasen thus became a Governorship of the Gilgit Agency. In 1905 Koh Ghizar was joined to Yasen as a single Governorship but was separated …………………………… formed into a separate Governship …………………………….. Wakhan, was in the name of His Highness …………………………….. approval of the Government of India …………….…………… refer all matters of importance for ……………. British Agent.
32. The Governors of these three districts carry on the administration subject to the approval of the Political Agent and hold the rank of paid official. Crimes of a serious nature may be tried by the Political Agent under the Frontier Crimes Regulation or the Indian Penal Code. The revenue of each district is taken by the Governor but a certain amount is credited to the Kashmir Darbar as tribute. The Governors of Yasen and Koh Ghizar receive subsidies of Rs. 1600 from the Kashmir Government and the Governor of Ishkoman a similar sum from the Imperial Government. 33. Chilas :- Chilas is a circular tract of country, the eastern side of which runs for a great distance with the boundary of the Gilgit Wazarat. It consists of eight distinct republican communities inhabiting valleys running up from both banks of the Indus which flows through the middle of the country. In the centre lies the village of Chilas itself. Until about the year 1850 the Chilas used to make occasional expeditions for plunder into the Astor Valley. It was these raids that determined Maharaja Gulab Singh to send a punitive expedition against Chilas in 1850-51. The attack was successful. The fort was captured and dismantled and a small tribute of gold dust was imposed; but the country was not occupied and was never made subject to the Maharaja. No authority was ever exercised over the county and no Kashmir official appears to have penetrated into it. Before attacking Chilas the Maharaja indirectly obtained the consent of the Board of Administration at Lahore and he informed the Board of the result and received their congratulations on his success. This expedition had the effect of frightening the Chilasis into good behavior and the annual tribute was subsequently brought in and presented regularly year by year. 34. The re-establishment of the Gilgit Agency in 1889 had the effect of making the Chilasis very restless. At that time the only connection which the State maintained with the inhabitants was a news writer stationed at Chilas. The Chilasis however expelled him in 1891 and about the same time committed two murders in the Astor Tahsil. Nothing that the British Agent could do would remove their suspicion and hostility, but the succeeded in establishing friendly relations with the republic of Gor, the district nearest to Bunji, the inhabitants of which were of a less turbulent disposition than those further to the west. A deputation of the people of Gor came to Gilgit in November 1892 and accepted a Sand in which “in the name of the Government of His Highness the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir” they were promised “in consideration of their opening their country to the officials and troops of His Highness the Maharaja and giving assistance to British Officers traveling of Gor that they would never be asked to pay revenue or any increased tribute or to do “kar beggar”. The Sanad was signed by the Governor of Gilgit and the British Agent. 35. When the Gor deputation returned, Dr. Robertson, the Assistant British Agent, with a small escort accompanied them in order to establish friendly relations with the Chilasis generally. On arrival, however, this off and it was decided that Chilas must be held for strategic reasons. A second and more serious attack in March 1893 was repulsed a fort was built, a garrison of Kashmir troops permanently mending these arrangements to the Home Government the Government of India said “We have now ascertained that Colonel Durand did not intend to propose the actual annexation of Chilas (i.e. to Kashmir) but the establishment of effective control over the State, as in the case of Hunza and Nagir with the internal administration of which Kashmir officials are not permitted to interface. We agree that it will be sufficient without altering the political status of Chilas to authorize the British Agent at Gilgit to make conditions with the Chilasis on behalf of the Darbar, whereby while the autonomy of Chilas is preserved as an act of leniency and subject to future good behavior the relations between the Kashmir State and Chilas will be placed on a satisfactory footing.
To this proposal the Secretary of State for India in September 1893 replied “Your proposals * * * * on the future relations of the Chilasis with Kashmir * * * * have my approval”. 36. In 1897 certain lands which had been taken from the Chilasis, after the disturbances of 1893, were given back to them, and the whole system of tribute paid by the Chilas district to the State was revised and a new scheme sanctioned, with the acquiescence of the State. In accordance with this the valleys were to pay small fixed sums to the State. This is practically the arrangement that is in force today.
37. In 1896 the Government of India emphasized the necessity for regarding the internal administration as belonging to the Chilas headmen and not to the Political Officer. In 1897 a proposal to invest the Assistant Political Agent with civil jurisdiction was rejected by the Government of India, but in 1901 he was invested with certain criminal powers to enable him to deal with murders and other serious cases, but he was cautioned that these powers must be used very sparingly and that in general all cases that could be settled by tribal custom must be referred to a tribal Jirga.
38. As to the relationship between the State and Chilas the Political Agent, Gilgit, in 1901 wrote as follows :
“Neither the local policy nor that of the Government of India towards Chilas, in respect of Kashmir rights over Chilas, seems to me to have been uniform in the past. In certain cases. (1) gold washing fees (2) octroi regulations, (3) tribute or revenue (4) treasury arrangements, Kashmir States rules and regulations applicable to other portions of the Gilgit district have been extended to Chilas, sometimes by a mere reference to the State Council, whereas in other matters all interference on the part of the State or their officials is carefully excluded. Similarly the Government of India have held themselves in the past responsible for the entire cost of certain classes or expenditure, (i.e. pay of Political officer, the Babusar-Ramghat road the Chilas fort and buildings, but have allowed the State to as the payment of levies, local and district public works, and the civil subordinate establishments necessary for the political administration of the tract. These however, mainly relate to whay may be classed as fiscal and municipal administration and are politically unimportant. No inconvenience by anything which was been done so far need arise because the position between the Imperial Government and the State regarding Chilas is sufficiently understood and recognized by the State local authorities in Gilgit for all practical purposes”.
The above account is not now strictly accurance, e.g. the public works are now almost exclusively paid for out of Imperial funds.
39. The region of Independent Territory :- The Independent Territory which lies to the South and West of the Gilgit Agency falls naturally into two portions, (1) that portion bordering on Koh Ghizar, Punial the Gilgit Wazarat and Chilas which has some political connection, however slight with those areas and (2) the regions known as Kandia and the Indus Kohistan which are a ……………… incagrita and have no connection whatever with Kashmir but are merely included in the Gilgit Agency as a matter of political convenience. No political officer has ever entered these regions and little is known of them except that they contain a certain amount of valuable forest. 40. The valleys which have some political connection with Gilgit are Darel, Tangir, Kandia and Seo on the right bank of the Indus and Harban Sazin and Jalkit on the left, and of these the two of any importance are Darel and Tangir. It has been related in paragraph 3 above how the Kashmir forces in 1866 embarked on a punitive expedition into Darel. Since then the State has received an annual tribute from the inhabitants of 4 tolas and 2 mashas of gold. This tribute is sent by the hand of representative of Darel to the Political Agent. The Political Agent credits the gold dust into the treasury and dismisses the Darelis with customary presents. The Darelis also pay a small tribute of salt to the Raja of Punial.
The neighboring Valley of Tangir was of old tributary to Yasen, and for many years past The Tangiris have been in the habit of affording an asylum to fugitive member of the ruling family of Yasen. A nazarana or tribute of a small quantity of salt and gold dust was for many years received by the Governor of Yasen from Tangir, but was stopped when the late Raja Pukhtun Wali made himself Raja of Tangir and Daral.
41. The Daralis and Tangiris graze vast number of animal in Punial and Koh Ghizar during the summer and pressure can be, and very often is, put on them by blockade of their person and animal to secure reparation for murders and other forms of lawlessness committed whit in the limits of the political distrcts. The action Agent, Gligit and the Assistant Political Agent, Chilas, exercise the powers of a Deputy Commissioner and the Resident in Kashmir those of a Commissioner.

SECTION-III
Constitutional position of the parious areas in the Agency
42. Foreign Department letter No. 1800-F., dated the 24th July 1901, conferred on the Political Agent, Gilgit and the Assistant Political Agent, Chilas, certain powers of criminal jurisdiction “ in the territories known as Chilas Ghizar, Koh, Yasen and Ishkoman * * * * which though under the suzerainty of Kashmir, are not Kashmir territory and with the internal administration of which Kashmir official are not allowed to interfere ”. This dictum has ever since been regarded by the local Political authorities as the cardinal principal governing all their action and policies. It has however never been accepted by the Kashmir Government in writing though they appear to have acquiesced in it until lately sub silentio. 43. The Kashmir Government indeed were not even informed of it by the Residency until four years letter. In May 1905 when asked to give their formal approval to a change of Governors in Ishkoman, the Darbar asked for full information as to the status, jurisdiction, etc., of these functionaries, and they showed plainly that they disliked being asked to give their approval, as a matter of form to measures the reason for which were not fully explained to them. Again a month later, in June 1905, when a question of serviced of summons in civil suits in the political districts was being discussed the Vice President of the Council wrote :- “ It world be convenient if the outlying districts be separately marked on a map, copy of which may be furnished to the Darbar, with a view to show the exact extent to territory in respect of which a distinction is to be made from the other territories of the state (the underlying is mine) * * * * If the object of the procedure rules be to prescribe a simple procedure for the trial of civil suits for such classes of people, the object. His Highness thinks could better be secured otherwise than by the rules proposed which serve to convey the impression that there is a difference in the central ……… as governing the settled districts and that which rules over the unsettled districts”.
44. It was then thought necessary that state be apprised of the letter was sent to the Vice President as follows-
“In 1900 the Resident Sir A Talbot recommended that the jurisdiction of the Kashmir Darbar should be extended to Chilas * * * * to enable the Darbar to exercise suzerainty in a practical manner. The Government of India however * * * * expressly laid down that * * * * Chilas Ghizar Koh, Yasen and Ishkoman though under the suzerainty of Kashmir are not Kashmir territory and Kash- administration. * * * * * The general policy of the Government of India towards these petty States is to allow the people to govern themselves as far as possible. British officers interfering only when it is imperatively necessary that they should do so.
Such being the circumstances, the Resident trusts, that the Kashmir Darbar will agree with him that further discussion of this question would be unprofitable. 45. Nothing more has been heard of this question, but the Kashmir Government, are evidently not convinced that the position a stated above is correct, for only a few months ago in discussing the question of service of summons in the political districts it was stated :- “As both the settled and unsettled tracts are part and parcel of the Jammu and Kashmir State, the principle laid down by the law * * * * should be followed * * * * * * “.
46. As there is nothing on record on this Residency office to show on what grounds the Government of India based their dictum that Chilas, Ghizar, Koh, Yasen and Ishkoman are not Kashmir territory, it is difficult for me to discuss this question. But it is permissible to observe that this claim might be difficult to sustain if it were subjected to legal examination. It is quite certain that these districts are not British territory and equally certain that they are not independent territory for their rulers are merely permanent officials who are appointed and removed by executive orders of the Government of India after obtaining the concurrence of the Kashmir State. If then they are not Kashmir territory, what is their legal status ? On every map of these regions that has ever been issued officially or otherwise, they are shown as being within the borders of Kashmir. It is possible that Chitral might put forward some shadowy claims to them, for they were once ruled by members of the Chitral family and the present Mehtar has not altogether dropped the idea of their reincorporation in his State; but as shown in paragraph 30 above, these districts were cut away entirely from Chitral 35 years ago and it was apparently intended that this severance should be for all time and that Chitral should never again exercise any ruling powers in the country as the people had “frequently declared their desire to have no more Mehtars over them”. In view of the fact that the whole Gilgit case is now under consideration. I have not thought it proper to enter into controversy at the present time with the State upon their claim that these tracts are “part and parcel of the Jammu and Kashmir State”. If the change I am about to advocate is accepted the point will be of little more than academic interest, but it certainly seems desirable that if and when the new arrangements are introduced, the real constitutional position should be laid down in consultation with the State and be explained in a carefully reasoned communication and that the blunt language which has been used in the past should not be repeated. Apart from the fact that Hunza and Nagir are semi independent States. (perhaps it would be more correct to describe them as “Chiefships”) and that by the plain terms of their sanads they owe a divided allegiance to the British Government and to the Maharaja of Kashmir a careful perusal of the historical facts in Section II would seem to point to the supposition that not only Hunza and Nagir but also Chilas, Koh-Ghizar, Yasen and Ishkoman are “part and parcel” of Kashmir only in the same sense as Kashmir itself is part and parcel of India, and that so long as they behave themselves they are as little subject to interference from Kashmir as Kashmir itself is from the Government of India. I do not for a moment think that the State has the faintest desire to interfere with them and I am convinced that the State will respect their rights as scrupulously as we ourselves do. What the State does resent is that there should be an outside intermediary between it and its feudatories. The aim that must be kept steadfastly in view is that petty interference by irresponsible State officials should once for all the excluded from all these districts whatever the future political arrangements may be for on this without doubt depends the happiness of the rulers of the political districts and chiefships and the peace of these frontier tracts. It should be mentioned that Punial is State territory and differs to this extent from the other political districts.

SECTION IV
The Jurisdiction of the Political Agent Gilgit and the Assistant Political Agent, Chilas 47. The Political Agent, Gilgit, has criminal jurisdiction through out the Gilgit Agency over European British subjects, Europeans, Americans, Japanese and British subjects accused of having committed offences conjointly with European British subjects; and the Assistant Political Agent, Chilas has similar jurisdiction in Chilas. In the Gilgit Wazarat the State Courts under very recent orders normally exercise criminal jurisdiction over British Indian subjects and Government servants on the understanding that the Government of India reserve to themselves the general right to claim the trial of such persons if and when circumstances would appear to warrant such action. 48. In Chilas and the Political districts however, which are outside the Gilgit Wazarat, the Political Agent and Assistant Political Agent exercise criminal jurisdiction over Indian British subjects and are also Deputy Commissioners for the purpose of the Frontier Crimes Regulations, under Foreign Department letter No. 1800-F, dated the 24th July 1901. The powers conferred by this letter relate to criminal proceedings in respect of all persons other than European British subjects and persons jointly charged with European British subjects. These powers are only to be used when their employment is really required, and the orders given are not intended to authorize any general interference with tribal authority or jurisdiction.
Neither the Political Agent nor the Assistant Political Agent have any powers of civil jurisdiction except those under Section 8 of Frontier Crimes Regulation. In the political districts such cases are settled according to local custom and in the Wazarat according to State law by the local judicial authority.
49. Proposals have on several occasions in the past been made for the extension of the jurisdiction of the Political officers in the Agency, but without success. In 1897 the Government of India refused to sanction a recommendation that the Assistant Political Agent, Chilas should be invested with civil powers. Again in 1915 the Resident rejected a proposal made by the Political Agent Gilgit, that all cases in which any members of the frontier tribes were complainants or plaintiffs and the accused or defendants were Kashmiris should be tried in the Court of the Assistant Political Agent, Chilas.
In 1912 His Highness the Maharaja agreed to an officer and some sepoys of the State troops who were jointly accused with the Chilas Agency Treasure of misappropriating money from the Chilas State Treasury being tried by the Political Agent, Gilgit. The Maharaja assented to this reluctantly and only after expressing the view that the case ought to be tried by the Political Agent and the Wazir-i-Wazarat of Gilgit sitting as a joint court.

SECTION V
The relations between the Political Agent and the Wazir-i-Wazarat 50. Since the re-establishment of the Agency no question has given more trouble than that of the relations between the Political Agent and the Wazir-i-Wazarat and the degree of control claimed by the Political Agent over the affairs and after 40 years the position is still far from satisfactory. When Colonel Parry Nisbett gave his views on the general proposal to re-establish the Agency he wrote :-
“The Officer in charge * * * should, I think, have a very considerable and active share in the control and Government of the country. This would b best secured, no doubt by the Maharaja of Kashmir conferring the post of Governor of Gilgit on the Political Officer in charge, but I fear this he would never consent to.”
In sending up their proposals to the Secretary of State the Government of India expressed their views on this point as follows : “The exact position of the officer in charge at Gilgit may require to be further considered hereafter. For the present we propose merely to stipulate that the Kashmir Governor of Gilgit will take no important step in dealing with the Kashmir organization and movements of the troops his instructions must be followed * * * * No doubt this arrangement is imperfect, and small jealousies and obstructions must be expected; but we hope they may be overcome. The Secretary of State acquiesced in this proposal, and in issuing formal orders to the Resident, the Government of India requested Colonel Parry Nisbett “to invite the attention of the Darbar to the stipulations that the organization and movements of the Kashmir troops in Gilgit must be regulated by his (the British Agent’s) instructions, and that the Governor of Gilgit must take no important steps in dealing with the feudatory States except by his advice. 51. Colonel Parry Nisbett however urged in reply to this that the position of the British Agent at Gilgit in his relation with the local civil and military affairs should be much more strongly laid down. “I should much prefer it being suggested to the Council that if they did not concur in appointing the British Agent at Gilgit as their Governor for the time being or associate an approved official with the British Agent as Joint Commissioner, then the civil official appointed to Gilgit must be approved by the Resident in Kashmir and in all matters the Kashmir Governor of Gilgit should defer to the advice and opinion of the British Agent, subject in cases of doubt or difference to the ultimate decision of the Resident in Kashmir.” The Government of India however refused to agree to any such suggestion. There is nothing to show that Colonel Parry Nisbett took any further action or whether he made any communication at all to the Darbar. All the wrote was "File" on the Foreign Secretary's letter dated the 19th November, 1889.
Extract from the record of discussion of various Gilgit matters between the Resident and Sir Albion Banerji on the 15th, November, 1927.
___________

* * * * * * 15. Sir Albion asked whether these were all the matters at present for consideration. The reply was that there was one lager question which the Resident wished to resevrve for the present until he know what was being done in the North West Frontier Province. This was the question of extending control over Darel, Tangir and certain other parts downstream form Chilas which are at present under no control. This question would largely depend on whether the North West Frontier Province decide to extend their control to include the Indus Kohistan. In that case it might be advisable to establish control over the intervening territory so as to link up with the North West Frontier Province. This would prevent the inhabitants from collecting arms as in the case of the Afridin and Mahsuds, and stop further wholesale deforestation. It also affected Kashmir proper, as the Jalkotis and others in the area referred to periodically raid Kashmir territory. It would also help to prevent Kuth smuggling which goes on at present. Only last year the Assistant Political Agent, Chilas, was instrumental in seizing between Rs. 7000-8000 worth of this commodity and handing it over to the authorities concerned.
D.No. 59-C/28.
D.O. letter from Secy. to the C.C., N.W.F.P.
No. 842-P.S./631 dated 17th March 1928.
For information.
Please see Resident's note of 27.02.28.
Para 7(b) Bir Singh's statement regarding the activities of the A.T.T.Co. and various other papers have been looked u-, also certain books, but there is nothing to show the condition of the forests on the left bank of the Indus. We have no book in our Libraty by Sir Aurel Stiven on Darel and Tangir, and Captain Godfrey's Report contains no information on the subject. Para 7(c) Captain Godfrey's Report contains no information regarding the pilgrim route up the Indus nor have office been able to trace any papers on this subject, unless the footpath which follows the Indus from Darbank, vide map published by the General Staff, is the old pilgrim route. This map shows that there is a footpath from Darband along the left bank of the Indus up to Thakot where it crosses to the right bank thence to a point above Chakai where it recloses to the left bank. It follows the left bank up to Jalkot and again crosses to the right bank and continues for about one mile where it recloses to the left bank. It then follows the left bank all the way to Chilas. Para 10 Captain Godfrey's Report does not show whether Tangir paid tribute during the period 1851 to 1889. According to Lieut Temple's Pracis on these regions is appears that in 18.. the Kashmir troops after its defeat by the Chitralis, Yasenis, Tangiris and Darelis revenged itself on its nearest neighbour, Darel, which they subjugated …………… counts for the payment, by the Darelis of the …………..

Dy. No. 266-C/28
Memo from Political Agent, Gilgit.
No. 98-S/I.16 dated 18th October, 1928.
The information contained in the enclosure to the Political Agent's letter was collected as similar information was asked for by the G. of I. from the Chief Commissioner, N.W.F. Province, in connection with his proposals to take over the independent territory adjoining the N.W.F.P. Although we were not asked by the G. of I. for similar information in regard to the independent territory nominally under the political control of the P.A. Gilgit, it is presumably Resident's intention to pass on to the G. of I. the information collected by Mr. Todd.
Draft submitted.
My dear Sir John, I have an idea that the Chief Commissioner, North West Frontier Province, is of opinion that we should take over, and administer is some form, the area of independent territory lying between the North West Frontier Province, Chitral and the Gilgit Agency. I do not know if the matter is more than a possibility, if it were to be carried out, it would considerably affect the Gilgit Agency, as it would mean taking over Darel, Tangir, Harban and so on. I should, therefore, be very grateful if you could find out whether anything of the sort is contemplated. My own feeling is that the move would be a sound one for two reasons; firstly, that we must not close our eyes to the possibility of Soviet agents reaching this area and creating trouble for us and, secondly, that Darel has become rich on the timber trade (and Tangir may do so) and is gradually being re-armed.
There are some small signs that, provided we only exercised a loose control like that in Chilas, there would not be much real opposition to our taking over these valleys and at present they are not sufficiently well armed to be able to stop us. In a few years time with agents stirring them up and better arms, the position would be very different. Agent from the trouble to an administration of having uncontrolled neighbours. I regard with misgiving the possibility, in the case of hostilities with Afghanistan and/or the Soviet Government, of having an independent area with an irresponsible and easily excited population in our midst. You do doubt appreciated during you tour, that we are much weaker here form the military point of view than appears on paper.
Yours Sincerely
Sir John Wood K.C.V.O., C.S.J.
Resident in Kashmir,
Sialket.

Enclosure No. -1
LETTER FROM THE POLITICAL AGENT IN GILGIT TO THE FIRST ASSISTANT TO THE RESIDENT IN KASHMIR NO. 10 S DATED THE 20TH MARCH, 1926 I have the honour to refer to your endorsement No. 353 dated the 27th January, 1926, in which you inform me that eh Government of India desire a comprehensive statement of the relations in which the various parts of what nominally makes up the Kashmir State stand to the Darbar, to each other and to the Government of India and that they ask for advice whether the position should be more clearly defined.
2. A statement in enclosed showing the relations in which the several states and districts of the Gilgit Agency stand to each other, to the Kashmir Darbar and to the Government of India. A map (with one spare copy) is also enclosed on which I have marked in colour the said States and districts.
3. The Government of India also ask for advice whether the position should be more clearly defined.
I believe that the whole question of the Gilgit Agency requires to be examined a fresh in the right of the Soviet threat from the North, and I therefore venture to make proposals which are of a somewhat wide nature, but which seem justified in view of the anxiety expressed in the Secret demi-official letter no. 364-X, dated the 13th February, 1926, (File no. 364-X of 1925) from the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department to the Resident in Kashmir. 4. The early history of the area which now forms the Gilgit Agency was one of continual warfare between the several States and Communities and of desultory military operations of varying success by the Kashmir State. An Agency was first established under Major Biddulph in 1878 but was withdrawn ; and the present Agency was established in 1889, in order to prevent Russia establishing herself in a position from which she could offer a threat to India. Law and order was imposed roads were constructed arrangements made for feeding and clothing the troops and a proper administration introduced almost solely through the efforts of the British Agent and his staff.
In considering my proposals I would ask you particularly to bear in mind these two points :- Firstly - that the Gilgit Agency was established primarily for strategic reasons, and Secondly - that the Gilgit Agency has been built up almost entirely through the efforts and influence of successive British Agent and their staffs.
5. Conditions both within and without the Agency have changed since it was established, and an organization which was sufficient to meet the Russian menace of a generation ago is no longer fitted to do so.
A reference is requested to the map accompanying this letter. It will be seen that eh Gilgit Agency and Chitral form a wedge driven up between Afghanistan and Chinese, Turkistan and that the point of the wedge is only separated from Russian territory by the narrow Afghan district of Wakhan. If it is to be of value in the defence of India, it seems essential that this wedge should be absolutely ……………………………. but it is not so at present.
There are two definite and serious sources of weakness in the Gilgit Agency :-
(i) the area of independent territory, which lies between the Gilgit Agency, the North West Frontier Province and Chitral and (ii) the existence of a dual control within the Gilgit Agency due to the districts of Gilgit, Bunji and Astor being administered by Kashmir State officials. 6. Independent territory - The area of independent territory is shows on the accompanying map, so far as it concerns the Gilgit Agency, i.e. Darel, Tangir, Harban, Shatial, Sazin and would therefore conveniently form part of the Gilgit Agency but the Jalkotis have dealings both with the Gilgit Agency and with the Hazara Authorities, so that authority over Jalkot would be a matter for enquiry. I am not familiar with the area of the independent or semi-independent territory on the side of the Malakand Agency, and I realize that the question is part of a broad frontier policy of which I can only present the local point of view. I feel, however that the arguments which make me propose taking over Darel etcetera apply with equal force to the whole independent area. So far as it affects the Gilgit Agency, I consider that eh move would be a sound one for two reasons :- firstly, that we must not close our eyes to the possibility or Soviet agents reaching this area creating trouble for us and, secondly, that Darel has become rich on the timber trade (and Tangir may do so) and is gradually being re-armed. Moreover the increasing number of raids by men from the independent territory and the protracted length of the Tangir Blockade are indications that it will be difficult to continue our policy of non interference. There are however some small signs that provided we only exercised a loose control; like that in Chilas, there would not be much rear opposition at present to our taking over these valleys and the inhabitants are not sufficiently well armed to be able to stop us. In a few years time, it the people were to come under hostile influences and were better armed, the position would be very different.
Apart from the trouble to an administration of having uncontrolled neighbours. I regard with misgiving, in the event of hostilities with Afghanistan and or the Soviet Government, the existence of an independent area with an irresponsible and easily excited population in our midst. Assuming Soviet military operations through Afghanistan and a threat from the North and North West of the Gilgit Agency, and also assuming hostile agents inflaming this independent territory and the re-arming of the tribes, it seems to me that there will be grave danger of the success of our defensive operations in Chitral and Gilgit being jeopardized by raids on our long line of communities.
If the independent territory is taken over and administered, it would render safe the alternative route to Gilgit via Abbottabad and the Babusar Pass, the importance of which especially as a winter line of communication was emphasized in paragraphs 12 and 13 of dispatch No. 142 dated the 11th July, 1893, from the Government of India in the Foreign Department to the Secretary of State for India.
7. Control of the Wazarat - The second weakness is the dual control within the Gilgit Agency due to the fact that the Wazarat districts of Gilgit, Bunji and Astor are administered by Kashmir State Officials. At the outset I wish to make it quite clear that I personally have had nothing but courtesy from all the Kashmir State Officials with whom I have come into contact and that I am looking at the question purely from the point of view of the defence of India. The Gilgit Agency, which exists only as a strategic necessity must be considered as a whole; it is clear from its geographical distribution that weakness in any one place (especially along the line of communications) endangers the whole labrie. I am convened that the existence of the Wazarat districts under the control of Kashmir State officials, at the base of the Gilgit Agency is a definite source of weakness from both the military and political point of view and that it would be an error not to remove this weakness if it is possible to do so with out giving off …………………………….

YASEN
In 1895 Yasen was severed from Chitral and formed into a Governorship of the Gilgit Agency. In 1905 Kuh-Ghizar was joined to Yasen as a single Governorship.
When the Governor, Raja Shah Abdur Rahman Khan, was deported to Kashmir in 1911, Yasen and Kuh-Ghizar were formed into separate Governorships.
These changes were made by the Government of India with the concurrence of the Kashmir Darbar. Treaties, Engagements and Sanads 1909, Vol. XI page 263 Letter No. 3220-F, dated 17th August, 1895, from Government of India, Foreign Department to Sir George Robertson, K.C.S.I. Endorsement No. 1671 dated 23rd March, 1905 from Assistant Resident in Kashmir to the Political Agent in Gilgit and endorsement No. 2700 dated the 12th May 1905, from Assistant Resident in Kashmir, to the Political Agent, Gilgit
2. The Governor administers (subject to the approval of the Political Agent) the district and holds the position of a paid official and has nature may be tried by the Political Agent under the Frontier Crimes Regulations or Indian Penal Code. Letter No. 1800-F, dated 24th July, 1901 from Government of India in the Foreign Department to the Resident in Kashmir.
3. The revenue of the district is taken by the Governor, but a certain amount is credited to the Kashmir Darbar as tribute. Endorsement No. 1975, dated 14th March, 1907 in the First Assistant to the Resident in Kashmir to Political Agent, Gilgit and telegram No. 1249, dated 9th March, 1908 from the First Assistant to Political Agent, Gilgit.
4. The district is under the suzerainty of the Kashmir Darbar, but is not Kashmir territory and Kashmir Darbar Officials are not allowed to interfere with it. Letter No. 1800-F, dated 24th July, 1901 from Government of India in the Foreign Department to the Resident in Kashmir. 5. The Governor receives a subsidy of Rs. 1200 a year from the Kashmir Darbar. Endorsement No. 6962, dated 11th November, 1912 from First Assistant to the Resident in Kashmir to Political Agent, Gilgit.
6. The districts supplies one Company of the Gilgit Corps of Scouts. The Scouts are paid by the Darbar and certain other charges in connection with the Corps by the Government of India. There are a number of Civil levies paid by the Kashmir Darbar through the Political Agent.

ISHKOMAN 1. In 1895 Ishkoman was several from Chitral and is now administered (subject to the approval of the Political Agent) by a Governor, who holds the position of a paid official and has no hereditary rights. Crimes of a serious nature may be tried by the Political Agent under the Frontier Crimes Regulations and Indian Penal Code. Treaties, Engagements and Sanads India 1909, Vol. XI page 263.
Letter No. 1800-F, dated 24th July, 1901 from Government of India, Foreign Department to Resident in Kashmir.
2. The revenue (in kind) of the district is taken by the Governor, but a certain amount is credited to the Kashmir Darbar as tribute. Standing Order, dated 19the June, 1896 (copy attached) (enclosure no.- 5 )
3. The district is under the suzerainty of Kashmir State, but is not Kashmir territory and Kashmir State Officials are not allowed to interfere with it. Letter No. 1800-F, dated 24th July, 1901 from Government of India, Foreign Department to Resident in Kashmir. 4. The Governor received a subsidy of Rs. 1200 a year from the Government of India Letter No. 1793, dated 28th November, 1891 from Government of India in the Foreign Department to Resident in Kashmir.
5. Mir Ali Mardan Shah, the late Governor of the district was appointed "in the name of His Highness the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir and with the approval of the Government of India and subject to his always conducting himself in a loyal and becoming manner". (Note - Mir Ali Mardan Shah died on the 26th February 1926 and the Government of India has approved the appointment of Khan Sahib Mir Baz Khan, as his successor. Standing Order, dated 19the June, 1896 (copy attached) 6. There are a number of Levies paid by the Kashmir Darbar through the Political Agent.

KUH-GHIZAR
In 1895 Kuh-Ghizar was severed from Chitral and formed into a Governorship and in 1905 it was incorporated with Yasen Governorship.
When the Governor, Raja Shah Abdur Rahmah Khan, was deported to Kashmir in 1911, Kuh-Ghizar was separated from Yasen and formed into separate Governorships under Khan Bahadur Raja Murad Khan, the present Governor. He was appointed by the Government of India with the concurrence of His Highness the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir.
Treaties, Engagements and Sanads India 1909, Vol. XI page 263.

Endorsement No. 223-G, dated 11th July, 1912, from First Assistant to the Resident in Kashmir, to Political Agent, Gilgit.
2. The Governor administers (subject to the approval of the Political Agent) the district and holds the position of a paid official and has no hereditary rights. Crimes of a serious nature may be tried by the Political Agent under the Frontier Crimes Regulations and Indian Penal Code. Letter No. 1800-F, dated 24th July, 1901 from Government of India, Foreign Department to Resident in Kashmir.
3. The revenue of the district is taken by the Governor, but a certain amount is credited to the Kashmir Darbar as tribute. Endorsement No. 1075, dated 14th March, 1907, from First Assistant to the Resident in Kashmir to Political Agent, Gilgit and telegram no. 1249, dated 9th March, 1908 from First Assistant to the Resident in Kashmir, to Political Agent, Gilgit. 4. The district is under the suzerainty of Kashmir State, but is not Kashmir territory and Kashmir State Officials are not allowed to interfere with it. Letter No. 1800-F, dated 24th July, 1901 from Government of India, Foreign Department to Resident in Kashmir. 5. The Governor received a subsidy of Rs. 1200 a year from the Government of India Endorsement No. 6962, dated 11th November, 1912 from First Assistant to the Resident in Kashmir to Political Agent, Gilgit.
6. The districts supplies one Company of the Gilgit Corps of Scouts. The Scouts are paid by the Darbar and certain other charges in connection with the Corps by the Government of India. There are a number of Civil levies paid by the Kashmir Darbar through the Political Agent.

Enclosure No. 3
Standing Order Mir Ali Mardan Shah ex-Mir of Wakhan is, in the name of His Highness the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir and with the approval of the Government of India, and subject to his always conducting himself in a loyal and becoming manner, appointed Governor over the Ishkoman Valley a district of the Khushwakt country lately incorporated in the territories of His Highness the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir.
2. The boundaries of the Ishkoman Valley are on the north Wakhan, on the south Punial, on the east Punial and Hunza, on the west Yasen and the Yarkhun Valley. 3. It consists of twelve villages, namely :- Kotshdeh, Chatorkhand, Dayin, Pakor, Shunas, Asumbar, Barjangal, Imit, Bathanz, Batswat, Bohrt, Ishkoman.
4. Mir Ali Mardan Shah gets a stipend of Rs. 100 (one hundred rupees) per mensem from the Government of India and he will be entitled to collect the following taxes from the people of his district yearly :-
180 maunds grain.
90 goats 2 maunds 10 seers ghi.
(of which 14 is to go to Government, which 14 is estimated after deducting amount taken by, and due to, Chharvelus, chharbus, etc.)
5. The Ishkoman valley is under the political control of the British Agent at Gilgit. Mir Ali Mardan Shah is therefore to refer all matters of importance for the orders of the British Agent through his Assistant stationed in Gupis. Most cases he is to settle himself according to the custom of the country, asking advice, should he require it, form the British Agent's Assistant at Gupis.

(Sd.)
British Agent, Gilgit,
19th June 1896

TAKING OVER OF THE INDEPENDENT TERRITORY LYING BETWEEN THE GILGIT AGENCY THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE AND CHITRAL
LETTER FROM THE POLITICAL AGENT IN GILGIT TO THE FIRST ASSISTANT TO THE RESIDENT IN KAHSMIR, NO. 98-S DATED THE 15TH NOVEMBER, 1926. (VERY CONFIDENTIAL).
Subject- Taking over the independent territory of Darel, Tangir, Harban, Shatial, Sazin and Jalkot. I have the honour to refer to paragraph 6 of my letter no. 10-S, dated the 20th March, 1926 and to the conversation recently held in Gulmarg on the subject of taking over, and administering loosely on the lines of Chilas, the independent territory of Darel, Tangir, Harban, Shatial, Sazin and Jalkot, and to submit definite proposals to that end. 2. Before placing my proposals before you in detail, I venture to remind you of the facts that we must face in coming to our decision. Our reason for establishing ourselves in the Gilgit Agency was, and is, to deny the country to Russia.
Our aims in the event of war with Russia are, firstly, to keep the country friendly to ourselves and to counter any Russian threat towards Kashmir and secondly, to reinforce Chitral. The operations laid down in the Chitral-Gilgit Defence Scheme involve our moving our small garrison towards the Darkot and Shandur Passes and a reference to the map enclosed in my letter no. 10-S dated the 20th March, 1926m will show how open our long line of communications is to a combined attack or to raids from the said independent territory.
It has, in the past, been the policy of the Government of India not to interfere in this independent territory, but conditions there are very different from those obtaining a generation ago; the valleys are more in touch with the outer world, the timber trade has brought wealth to the people and re-arming is steadily, though at present slowly. going on, while, the potential danger to our defence from a rising fomented by subversive intrigue from beyond the frontier is much greater than was formerly the case. That it is not idle to fear trouble from this direction is shown by the facts that a combined attack by the Indus tribes at the time of the taking of Chilas in 1893 was only frustrated by the appearance amount the tribes of an epidemic, and that during the time when Raja Pukhtun Wali was ruler of Darel and Tangir anxiety was caused by the possibility that his policy of aggrandizement might commit him to leading a rising against us. The danger is mentioned in the Chitral-Gilgit Defence Scheme of 1923, but I am doubtful, having regard to changed conditions, whether sufficient importance is attached to it. Indeed, I am convinced that, unless our control is imposed upon this area, an increase in the garrison of the Gilgit Agency will be inevitable. Much trouble and expense is, moreover, caused in time of peace by the presence on our border of these communities, whose feuds and factions make it impossible for their Jirgahs to control them or to offer reparation for raids. It should be explained that all the communities in question are Shina speaking and belong ethnologically to the group of Shinaki republics in Chilas. If this independent territory were to be brought under our control the safety of the Kaghan Valley road would be ensured. This road, besides forming an alternative route, would give a winter line of communication with the Gilgit Agency, which though unpleasant, could be used in emergency when the other routes are impassable, and its importance in this respect has been fully recognized by the Government of India.
I believe that these considerations will compel a decision that the principle of taking over this independent territory and administering it loosely on the lines of Chilas is essential both from the military and the political points of view.
3. When passing through Srinagar in September, 1926, I was visited by representatives of two of the leading firms who extract timber in Darel and Tangir (one bearing a request from the Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, that I should do what I could to help his firm), both of whom wished to see a strong rule established in Darel and Tangir. The representative of one firm wished that the Government of India would allow Mehtar Jao Shah Alam (nephew of the late Raja Pukhtun Wali) to try to recover control of Darel and Tangir. I said that I thought that it was most unlikely that the Government of India would be prepared to countenance any attempt of the Mehtar Jao to establish himself in Darel and Tangir and that I myself would not recommend such a course.
The Resident in Kashmir will remember that the case of Mehtar Jao Shah Alam was placed before him recently by Sir Aurel Stein, who was in favour of helping the Mehtar Jao in his project, but that I was strongly opposed to this course, or to allowing control over Darel and Tangir to fall into any hands other than our own. I trust that this view, with which I think that the Resident in Kashmir concurred, will have been accepted by the Government of India and I need not repeat here the arguments in support of it.
The representative of the other firm appeared to be in favour of the Government of India taking over the valleys and administering them on the lines of Chilas and I understand that the timber firms as a whole are so anxious to obtain settled conditions for their trade, that they might even be prepared to offer Government a sum of money (one lakh of rupees was tentatively mentioned) towards the cost of the undertaking).
These interviews at least show that, if the Government of India decide to impose their rule on Darel and Tangir, it would be likely that considerable support would be given by the timber firms, who experience great difficulty (just we do) from the fact that there is no stable authority, in either valley, which can guarantee law and order and respect for contracts.
I feel that it would not be in keeping with the dignity of the Government of India or of the Kashmir Darbar to accept, even if ordered, any sum from the timber trade towards the cost of taking over the control of these valleys, but the trade is of considerable value and experience may show it is possible to levy a tax on timber extraction. I think that it is necessary to leave our hands free to impose such a tax, should it be found possible to do so from the political point of view, at any rate to an amount sufficient to cover the ordinary annual expenditure on the administration. There are indications that the communities of both Darel and Tangir are tired of having no authority to whose they can refer their more serious disputes and, indeed, during the recent visit in ……….. of representative Jirgahs from Darel and Tangir, indirect suggestions were made tht an Assistant Political Agent should be appointed in those valleys. It is difficult to gauge to what extent these advances are genuine; but the fact that they have been made at all and the friendly attitude of two Jirgahs leads me to believe that there would be little real opposition to our establishing over them a loose and personal control like that exercised in Chilas.
In the last few months closer and more friendly relations with the Darel and Tangir Jirgahs have been established than have existed for some years and, if the principle of taking over control of the independent territory is accepted by the Government of India, I propose to take steps (such as, for example, inviting the Jirgahs to the annual Jalsah or Gathering of the Chiefs in the Spring) to, foster these relations and pave the may to our receiving a format request from the Jirgahs for us to assume control over their valleys. In all the circumstances, I believe that it is possible for us to obtain our end in this way.
A parallel is afforded by the circumstances in which we took over control of the Thor Nullah in 1898 (see Captain MeMahon's letter No. 754, dated the 16th April, 1898). I wish to make it clear that I should take no action which would commit us to taking over the country by force, though I consider that, if the attempt to obtain control by these means were to fail, it would be necessary to consider the use of force. If and when the Jirgahs make the formal request mentioned above, I recommend that they should be summoned by the Political Agent to Chilas when they could be informed that the Government of India had decided to appoint an officer to take charge of their affairs and a date could be fixed for the officer to cross the border, where he should be met by representatives of the several communities. I am inclined to think that the action should be taken during the winter, as in the summer the people are scattered up the side valleys, but I should prefer not to suggest any exact time but to await a favourable opportunity which can only be judged locally.
5. At first it will be essential to appoint an officer on special duty, as he must remain in the valleys, interview the Jirgahs and appoint subsidy holders or lambardars and levies get to know the people intimately and gather information ; and it would be impossible for the Assistant Political Agent, Chilas, to do this and his own work. Once, however, our control has been established, it should be possible to bring the area under the Assistant Political Agent, Chilas, and to create a post of Indian Assistant for Darel and Tangir. I therefore, recommend the appointment of an officer on Special Duty for Darel and Tangir for a period of six months in the first instance and, at the end of that time, experience will have shown whether it is possible at once to hand the control over to the Assistant Political Agent, Chilas or whether the Officer on Special Duty should be retained for a short further period. The officer should be a British Military Political Officer of about the seniority of officers usually appointed to Chilas and, if possible, one who knows Shina or in default of Shina, Pushtu. The climate is unpleasant and the officer will have to live in tents, and transport charges render all imported goods very expensive. I, therefore recommend that he should be given a local allowance of Rs. 200 a month.
An allowance of Rs. 100 a month should be given if the officer is qualified in Pushtu, as is sanctioned for Chilas (see foot-note to the Quarterly list of the Foreign and Political Department No. 77 page 54). It is essential that the officer should tour freely and a traveling allowance grant of Rs. 2000 is recommended. The cost of the officer will, therefore, be :-

Rs. Day and overseas pay (as for officer in his 5th year) 900 per mensem.
Local allowance (as for officer in his 5th year) 200 per mensem.
Language allowance (if admissible) 100 per mensem.
Total : 1200 per mensem.
or 7200 for six months
Traveling allowance grant 2000 for six months
Total : 9200 for six months
6. It would be advisable to send with the Officer on Special Duty a small escort of one officer and 20 other ranks (one section) of the Gilgit Corps of Scouts, both to protect his camp and to maintain his dignity. At first another section should be stationed at Minar about 5 miles west of the mouth of Thor Nullah (see Degree Sheet 43-E), as a precautionary measures.
The cost of the escort and supporting section for six months amounts to Rs. 7200 of which details are given in the Statement A attached.
7. The office on Special Duty will require the establishment and equipment which are shown in the Statement B attached to this letter, the cost of which will amount to Rs. 7,450. 8. I also recommend that the Officer on Special Duty should be accompanied by a Sub-Assistant Surgeon, because the value of medical work in circumstances such as these, as a means of gaining the confidence and good will of the people, cannot be overestimated, and the fact that medical work would be done in their valleys would appeal strongly to the people as a reason for coming under our control.
A statement D is attached showing the cost, which will amount to Rs. 6,530.
9. In order that rapid communication may be kept up with Chilas, I recommend that a telephone lien should be put up between Chilas and Minar and, if feasible, carried across the river. About 80 miles of line would be required and the Divisional Engineer, Telegraphs, Rawalpindi States that the rental will be Rs. 2,030 a year, provided that the rental is guaranteed for five years at least, in which case the Posts and Telegraph Department will bear the cost of erection. If, however, the line is required for a shorter period the cost of erecting and dismantling the line (Rs. 8,193) will have to be paid in addition to the rental. If our control over the valleys is successfully established, the telephone line will be required permanently and I have therefore, entered rental only in my estimates.
10. It would be necessary to appoint a number of subsidy-holders (or lambardars) and levies, as has been done in Chilas where they receive allowances (in the case of Thor, the nearest point to Darel and Tangir, Rs. 40 a year) which are paid out personally by the Political Agent. It is difficult at the present stage to give exact figures regarding either the number of men to whom subsidies sould be granted or the exact amount to be given to each man, but on the analogy of Chilas, I think that the appointment of not more than twenty lambardars in Darel twenty in Tangir and five in Harban should be enough. I propose that a grant of Rs. 2,000 a year should be given to be distributed as the Officer on Special Duty may find desirable, subject to the approval of the Political Agent, Gilgit.
Three levies would be required to each of the three main villages of Darel and Tangir respectively an three in Harban, who should receive Rs. 8 a month as do those in Thor. The levies form a recognized part of the civil administration of the Gilgit Agency, where there are no regular police, and apart from their ordinary duties, they help the Jirgahs in enforcing their authority. I do not a present recommend the appointment of any Havildar, as owing to the feuds between the villages, no man of one village could exercise authority over levies of another. The cost of the levies would be Rs. 2,016 a year.
11. I regard it as essential that at the inception of the scheme the Political Agent and Officer on Special Duty should have at their disposal a sum of Rs. 2,000 for secret service purposes. There are bound to be cases in which small sums given promptly will buy off opposition from individuals, who may think that some interest of theirs is threatened, and will generally smooth the way. This grant will not recur, as once the country has been taken over a small sum should suffice for secret service purposes.
12. The Jirgahs may ask for a grant of Sanads. If they do not edo so, I should not of course suggest it to them. If, however they raise the question, I recommend that Sanads should be given to the Darel, Tangir and Harban Jirgahs on the lines of that given to the people of Thor. The Darel Jirgahs present an annual tribute of 4 tulus and 2 Mashas of gold (About Rs. 61) to His Highness the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir State, paid through the Raja of Punial (to whom they also give an annual present of salt) and the Political Agent.
I think that we should confine ourselves to continuing the payment of the time-honoured tribute from Darel and to requiring the Tangir Jirgah to pay a similar tribute, while that of Harban might be fixed at slightly less than that payable by Thor (12 male goats) say 6 male goats. It should be remembered that our object is merely to impose our control for strategic reasons and it would be highly impolitic to risk failure to attain this end by a demand for a greater tribute. 13. The inhabitants of both Darel and Tangir have certain customary rights o grazing in the Gilgit Agency. Some of the grazing fee is paid to the Govdernors of Kuh-Ghizar and of Punial. In the event of our taking over control of Darel and Tangir, it would be necessary to do away with the fees, as they are a continual source of friction between the several valleys, and to fix certain limits below which Darel and Tangir flocks should biot be brought. It will be necessary to compensate the Governors for the loss of this source of revenue and I request that I may be empowered to grant them an annual payment of not more than Rs. 200 a year each. 14. The total cost of the proposals for six months is, therefore, as follows :-
Rs. Officer on Special Duty 9,200
Establishment and Equipment 7,450
Secret Service 2,000
Escort 7,200
Sub-Assistant Surgeon 6,530
Telephone 1,015
Lambardars 1,000
Levies 1,008
Traveling allowance for Officer on Special Duty, Sub-Assistant Surgeon and Compounder from India to Chilas 2,000
Payment to Governors 200
Total Say 37,600
I consider that it would be a fair arrangement for the Government of India to bear the whole cost of these initial measures and that, as the tribute will be rendered to His Highness the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, subsequent expenditure should be borne half by the Government of India and half by the Kashmir Darbar.
15. A statement F is attached showing roughly the annual expenditure that will be incurred when the administration in brought under the control of the Assistant Political Agent, Chilas and an Indian Assistant stationed in the valleys. The estimate amounts to Rs. 21,000 a year, but it will be appreciated that it is difficult at the present stage to do more than give an approximate figure. In addition, there will be a sum of Rs. 400, the cost of payment to the Governors of Punial and Kuh-Ghizar, mentioned in paragraph 13. As stated in paragraph 14, I consider that half of this amount should be paid by the Government of India and half by the Kashmir Darbar. 16. It will be necessary to build permanent quarters for the Indian Assistant for Darel and Tangir in Tangir, but at present it is impossible to say where his headquarters will be fixed or what the cost of the building will be. 17. It is certain that in the course of negotiations the Tangir Jirgah will ask for the remission of the fine of Rs. 2,000 imposed on them in connection with the Tangir Blockade (see my letter no. 225-T, dated the 28th September, 1926) and I recommend that this request should be granted as it is desirable that any possible cause for ill-feeling or friction should be removed at the outset.
18. I consider that when our control has been firmly established over Darel, Tangir and Harban, the Jalkotis, who at present I understand, are unwilling to submit to our rule are likely to alter their attitude. I think, however, that in view of the large area and difficulties of getting about, it would be preferable for Jalkot to be administered by the Assistant Commissioner, Mansera, who is in closer touch with Jalkot than is the Assistant Political Agent, Chilas. Sazin and Shatial are unimportant places and can be taken over when a favourable opportunity offers. 19. In conclusion I earnestly beg that this proposal may be considered in the light of recent developments in Central Asia, which clearly show that we cannot afford to leave untaken any measure that will strengthen our position on this frontier. If we succeed in our present purpose, we shall have removed a very definite source of weakness in our defence and I venture to urge that the advantage gained far outweighs the cost which is involved.
________________

Copy to Assistant Political Agent Chilas.
LETTER FROM THE HON'BLE SIR NORMAN BOLTON, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., CHIEF COMMISSIONER, NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE, PESHAWAR, NO. 807-P.S. /527, DATED THE 27TH APRIL 1927.
Subject : Proposed agreement between the Government of India and the Tribes of Swat Kohistan (Garwi Tract)
I have the honour to invite a reference to the correspondence ending with your telegram No. 521-S, dated the 16the March 1927 in which the Government of India ask for my detailed appreciation and proposals and also for certain information regarding the tribes, with whom it is now proposed to enter into closer political relations.
2. The area occupied by the tribes comprises five villages viz. Harianai Kalam, Urkot, Gabrai and Ushu situated on the upper reaches of the Swat River and on the Gabrai and Ushu rivers, which unite at Kalam to form the Swat River. The position of all these villages is shown on degree sheet No. 43-A, to which a reference is invited. The tract is bounded to the south by the territories of the Wali of Swat, which on the left bank of the Swat River include Mankial and on the right bank extend to Pashmal opposite, Haranai. The western boundary is the high range; which includes the Zhandrai and Badwai peaks and separates Swat Kohistan from Dir Kohistan. To the north lies the eastern portion of the Chitral State and the Gilgit Agency, while the eastern boundary is a high range separating Swat rivers. These boundaries are necessarily somewhat vague particularly to the north, since the Swat Kohistan has never been surveyed nor indeed has it been visited by any Government official, but it can be stated with confidence that to the north of the Garwi tract there are on inhabitants of Swat Kohistan, who have any political cohesion or importance. The tribes who inhabit that portion of Swat Kohistan which lies to the south of the Garwi tract, have been conquered by the Wali of Swat and have no independent, which would enable them to conclude with Government an agreement similar to that now proposed to be made with the tribes of the Garwi tract, their attitude towards those negotiations need not in present circumstances be considered. 3. The claims of the three rulers, whose territories border on this tract of Swat Kohistan, viz. His Highness the Mehtar of Chitral, the Nawab of Dir and the Wali of Swat - were dealt with at some length in Sir John Maffey's Memorandum No. 401-F/23, S.No. (10). His conclusions were that is was inexpedient and unnecessary to recognize the claims of any of the three to conquer the Garwi tribes and he therefore recommended :-
a. that His Highness the Mehtar should be informed that any extension of his territories in this direction would not be permitted, b. that an assurance should be taken from the Main Gul of Swat (as he was then styled) to abstain from unprovoked attack in this region, c. that the Nawab of Dir should be told of the Main Gul occasion to break his promise, he need expect no help from Government.
These proposals were approved by the Government of India [ibid S.No. (13)] and the measures taken have resulted in the independence of the Garwi tract being maintained intact up to the present. The only material alteration in the position is that the assurance then given by the Main Gul was in May 1926 [F.No. 26-F/26, S.No. (9)] incorporated in the format agreement executed between as Wali of Swat. I trust therefore that the Government of India will agree with me that the claims of these rulers need not now be regarded as any impediment to the formation of closer political relations between the Government of India and the tribes of the Garwi tracts.
4. It will be convenient at this point to explain the details of my proposals and my reasons for considering it desirable to enter into a definite agreement with these tribes. It has for many years been the considered policy of Government to discourage the uncontrolled felling of timber in the Swat Kohistan. The policy is dictated partly by the necessity for preserving this area from that wholesale destruction which has ruined the deodar forests of Dir. A more important consideration is the maintenance of an even rainfall in the catchments area of the Swat River and the prevention of violent floods in the interests of the Upper Swat Canal, which takes off at Chakdarra. This policy has been and can still be enforced by the total prohibition of export by river and the confiscation of logs when they reach Chakdarra. So long however as the tribes of Kalam, Ushu, etc. are at liberty to execute contracts without reference to Government extensive fallings can be done by contractors on the plea of ignorance of any restrictions. Thus during the last 12 months some members of the Jirga of Harianai, one of the villages in this tract, gave a ten years contract to Lala Harkeshen Lal of Lahore for unlimited felling of timber and his ………….. started the work without any intimation being given to the political authorities. As soon as the facts were known the contractor's agents were informed that any timber out under the contract would not be allowed to be exported. They therefore stopped work and withdrew but not without felling a number of trees, which the contractor now claims to be allowed to export on account of his capital outlay. It was this incident which convinced me of the necessity for some understanding with the tribes themselves in order to prevent the hands of Government from being forced by enterprising contractors and to extend to what are believed to be the most valuable forests in the Swat Valley the same system of Government control, which I have already recommended for the forests owned by the Wali of Swat. A number of requests have also been received at various times from the Jirgas of these tribes asking for Government protection against the intrigues of the Wali of Swat and his emissaries and the Political Agent was instructed to summon the full Jirgas of Kalam, Ushu, etc., mainly in order to discuss the future management of their forest. The full Jirgas came to Malakand and thence to Peshawar, where they were interviewed by me. Their attitude was extremely friendly and they earnestly expressed a desire for the assistance of Government in the exploitation of their forests and the protection of their territories from their neighbours. After full discussion with them, a draft agreement was drawn up, of which I attach a literal translation for the information of the Government of India, and this was accepted by the full Jirga with enthusiasm.
5. It will be noted that the only clause in this agreement, which an be regarded as committing Government to any action is clause 2. The Jirga request that Government will prevent their neighbours from intriguing in their country. This is effect Government has already done for the last three years by the action taken with the approval of the Government of India as detailed in paragraph 3 of this letter. I assume that there is no intention of altering the attitude then adopted towards the ambitions of His Highness the Mehtar of Chitral. The only other serious candidate for conquest in this region is the Wali of Swat, who has formally agreed to be bound by the wishes of Government in the matter. So long as the Mehtar and the Wali are not permitted to invade the Garwi tract there is, in my opinion, no danger of the Nawab of Dir entering upon a campaign in this area. The Nawab has already in Dir Kohistan sufficient forests to supply his needs and to supplement his revenue.
The tribes of the Indus Kohistan, regarding the effect on whom the Government of India have also asked for information, are separated from Swat Kohistan by a high range of mountains. The only interest which they have hitherto shown towards these negotiations between Government and the Swat Kohistanis has taken the form of an application for the protection of Government against the Wali of Swat, and for an agreement similar to that accepted by the Swat Kohistanis, including Government control of their forests. Since the Wali is not ate present under any obligation to Government to refrain from conquering the Indus Kohistan on the right bank of the river an also the Indus Kohistanis are under the nominal control of the Gilgit Agency. I have at present declined to consider the request of the Indus Kohistan Jirga. But I am taking steps to ascertain whether the Wali of Swat would welcome himself and the Indus Kohistanis of their long standing quarrel. Should both parties agree, I consider that it would be greatly to the advantage of Government to effect such a settlement thereby reducing the danger of further hostilities between the Wali of Swat and the Nawab of Amb. Opportunity would also be taken on this settlement to bring the forests of the southern valleys of the Indus Kohistan also within the scheme of Government control. Proposals to this end will be submitted separately to the Government of India, should my present intentions take a definite form. Meanwhile I consider that the ratification of the proposed agreement between Government and the tribes of the Garwi tract will be viewed without suspicion or hostility by the tribes of the Indus Kohistan and will contribute materially to the peace and development of both Swat and Indus Kohistan.
6. If the Government of India are please to sanction the ratification of the proposed agreement with the tribes of Kalam etc. I propose to inform His Highness the Mehtar, the Nawab of Dir and the Wali of Swat officially of the substance of it in order that they may realize finally the futility of their designs upon this area. A scheme of forest control will be worked out after the arrival of the special Forest Officer whose appointment has now been sactioned.
Enclosure.
Agreement between Kalam and Utrot jirgas and the Government, dated Malakand, the 5th March, 1927 1. We agree that in future we will be friendly to the Government and will, when called upon to do so, send out representatives to visit the Political Agent and to discuss our affairs with him. 2. We will not permit the agents of the Mehtar of Chitral, the Nawab of Dir or the Wali of Swat to visit our country without the permission of the Government. We request that the Government will prevent our neighbours from intriguing in our country or with any of our factions.
3. We will in future enter into no negotiations for the cutting or sale of timber from our forests without first obtaining the sanction of the Political Agent. If any such contract is arranged, we will submit if for the sanction of Government before any felling operations are commenced.
4. We will permit Forest officers dispatched by Government to visit and inspect our forests and to mark trees for cutting in accordance with a proper plan. We will guarantee their safely and offer them no hindrance in their work.
5. Life of Lord Rawlinson by General Sir Frederick Maurice, Page 323.
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The Gilgit Agency has acquired a great reputation for useful work, but it seems to me to have outgrown much of its usefulness and to be now an unnecessary expense. We took Yasen away from Chitral after the rebellion of 1895; but Chitral is now very loyal and it would be an graceful act to return it. We could then make the frontier of Chitral march with that of Kashmir and do away with the Gilgit Agency. The authorities at Simla are nervous about Bolshevik infiltration through the passes of the Hindu Kush, just as they used to be about Russian Armies coming this way. But there is little or no danger of this taking place without our knowledge as it is impossible for any human being to move in the country without the inhabitants knowing all about it. I would insist on the Mehtar (of Chitral) in return for the provinces which I purpose to return to him, receiving a British Resident at either Chitral or Mastuj, who would keep us fully informed of what was going on. Some of the districts in Norhtern Chitral and Yasen produce men of manly type and good physique, and there would be no difficulty in training some thousands of them in regiments of scouts. This would help them to improve their condition and would be welcome. They are, most of them followers of the Aga Khan; are not fanatical Mohamedans, and quite ready to be loyal to us. They would be useful people, if we washed, taught and trained them. I think that on the limes which I have sketched here there is room for considerable economy combined with an increase of efficiency, such as would remove the bogy of infiltration through the Hindu Kush passes. I am very glad to have had a chance of studying these interesting problems on the spot.
_________________

(Copy. Original in F. No. 3-C. of 1895)
No. 320-F.
FROM: THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, FOREST DEPARTMENT
TO : SIR GEORGE ROBERTSON, K.G.S.I.
Simla, Dated the 17th August 1895.
Sir,
You have already been verbally informed that Her. Majesty's Government have decide that a garrison should be retained in Chitral territory, and that the road from the Swat river to the border of Chitral should be protected by means of levies, a force being for the present at least, maintained on the Malakand Pass, and at the crossing of the Swat river at Chakdarra.
2. The Governor-General in Council has resolved to depute you to Chitral in order to formally install Shuja-ul-Mulk as Mehtar in the name of the Maharaja of Kashmir as his suzerain and with the authority and approval of the Government of India as was done in 1892 in the case of the Chiefs of Hunza and Nagar. The future policy to be adopted in regard to the Chitral State may be conveniently enunciated in your speech while installing Shuja-ul-Mulk, and I am to convey to you the following instructions a for your guidance.
3. Recent events have forced the Government of India to reconsider the extent of country over ………………….. Mehtar should hold sway. The circumstances of the Katur and Khuswakt tracts differ materially, and the Khuswaktis have frequently declared to the British Agent at Gilgit their desire to have no more Mehtar's over them, and to come under the direct management of the Gilgit Agency. In these circumstances it has been decided that the Mehtar's direct control shall not extend beyond the Katur country as ………….. understood. The British Agent at Gilgit will on ……………….. State, appoint and pay the Governor's ………………………. Khuswakt country and their relations will be direct with him, except that a matter of convenience the Governor of the Mastuj valley will, for the present, correspond with the Political Officer in Chitral,.
4. The general internal administration of the country will be left in the hands of the Mehtar an of his advisors. The Government of India do not intend to undertake, themselves, the management of the internal affairs of Chitral, their concern being with the foreign relations of the State, and with its general welfare. It, however, has to be remembered that Shuja-ul-Mulk is only a boy, and that, at an age when other boys are engaged in education and amusement, he has been called upon to hold the reins of State. Bearing this fact in mind, the Government of India recognize the necessity of his receiving some help during the time of his minority, and it has consequently been decided to leave at Chitral and experienced Political Officer upon whom the Mehtar may always call for advice and assistance, while it is proposed to appoint three persons, Raja Bahadur Khan, the Governor of Mastuj, Wazir Inayat Khan and Asaqal Fateh Ali Shah to give him help, instruction and advice in the management of his State an in the laws and customs of the people. Ordinarily the entire country will be governed in accordance with their experience and judgment; but nevertheless the Assistant British Agent, if he thinks it necessary to do so, may, at any time, ask the Mehtar to delay action recommended by his three advisers’, until the opinion of the British Agent at Gilgit has been obtained. It is to be understood that you will yourself dispose of any ………….. matter referred to you by the Assistant Political Agent or will refer it for the decision of the Government of India in accordance with any general or particular. ………………………… to the case but as between you and the ………………………………… the final end authoritative.
6. The subsidy paid to the late Mehtar of Chitral amounted to Rs. 30,000 of this Rs. 16,000 was contributed by Kashmir; the reminder by the Government of India. ……………. he given subsidy of Rs. 1,000 …………………. of the loss of revenue arising from ……… ……. Khushwakht country, he may be given ……………. Rs. 8,000 a year. Monthly stipends of Rs. 100 a month may be paid to the Governors of "Mastuj, Ghizar the Koh district and Yasen, and to the three advisers of the Mehtar ……………………….. which would still remain unexpended, …………………….. utilized in paying small salaries ……….. Rs. 10 a month to the headmen of particular sub-divisions or villages.
7. Inasmuch as the Political officers in Chitral will be, until further orders at any rate, Assistant to the British Agent at Gilgit, it will be desirable to maintain ..postal line between Chitral and Gilgit, and some improvement in the bridges and the more difficult parts of the road between Chitral and Mastuj will be necessary. This is a matter as to which it may be necessary to send you further instructions; but in the meanwhile the Government of India will consider whether they cannot, in the interests to economy carry out some of this work by troops, under orders issued in the Military Department to the Officer Commanding.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient servant,
W.S. Cuningham
Secretary to the Government of India
(Copy. Original, in F.No. 3-C. of 1895)
No. - 257-F
From :
...............................................
To :
...............................................
Sir,
It has been decided to separate Chitral, upto the Shandur and Darkot passes from the Gilgit ………………… and to add it to the political chance at present held by Major Deane. A copy of correspondence on the subject with Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India is enclosed.
2. The Government of India desire that this re-organization should be introduced as soon as conveniently possible. I am to request that you will decide the date indirect communication with Major Deane, and report it for information. Major Deane's appointment will thereafter be designated, "Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral".
3. You were informed in October last that eh vacancies then existing in the sanctioned staff of "Special duty" officers in Gilgit should not be filled up, and that the distribution of the remaining officers would cost as hitherto with the British Agent. The appointment of British Agent Gilgit has now been abolished with effect from the 15th November, 1896, and the new appointment of Political Agent in Gilgit has been substituted. Subject to your general control, the Political Agent will regulated the disposition of the subordinate officers in the Agency. 4. The changes in the establishments for Gilgit and Chitral recommended in your letter No.-41, dated the 6th January 1897; are under consideration, and orders will be passed as soon as possible. I have the honour to be
can be made in the case of the majority of Indian States with varying degrees of truth but if even 50% of what he says is true if would appear that we are failing in that region to fulfill our responsibilities towards the subjects of the Mirs. I am inclined to think that we ought to consider carefully the desirability of introducing in Hunza and Nagir a system analogous to that in Chitral, where in return for the support given to the Mehtar by us we insist on exercising some control over his administration though a Resident Assistant Political Agent.
b. The deplorable state of the Gilgit Scouts owing to the method of recruitment and control. We are already initiating steps to have the whole position examined and a re-organization effected on the advice of the I.O.F.C. and I think that until we get his report we had better not take action on Colonel Schomberg's report.
c. The dangers and difficulties likely to arise in the Wazarat itself on the introduction of the new system of administration. Colonel Schomberg would apparently like to see (1) the immediate expulsion of all Kashmiri officials (2) the development of the road from Abbottabad to Gilgit so as to make it the real line of communication, (3) the placing of the Agency including the Wazarat directly under the North-West Frontier administration, (4) the introduction of police from the North-West Frontier, (5) the posting of a garrison of regular troops at Gilgit from Abbottabad. Without these measures being adopted the anticipates that the future administration will be worse than the existing one and that the economic condition of this area will become desperate. There may be much truth in this, but it is obvious that all these measures will entail heavy expenditure by the Government of India and the whole raison d'etre of the change and the justification for it was economy and not more expense. The economy to be expected has I think already been reduced to about a lakh or less and it would be very difficult now to ask the Finance Department to go large in the opposite direction. There are also grave practical difficulties about (1), (4) and (5).
d. The pro-Bolshevic intrigues and Chinese connections of the Mir of Hunza and the necessity for a proper intelligence organization in this area. Colonel Schomberg does not offer any very helpful suggestions as to how this situation should be remedied and merely says that "the situation calls for some sort of re-organization and
………….
. must be dealt with promptly by a British officer". 4. As regards the Gilgit Scouts there has already been something in the nature of an incipient mutiny, and it is quite evident that in submitting their original re-organization scheme Gillan and the Commandant failed to realize that the terms of service were impossible for a permanently embodied Corps on which the security of an important frontier was in future to depend. As an example it has now come to light that the sepoys only get Rs. 9/- per mensem - less than a coolie. When service represented only a little pocket money at an off season of the year with a minimum of discipline, this did not matter; but for a corps on which the security of India in this region depends it is ludicrous wage.
a. To bring the Mirs of Hunza and Nagir under effective control and at the same time to bring to an end Chinese interference in Hunza by stationing the Assistant Political Agent at Baltit and prohibiting the dispatch of Hunza tribute to Kashgar (vide our demi-official letter no. F.2006-X/35, dated the 22nd June, 1935 to Resident of which a copy was sent to you).
b. Proposals for raising the pay of the Gilgit Scouts forthwith to the scale in force in the Kashmir State troops have, I am glad to say already been accepted in the Finance Department. This scale is considerably more modest than that in force in the Frontier Corps on the North-West Frontier. We are also considering making service in the Scouts pensionable.
c. Dispatch of Erskine (I.O.F.C., Peshawar) to Gilgit in October on a mission of inspection to report on future organization, training and control of the Scouts. I enclose a copy of a Personal letter recently addressed to him on this subject. Erskine's wide experience, both political and military, and character ensure a really useful report.
d. Dispatch of a General Staff officer to Gilgit with Erskine to draw up a defence scheme for that frontier in the light of the new conditions. e. Proposal for improvement of communications from Abbottabad via the Kaghan Valley in place of the old route through Kashmir. This scheme is connected with our wider proposal for the improvement of trade facilities with Sinkiang by the Gilgit route, and also with one of Neol's projects for the development of a Spain the Kaghan. We have sent up a special P.W.D. officer for three months to report on P.W.D re-organization.
f. Arrangements are being made to post a trained intelligence agent at Gilgit, and Williamson is quite alive to the importance of the matter.
6. You mention particularly the suggestion to bring Gilgit under the control of the Agent to the Governor General at Peshawar. Metcalfe, I know, is inclined to the view that this is what will have to be done eventually. It is already abundantly evident that help for Gilgit, whether in the form of military reinforcement, aid in organization of irregulars, or even (the latest instance) cooperation in jailing convicts can only come from the North-West Frontier Province. And after all Chitral also is a nominal fief of Kashmir, so that control of the Gilgit princelings from Peshawar would not be without good precedent. But in this matter it will be necessary to choose our time carefully, and not to antagonize unnecessarily His Highness of Kashmir, and we feel that patience is necessary. The extracts which I enclose throw light on the difficulties likely to arise; but there seems little doubt that circumstances before long will force our hand.
7. As your suggest, we are not sending Schomberg's criticisms to Lang, but prefer to proceed as indicated, and not to give the impression that courses of action are being decided on irresponsible criticism from without. Actually most of what is now being done had been undertaken independently of these criticisms : this is not to say that they do not provide valuable reinforcement - in particular the idea for a permanent Political Officer at Baltit is borrowed from Schomberg.

To
J.C. Walton, Esquire, C.B., M.C.
Secretary, Political Department,
India Office, London.
Copy of a Private and Personal letter from O.K. Carce, Esquire, C.I.E., Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, to Colonel C.E.T. Erskine, C.I.E., D.S.O., M.C., Inspecting Officer and Secretary, Frontier Corps, North-West Frontier Province, Nathiagali, dated the 19th July 1935.
______________

Many thanks for your P. & P. letter of the 1st of July on the subject of the Gilgit Scouts. The Government of India do not wish to commit themselves in advance to any particular policy in this matter until they have heard what you as a person pre-eminently qualified to judge of the necessities of the case both from the point of view of efficiency and of political necessity, recommend should be the policy. Obviously it will be necessary to bear in mind political considerations to a considerable extent just as it has been in Chitral. On the other hand, unlike Chitral the Gilgit Scouts are being re-organized on a basis of 4 companies of 100 men each permanently embodied, and 3 Companies of 80 each embodied for 4 months in a year, and as you know they will not have the backing of a battalion of regular troops in the manner that the Chitral Scouts have in Chitral. How far it will be necessary to break away from the old traditions and to substitute something more like the traditions of the Frontier Corps proper of Waziristan and Kurram, is a matter in which you after a personal investigation will be in a far stronger position to judge than we can from here. If you think that certain matters such as the position of the Political Agent vis-à-vis the Corps are too delicate to mention in your official report, there is no reason why you should not submit further suggestions in such matters by confidential and demi-official letter. 2. We have asked Lang, Resident of Kashmir, for his views as to your terms of reference, and shall be addressing you officially in the matter before you go up. This letter should therefore be regarded as private and personal. I may add that we also have been in communication with Schomberg and the decision to send you to Gilgit is mainly due to anxiety last a failure to place efficiency first might endanger the future of the Gilgit Agency. This is not to say that political considerations and the good-will of the Chiefs of the Gilgit Agency can be left out of account. It was because it was felt that you were the last person to leave such considerations on one side that it was decided to ask for your assistance in the matter.
inhabitants wish to join the Agency. Their forests will yield a considerable revenue, though not as great as formerly. Further it will cost little to take over the country, whereas their continuance as an independent territory means great anxiety and leads to a good deal of crime and raiding, in and near the Agency.
THE GILGIT AGENCY AND THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE.
The future of the newly organized Gilgit Agency, under the Resident in Kashmir appears to offer certain disadvantages. So long as it is remotely an administrative appendage of Kashmir, so long will the nexus with the Kashmir State prove a hindrance to the satisfactory working of the Agency, as it has undoubtedly in the past. Indeed, it would be safe to surmise that the removal of these complications has been one of the objects of the new formation. The alternatives are to make the Agency an independent until, directly under the Government of India, entirely free of control by either the Resident in Kashmir or the Government of the North-West Frontier Province. The difficulties here are considerable, from an administrative and routine standpoint. The second course is the incorporation of the Gilgit Agency in the North-West Frontier Province. The analogy would be with Berar, where, in spite of a good deal of artificial and interested agitation, the arrangement is a success and the susceptibilities of the ruler, H.E.H. the Nizam, sufficiently considered. It may be suggested that to incorporate the new Gilgit Agency with the North-West Frontier Province would mean a certain amount of interference and obstruction, for that is what such interference means, form the Legislative Assembly or Council of the province. That is true. But such pragmatism is inevitable, partly because if interference is the obstacle against uniting the Agency with the Frontier. It will not be escaped by retaining the connection with Kashmir. Indeed, if the link with Kashmir is preserved, obstruction either open in the Assembly there, or furtively, through the Darbar officials, will be source of real difficulty. No Kashmiri official will be able to resist criticism or interference.
The advantages for union with the R.W.F.P. are considerable and convincing.
(1) The Agency is predominantly Mahomedan.
(2) The problems of the Agency, vis-a-vis the frontier, are similar to those in the Frontier Province.
(3) Geographically the Agency is a part of the Province and not of Kashmir.
(4) Commercially the tendency is for trade to develop with the Punjab, Via Abbottabad, and Peshawar is becoming a considerable center for Central Asiatic Traders, as the conditions there appeal to them.
(5) Security points to the need of the Agency being dealt with from N.W.F.F. and not from Kashmir. Police, army and air force arrangement should be centralized in the Frontier Province. (6) Economically, it is essential for the Agency to the linked with the Frontier Province. It is only thus that its inhabitants, many of whom belong to the most manly races in India, can have any hope of employment in the Constabulary. Army or Police as well as in the civil services of the Frontier administration. There is no danger of the province being swamped with would be employees. There will be a certain and proper demand for service under the Government, which will be met. Such service will neutralize to some extent the stringency caused by the withdrawal of the Kashmir troops.
If this agency be denied incorporation with the province, there can be no hope of any development. Gilgit has long been a backwater, and under the present proposals it will become over more stagnant economically than before. Its people have every right to expect that political changes should benefit them, and not damage them. The Kashmir State has been conspicuously unfriendly in the past towards the Agency. It is likely to become even more so in the future, for the new arrangement is resented by those in authority these.
The only solution seems to be close connection with the North-West Frontier Province, and the sooner that the fate of the Agency is decided, the better if will be.

THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE GILGIT AGENCY
1. The Gilgit Agency marches with (1) Chinese Turkestan (2) Tribal territory, viz. Tangir and Darel (3) Chitral. Its other boundaries are with the N.W.F. Province or with Kashmir.
2. The State of Hunza marches with Chinese Turkestan and Afghanistan. The ilaqa of ISHKOMAN with Afghanistan. The frontiers of the other States are separate from and unconnected with any part of the Indian frontier marching with foreign territory.
The relations of Hunza with Chinese territory are important, and may be summarized as follows : (a) The SARIKOL Pamir, as far as the URUK Jilga, on the right of the TASHKURGAN River, between DAFDAR AND TASHKURGAN Town, is claimed by the Mir of Hunza as his ow source of the "Oxus" by the Rt. Hon. G.N. Curzon" the map is so coloured as to support the claim. Unfortunately the Pamir Boundar committee of 1893 ignored the rights of the Mir, if the had any, either by accident or inadvertence. The Mir receives as tribute from the nomads in the area claimed, felts and ropes to the annual of about £10. He also grazes his sheep, and issues permits to his people, which have no value, to enter the Pamirs. Prior to the disturbances in Chinese Turkestan he had been in the habit of sending a tribute in gold to the Chinese The gold was, of course, a levy from his subjects. In return the Chinese used to send presents of a value of about £50. A photograph of the presentation of this tribute was always sent to the Chinese governor in URUMCHI.
(b) The land of SAFDAR ALI, later Mir of Hunza, who died in 1930, are claimed by the Mir. These land are situate in KUCHAR and near YARKAND.
Those at YARKAND were given to a former Mir of Hunza, when that State was a vassal of China, as a reward for good service. Those at LUCHAR were purchased by SAFDAR ALI.
(c) Certain rights on the left bank of the RASKAL or YARKAND river, in territory known as RASKAM, viz. at KOKTASH and BASH ANDIJAN are claimed.
The value to the Mir of these rights at present are nil. Certain rights in the MUSTAGH river, also known as the SHAKGAM or OPRANG are also claimed. With regard to the Mir's claims in the PAMIRS, there is no proof, and there is no tradition of Hunza rule. The present tribute from the Nomads represents no more than a wish to keep on friendly terms with a neighboring chief, who is also a co-religionist. The Mir's position in SARIKOL is a usurpation, and has always been rightly presented and opposed by the Chinese. As to SAFDAR ALI's land. He was feudatory of the Chinese, and never a British subject, and it is difficult to see how the present Mir, the nominee of the British and who, sui juris, has no status as a claimant, owing to his illegitimacy and juniority, can demand the possessions of his elder brother.
By Chinese law, only a Chinese national can own land in China, The Mir of Hunza's claim is unjust to the descendants of his brother, and wholly untenable by Chinese or by international law. H.B.M. Consul-General at Kashgar as well as the Political Agent in Gilgit should see that this absurd claim is not countenanced by them.
The SINO INDIAN frontier has never been settled. In most maps, Swedish, German, Russian and British, the frontier is shown along the Raskam River. The position is complicated by the undoubted right of the Mir to the whole of the BHALDU or NORTHERN SHINGSHAL valley, which lies beyond the main INDO-CENTRAL ASIATIC watershed.
The proper course is either to claim all the left side of the Raskam River, with some valuable but unused land, or to limit the Mir of Hunza to the whole of the area drained by the Mustagh river, up to its junction with the Raskam or Yarkand river at its junction at Chong Jilga. To round off the frontier the latter proposal is preferable, although it means the surrender of what is undoubtedly British territory, of no use to the Chinese but of considerable value to the Mir. Again certain parts of the Mustagh river are claimed by the Sarikol nomads, but this is a mere intrusion on their part.
The Chapursar Valley, in Western Hunza offers easy access to Afghnistan, and there is considerable intercourse locally betwe3en the two countries, as the population is the same race on both sides of the frontier. The situation cells for no comment, except in so far that this is a direct unsupervised way into India from Afghanistan. It is a way too that leads conveniently from Russian and Chinese territory. Refugees have come by this route, and as a precaution it might well be closed.
Ishkoman has communication with Afghanistan by the Karumbar river and the KHORA BHORT pass. This route is closed for six months, every year from May to October. It is little used, and calls for no comment, but is and alternative to the route, from Afghan Wakhan to India via Chitral. The TRANSFRONTIER ACTIVITIES OF THE MIR OF HUNZA.
The situation in the Gilgit agency is at once complicated and aggravated by the role played by the Mir of Hunza who, owing to the situation of his State and his claims to trans-frontier rights and privileges has extra-territorial commitments and interests which are at once undesirable and unique. Indeed, the Mir has become the sole arbiter on his part of the frontier. He has no qualifications for this role.
The writer of this report has observed the intrigues of the Mir, for over nine years and has realized that they are a real potential danger. The Mir maintains an elaborate intelligence system, and passes on to the Political Agent Gilgit such snippets of information, usually false, always incomplete, that his spies give him. The Mir has long had dealings with the Bolshevists, and offered into relations with them before the British Government did so. There is no use giving details about these matters. The fact that he does so, is undoubted.
The SARIKALIS on the SARIKOL PAMIR have always given tribute to the Mir. In 1933, when the troubles in Turkestan reached their area, they sent for help to the Mir, in case they were looted. The Mir was foolish enough, to promise this to them. When these nomads were pillaged they sent to the Mir asking him to redeem his pledge. He did not do so, and he could not, so the Sarikolis crossed into the Mir's territory at the Khunjerab Jilga and drove off his flocks. When Shah Mansur was one of the Khotan Amirs, he wrote for help to the Mir, who replied promising it. The murder of the Amir upset the Mir of Hunza, who had hoped for grants of land, and other benefits form Amir.
His intercourse with Shah Mansur was no hindrance to his remaining on friendly terms with MA-SHAo-WU, Taotai of Kashgar, who has many business dealings with the Mir, very much to the Taotai disadvantage.
An unpleasant episode in 1934 was the case of a Russian Tartar from Kazan who, landing in India with a Turkish passport, was allowed to travel via Chitral to Sinkiang. In his company were two other Tertars who alleged that they had picked him up at Bombay. This man and his party were robbed of their arms in the Pamirs. It is difficult to say by whom, but one of the arms found its way to the Mir of Hunza.
This Tartar who want by the name of Abdul Hamid sent word to the Mir that he would kill any Hunza man he met ; whereupon the Mir ordered his flocks to be driven back over the frontier, and let his subjects feni for themselves. This man, Abdul Hamid, after being detained at Misgar, crossed the frontier, and murdered a harmless nomad one maron from the border. This sort of episode is dangerous, and may lead to a serious incidents on the frontier. The Mir's intrigues are futile, and mischievous, and should be stopped entirely. There should be a proper post established and there should be no activity allowed by any one beyond the frontier. What is the political agent at Gilgit, or in the case of those coming form Kashgar, but from no place nearer the frontier, of the Consul-General there. It will be realized that a guard of local levies will be quite useless for such duties. Gurkhas would be ideal troops. The Soviet has now established itself in the Pamirs and Western Sinkiang and in a very short while conditions there will be the same as now prevail in Outer MONGOLIA. Some form of supervision and control are needed. On one part of the frontier there is an elaborate system of intelligence, and in a part of the same frontier, within sight of Russia, China and Afghanistan there is no control or guard at all. This policy seems inconsistent and hardly prudent.
The discontent in Hunza offers a soil ready, even avid, for Bolshevist propaganda. Indeed, it is already there. on man, KALANDAR, a Hunza man who fled some years ago to Soviet Russia, has a good post under the Bolshevists. With him went another man who has not been given more than a Junior Job. The whole situation in the Gilgit Agency calls for some sort of re-organization, and the situation in Hunza and in Nagir must be dealt with promptly, by a British officer.
Even in Gilgit town itself there is a good deal of Bolshevist propaganda and the appeal is against the Mirs and the Darbar to there sympathetic conditions under the red flag. There is nothing in the proposals for administering the new Gilgit Agency that can deal even superficially with any or these problems.

Mr. Walton.
I have read these papers with the greatest interest. I know Colonel Schoberg slightly. He is a very energetic man who walks hard and talks hard, and it would appear form the correspondence writes hard and types hard also. What he says, however, should be taken with a grain of salt as I know he harbours grievances - imaginary or real - against the Government of India, and he never fails to make use of this fact.
Where there is smoke there must be some fire however, and I do think that no manner regime is to be introduced into the Gilgit Agency that it would be advisable for the Government of India to review the situation. The best part of Colonel Schomberg's note is that in which he refers to the possibility of the Gilgit Agency coming under the North West Frontier Province under the regime. It is a Mohammedan country and it would come under officials who have very great experience in dealing with Mohammedan people. Another great experience is dealing with Mohammedan people. Another great advantage would be that the Scouts (whose improvement to my mind is essential) would come under the Inspector of Frontier Corps, and this would mean the periodical inspection of these Scouts by the Inspector of Frontier Corps. This would I am sure lead to efficiency. I am inclined to think that the efficiency of the Gilgit Scouts would also be improved if another British officer was posted to the Corps, but this would cost money and I am doubtful if the N.W.F.P. finances would run to it. What Colonel Schomberg says about the infiltration of Bolshevism through the Gilgit Agency is interesting and in my opinion demands attention. Here again, should the Agency come under the N.W.F.P. it would be possible to introduce a system of Intelligence which might do much to cope with infiltration of Bolshevism. If the Agency is brought under the N.W.F.P. the easiest and most natural line of approach would be from Hazara through Abbottabad, which is as you know it, close proximity to the Head Quarters of N.W.F.. both at Peshawar and Nathia Gali. In view of the above I strongly support the idea of Mr. Metcalfe being approached C.O. When handling Colonel Schomberg's paper he will have to exercise tact as if the Kashmir officials, and others, were to get hold of it they would I think be justifiably annoyed.
Private and Personal Will your please refer to your personal letter to Metcalfe dated the 22nd March 1935, enclosing Schomberg's indictment on the management of the Gilgit Agency ? Metcalfe handed these papers over to me with a note, and it occurs to me that you might wish to hear something of his views and of the action which we have a already in hand or in contemplation in regard to Gilgit. 2. In the first place Metcalfe thought, and from what I have seen of the papers I agree with him, that there is a very real substratum of truth in Schomberg's candid criticisms. We have not ourselves been altogether happy about developments in Gilgit and beyond, and it has been fully realized that the advance of Russia in Sinkiang coupled with the withdrawal of Kashmir troops from Gilgit gives food for anxious thought. Schomberg has also been in communication with this office, which is always interested to hear what he has to say about these parts. As you say, even allowing for bias, it is difficult to dismiss all his criticism as wholly groundless.
3. Metcalfe summed up Schomberg's points as follows :
(a) The misrule and oppression in Hunza and Nagir, which Colonel Schomberg attributes to the fact that owing to our moral support the Mirs are no longer restrained by the ordinary sanctions imposed by custom. This is a criticism which can be made in the case of the majority of Indian States with varying degrees of truth but if even 50% of what he says is true it would appear that we are failing in that region to fulfill our responsibilities towards the subjects of the Mirs. I am inclined to think that we ought to consider carefully the desirability of introducing in Hunza and Nagir a system analogous to that in Chitral, where in return for the support given to the Mehtar by us we insist on exercising some control over his administration through a Resident Assistant Political Agent.
(b) The deplorable State of the Gilgit Scouts owing to the method of recruitment and control. We are already initiating steps to have the whole position examined and a re-organization effected on the advice of the I.O.F.C. and I think that until we get his report we had better not take action on Colonel Schomberg's report.
(c) The dangers and difficulties likely to arise in the Wazarat itself on the introduction of the new system of administration. Colonel Schomberg would apparently like to see (1) the immediate expulsion of all Kashmiri officials, (2) the development of the road from Abbottabad to Gilgit so as to make it the real line of communication, (3) the placing of the Agency including the Wazarat directly under the North-West Frontier administration, (4) the ………………… introduction of police from the North-West Frontier (5) the posting of a garrison of regular troops at Gilgit from Abbottabad. Without these measures being adopted he anticipates that the future administration will be worse than the existing one and that the economic condition of this area will become desperate. They may be much truth in this, but it is obvious that all these measures will entail heavy expenditure by the Government of India and the whole raison d'etre of the change and the justification for it was economy and not more expense. The economy to be expected has I think already been reduced to about a lakh or less an it would be very difficult now to ask the Finance Department to go large in the opposite direction. There are also grave practical difficulties about (1), (4) and (5). (d) The pro-Bolsheviks intrigues and Chinese connections of the Mir of Hunza and the necessity for a proper intelligence organization in this area. Colonel Schomberg does not offer any very helpful suggestions as to how this situation should be remedied and merely says that "the situation call for some sort of re-organization and …………… must be dealt with promptly by a British officer". 4. As regards the Gilgit Scouts there has already been something in the nature of an incipient mutiny, and it is quite evident that in submitting their original re-organization scheme Gillan and the Commandant failed to realize that the terms of service were impossible for a permanently embodied Corps on which the security of an important frontier was in future to depend. As an example it has now come to light that eh sepoys only get Rs.9/- per mensem - less than a coolie. When service represented only a little pocket money at an off season of the year with a minimum of discipline, this did not matter; but for a corps on which the security of India in this region depends it is ludicrous wage.
5. You will already have seen from papers sent to you separately the action now proposed to set matters right. The lines on which we are working may be summed up as follows : (a) To bring the Mirs of Hunza and Nagir under effective control and at the same time to bring to an end Chinese interference in Hunza by stationing the Assistant Political Agent at Baltit and prohibiting the despatch of Hunza tribute to Kashgar (vide our demi-official letter no. F206-X/35, dated the 22nd June 1935 to Resident of which a copy was sent to you).
(b) Proposals for raising the pay of the Gilgit Scouts forthwith to the scale in force in the Kashmir State troops have, I am glad to say already been accepted in the Finance Department. This scale is considerably more modest than that in force in the Frontier Corps on the North-West Frontier. We are also considering making service in the Scouts pensionable. (c) Despatch of Ersking (I.O.F.C. Peshawar0 to Gilgit in October on a mission of inspection to report on future organization, training and control of the Scouts. I enclose a copy of a Personal letter recently addressed to him on this subject. Erskine's wide experience, both political and military, and character ensure a really useful report.
(d) Despatch of a General Staff officer to Gilgit with Erskine to draw up a defence scheme for that frontier in the light of the new conditions.
(e) Proposal for improvement of communications form Abbottabad via the Kaghan Valley in place of the old route through Kashmir. This scheme is connected with our wider proposal for the improvement of trade facilities with Sinkiang by the Gilgit route, and also with one of Noel's projects for the development of a Spa in the Kaghan. We have sent up a special P.W.D. officer for three months to report on P.W.D. re-organization.
(f) Arrangements are being made to post a trained intelligence agent at Gilgit, and Williamson is quite alive to the importance of the matter.
6. You mention particularly the suggestion to bring Gilgit unde the control of the Agent to the Governor General at Peshawar. Metcalfe, I know, is inclined to the view that this is what will have to be done eventually. It is already abundantly evident that help for Gilgit, whether in the form of military reinforcement, aid in organization of irregulars, or even (the latest instance) cooperation in jailing convicts can only come from the North-West Frontier Province. And after all Chitral also is a nominal fief of Kashmir, so that control of the Gilgit princelings from Peshawar would not be without good precedent. But in this matter it will be necessary to choose our time carefully, and not to antagonize unnecessarily His Highness of Kashmir, and we feel that patience is necessary. The extracts which I enclose throw light on the difficulties likely to arise; but there seems little doubt that circumstances before long will force our hand.
7. As you suggest, we are not sending Schomberg's criticisms to Lang, but prefer to proceed as indicated, and not to give the impression that courses of action are being decided on irresponsible criticism from without. Actually most of what is now being done had been undertaken independently of these criticisms; this is not to say that they do not provide valuable reinforcement - in particular the idea for a permanent Political Officer at Baltit is borrowed from Schomberg.

To,
J.C. Walton, Esquire, C.B., M.C.,
Secretary, Political Department,
India Office, LONDON.
Copy of a Private and Personal letter from O.K. Caroe, Esquire, C.I.E., Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, to Colonel C.E.T. Erskine, C.I.E., D.S.O., M.C., Inspecting Officer and Secretary, Frontier Corps, North-West Frontier Province, Nathiagali, dated the 19th July 1935.
________________

Many thanks for your P&P letter of the 1st of July on the subject of the Gilgit Scouts. The Government of India do not wish to commit themselves in advance to any particular policy in this matter until they have heard what you as a person pre-eminently qualified to judge of the necessities of the case both from the point of view of efficiency and of political necessity, recommend should be the policy. Obviously it will be necessary to bear in mind political considerations to a considerable extent jus as it has been in Chitral. On the other hand, unlike Chitral the Gilgit Scouts are being re-organized on a basis of 4 Companies of 100 men each permanently embodied, and 3 Companies of 80 each embodied for 4 months in a year, and as you know they will not have the backing of a battalion of regular troops in the manner that the Chitral Scouts have in Chitral. How far it will be necessary to break away from the old traditions and to substitute something more like the traditions of the Frontier Corps proper of Waziristan and Kurram, is a matter in which you after a personal investigation will be in a far stronger position to judge than we can from here. If you think that certain matters such as the position of the Political Agent vis-à-vis the Corps are too delicate to mention in your official report, there is no reason why you should not submit further suggestions in such matters by confidential and demi-official letter. 2. We have asked Lang, Resident of Kashmir, for his views as to your terms of reference, and shall be addressing you officially in the matter before you go up. This letter should therefore be regarded as private and personal. I may add that we also have been in communication with Schomberg and the decision to send you to Gilgit is mainly due to anxiety last a failure to place efficiency first might endanger the future of the Gilgit Agency. This is not to say that political considerations and the good-will of the Chiefs of the Gilgit Agency can be left out of account. It was because it was felt that you were the last person to leave such considerations on one side that it was decided to ask for your assistance in the matter.
____________________

inhabitants wish to join the Agency. Their forests will yield a considerable revenue, though not as great as formerly. Further it will cost little to take over the country, whereas their continuance as an independent territory means great anxiety and leads to a good deal of crime and raiding, in and near the Agency.
THE GILGIT AGENCY AND THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE.
The future of the newly organized Gilgit Agency, under the Resident in Kashmir appears to offer certain disadvantages. So long as it is remotely an administrative appendage of Kashmir, so long will the nexus with the Kashmir State prove a hindrance to the satisfactory working of the Agency, as it has undoubtedly in the past. Indeed, it would be safe to surmise that the removal of these complications has been one of the objects of the new formation. The alternatives are to make the Agency an independent until, directly under the Government of India, entirely free of control by either the Resident in Kashmir or the Government of the North-West Frontier Province. The difficulties here are considerable, from an administrative and routine standpoint. The second course is the incorporation of the Gilgit Agency in the North-West Frontier Province. The analogy would be with Berar, where, in spite of a good deal of artificial and interested agitation, the arrangement is a success and the susceptibilities of the ruler, H.E.H. the Nizam, sufficiently considered. It may be suggested that to incorporate the new Gilgit Agency with the North-West Frontier Province would mean a certain amount of interference and obstruction, for that is what such interference means, form the Legislative Assembly or Council of the province. That is true. But such pragmatism is inevitable, partly because if interference is the obstacle against uniting the Agency with the Frontier. It will not be escaped by retaining the connection with Kashmir. Indeed, if the link with Kashmir is preserved, obstruction either open in the Assembly there, or furtively, through the Darbar officials, will be source of real difficulty. No Kashmiri official will be able to resist criticism or interference.
The advantages for union with the R.W.F.P. are considerable and convincing.
(1) The Agency is predominantly Mahomedan.
(2) The problems of the Agency, vis-a-vis the frontier, are similar to those in the Frontier Province.
(3) Geographically the Agency is a part of the Province and not of Kashmir. (4) Commercially the tendency is for trade to develop with the Punjab, Via Abbottabad, and Peshawar is becoming a considerable center for Central Asiatic Traders, as the conditions there appeal to them.
(5) Security points to the need of the Agency being dealt with from N.W.F.F. and not from Kashmir. Police, army and air force arrangement should be centralized in the Frontier Province. (6) Economically, it is essential for the Agency to the linked with the Frontier Province. It is only thus that its inhabitants, many of whom belong to the most manly races in India, can have any hope of employment in the Constabulary. Army or Police as well as in the civil services of the Frontier administration. There is no danger of the province being swamped with would be employees. There will be a certain and proper demand for service under the Government, which will be met. Such service will neutralize to some extent the stringency caused by the withdrawal of the Kashmir troops.
If this agency be denied incorporation with the province, there can be no hope of any development. Gilgit has long been a backwater, and under the present proposals it will become over more stagnant economically than before. Its people have every right to expect that political changes should benefit them, and not damage them. The Kashmir State has been conspicuously unfriendly in the past towards the Agency. It is likely to become even more so in the future, for the new arrangement is recented by those in authority these.
The only solution seems to be close connection with the North-West Frontier Province, and the sooner that the fate of the Agency is decided, the better if will be.

THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE GILGIT AGENCY
The Gilgit Agency marches with (1) Chinese Turkestan (2) Tribal territory, viz. Tangir and Darel (3) Chitral. Its other boundaries are with the N.W.F. Province or with Kashmir. 2. The State of Hunza marches with Chinese Turkestan and Afghanistan. The ilaqa of ISHKOMAN with Afghanistan. The frontiers of the other States are separate from and unconnected with any part of the Indian frontier marching with foreign territory.
(a) The SARIKOL Pamir, as far as the URUK Jilga, on the right of the TASHKURGAN River, between DAFDAR AND TASHKURGAN Town, is claimed by the Mir of Hunza as his ow source of the "Oxus" by the Rt. Hon. G.N. Curzon" the map is so coloured as to support the claim. Unfortunately the Pamir Boundar committee of 1893 ignored the rights of the Mir, if he had any, either by accident or inadvertence. The Mir receives as tribute from the nomads in the area claimed, felts and ropes to the annual of about £10. He also grazes his sheep, and issues permits to his people, which have no value, to enter the Pamirs. Prior to the disturbances in Chinese Turkestan he had been in the habit of sending a tribute in gold to the Chinese The gold was, of course, a levy from his subjects. In return the Chinese used to send presents of a value of about £50. A photograph of the presentation of this tribute was always sent to the Chinese governor in URUMCHI.
(b) The land of SAFDAR ALI, later Mir of Hunza, who died in 1930, are claimed by the Mir. These land are situate in KUCHAR and near YARKAND.
Those at YARKAND were given to a former Mir of Hunza, when that State was a vassal of China, as a reward for good service. Those at LUCHAR were purchased by SAFDAR ALI. (c) Certain rights on the left bank of the RASKAL or YARKAND river, in territory known as RASKAM, viz. at KOKTASH and BASH ANDIJAN are claimed.
The value to the Mir of these rights at present are nil.
Certain rights in the MUSTAGH river, also known as the SHAKGAM or OPRANG are also claimed. With regard to the Mir's claims in the PAMIRS, there is no proof, and there is no tradition of Hunza rule. The present tribute from the Nomads represents no more than a wish to keep on friendly terms with a neighboring chief, who is also a co-religionist. The Mir's position in SARIKOL is a usurpation, and has always been rightly presented and opposed by the Chinese. As to SAFDAR ALI's land. He was feudatory of the Chinese, and never a British subject, and it is difficult to see how the present Mir, the nominee of the British and who, sui juris, has no status as a claimant, owing to his illegitimacy and juniority, can demand the possessions of his elder brother.
By Chinese law, only a Chinese national can own land in China, The Mir of Hunza's claim is unjust to the descendants of his brother, and wholly untenable by Chinese or by international law. H.B.M. Consul-General at Kashgar as well as the Political Agent in Gilgit should see that this absurd claim is not countenanced by them.
The SINO INDIAN frontier has never been settled. In most maps, Swedish, German, Russian and British, the frontier is shown along the Raskam River. The position is complicated by the undoubted right of the Mir to the whole of the BHALDU or NORTHERN SHINGSHAL valley, which lies beyond the main INDO-CENTRAL ASIATIC watershed.
The proper course is either to claim all the left side of the Raskam River, with some valuable but unused land, or to limit the Mir of Hunza to the whole of the area drained by the Mustagh river, up to its junction with the Raskam or Yarkand river at its junction at Chong Jilga. To round off the frontier the latter proposal is preferable, although it means the surrender of what is undoubtedly British territory, of no use to the Chinese but of considerable value to the Mir. Again certain parts of the Mustagh river are claimed by the Sarikol nomads, but this is a mere intrusion on their part.
The Chapursar Valley, in Western Hunza offers easy access to Afghnistan, and there is considerable intercourse locally betwe3en the two countries, as the population is the same race on both sides of the frontier. The situation cells for no comment, except in so far that this is a direct unsupervised way into India from Afghanistan. It is a way too that leads conveniently from Russian and Chinese territory. Refugees have come by this route, and as a precaution it might well be closed.
Ishkoman has communication with Afghanistan by the Karumbar river and the KHORA BHORT pass. This route is closed for six months, every year from May to October. It is little used, and calls for no comment, but it is and alternative to the route, from Afghan Wakhan to India via Chitral.

The TRANSFRONTIER ACTIVITIES OF THE MIR OF HUNZA.
The situation in the Gilgit agency is at once complicated and aggravated by the role played by the Mir of Hunza who, owing to the situation of his State and his claims to trans-frontier rights and privileges has extra-territorial commitments and interests which are at once undesirable and unique. Indeed, the Mir has become the sole arbiter on his part of the frontier. He has no qualifications for this role.
The writer of this report has observed the intrigues of the Mir, for over nine years and has realized that they are a real potential danger. The Mir maintains an elaborate intelligence system, and passes on to the Political Agent Gilgit such snippets of information, usually false, always incomplete, that his spies give him. The Mir has long had dealings with the Bolshevists, and offered into relations with them before the British Government did …… There is no use giving details about these matters. The ……….. that he does so, is undoubted.
The SARI..LIS on the SARIKOL PAMIR have always given tribute to the Mir. In 1933, when the troubles in Turkestan reached their area, they sent for help to the Mir, in case they were looted. The Mir was foolish enough, to promise this to them. When these nomads were pillaged they sent to the Mir asking him to redeem his pledge. He did not do so, and he could not, so the Sarikolis crossed into the Mir's territory at the Khunjerab Jilga and drove off his flooks. When Shah Mansur was one of the Khotan Amirs, he wrote for help to the Mir, who replied promising it. The murder of the Amir upset the Mir of Hunza, who had hoped for grants of land, and other benefits form Amir.
His intercourse with Shah Mansur was no hindrance to his remaining on friendly terms with MA-SHAo-WU, Taotai of Kashgar, who has many business dealings with the Mir, very much to the Taotai disadvantage.
An unpleasant episode in 1934 was the case of a Russian Tartar from Kazan who, landing in India with a Turkish passport, was allowed to travel via Chitral to Sinkiang. In his company were two other Tertars who alleged that they had picked him up at Bombay. This man and his party were robbed of their arms in the Pamirs. It is difficult to say by whom, but one of the arms found its way to the Mir of Hunza.
This Tartar who want by the name of Abdul Hamid sent word to the Mir that he would kill any Hunza man he met ; whereupon the Mir ordered his flocks to be driven back over the frontier, and let his subjects feni for themselves. This man, Abdul Hamid, after being detained at Misgar, crossed the frontier, and murdered a harmless nomad one maron from the border. This sort of episode is dangerous, and may lead to a serious incidents on the frontier. The Mir's intrigues are futile, and mischievous, and should be stopped entirely. There should be a proper post established and there should be no activity allowed by any one beyond the frontier. What is the political agent at Gilgit, or in the case of those coming from Kashghar, but from no place nearer the frontier, of the Consul-General there. It will be realized that a guard of local levies will be quite useless for such duties. Gurkhas would be ideal troops. The Soviet has now established itself in the Pamirs and Western Sinkiang and in a very short while conditions there will be the same as now prevail in Outer Mangolia. Some form of supervision and control are needed. On one part of the frontier there is an elaborate system of intelligence, and in a part of the same frontier, within sight of Russia, China and Afghanistan there is no control or guard at all. This policy seems inconsistent and hardly prudent.
The discontent in Hunza offers a soil ready, even avid, for Bolshevist propaganda. Indeed, it is already there. on man, KALANDAR, a Hunza man who fled some years ago to Soviet Russia, has a good post under the Bolshevists. With him went another man who has not been given more than a Junior Job. The whole situation in the Gilgit Agency calls for some sort of re-organization, and the situation in Hunza and in Nagir must be dealt with promptly, by a British officer. Even in Gilgit town itself there is a good deal of Bolshevist propaganda and the appeal is against the Mirs and the Darbar to there sympathetic conditions under the red flag. There is nothing in the proposals for administering the new Gilgit Agency that can deal even superficially with any or these problems.

Mr. Walton.
I have read these papers with the greatest interest. I know Colonel Schoberg slightly. He is a very energetic man who walks hard and talks hard, and it would appear form the correspondence writes hard and types hard also. What he says, however, should be taken with a grain of salt as I know he harbours grievances - imaginary or real - against the Government of India, and he never fails to make use of this fact.
Where there is smoke there must be some fire however, and I do think that no manner regime is to be introduced into the Gilgit Agency that it would be advisable for the Government of India to review the situation. The best part of Colonel Schomberg's note is that in which he refers to the possibility of the Gilgit Agency coming under the North West Frontier Province under the regime. It is a Mohammedan country and it would come under officials who have very great experience in dealing with Mohammedan people. Another great experience is dealing with Mohammedan people. Another great advantage would be that the Scouts (whose improvement to my mind is essential) would come under the Inspector of Frontier Corps, and this would mean the periodical inspection of these Scouts by the Inspector of Frontier Corps. This would I am sure lead to efficiency. I am inclined to think that the efficiency of the Gilgit Scouts would also be improved if another British officer was posted to the Corps, but this would cost money and I am doubtful if the N.W.F.P. finances would run to it. What Colonel Schomberg says about the infiltration of Bolshevism through the Gilgit Agency is interesting and in my opinion demands attention. Here again, should the Agency come under the N.W.F.P. it would be possible to introduce a system of Intelligence which might do much to cope with infiltration of Bolshevism. If the Agency is brought under the N.W.F.P. the easiest and most natural line of approach would be from Hazara through Abbottabad, which is as you know it, close proximity to the Head Quarters of N.W.F.. both at Peshawar and Nathia Gali.
In view of the above I strongly support the ………….. of Mr. Metcalfe being approached C.O. When handling Colonel Schomberg's paper he will have to exercise tact as if the Kashmir officials, and others, were to get hold of it they would I think be justifiably annoyed. G-12- POLITICAL- SCOUTS AND LIVES= (CONCLUDED)
istrict or Province Detailed Heads Particulars of Charge Or kind of expenditure. 1984.85
` 1985.80
Increase
Decrease
No. Amount No. Amount
Gilgit Civil Levies- (concluded.) Havildars at Rs. 8. p.m. each 3 288 3 288
…. …. Leives ,, ,, 10 ,, ,, 27 3,240 27 3,240 …. ….
,, ,, ,, 8 ,, ,, 21 2,016 21 2,016 ….
…. ,, ,, ,, 6 ,, ,, 9 648 9 648 ….
…. Mukadam allowance ….. … 2,150 …. 2,150 …. ….
Total …… 71 10,094 71 10,094 …. …. Raja Orderlies’ pay ….. 1 720 1 720 …. ….
Dismissed Levies’ allowance …. 600 … 540 …. 60
Total …. 1 1,320 1 1,260 …. 60 Pay and Local allowance to Levy Munshi (6th clerk) …. 1 1,342 1
*1,342 …. …. Pension Conribution to above(1/6th of average emoluments) …. 336 ….
336 …. …. Total ….. 1 1,678 1 1,678 …. …. Total Establishment Levies 203 23,496 203 23,436 …. 60
L.A. Local allowance to Head Quarters Civil Levies and Khalasis …. 1,304
….
1,304 …. …. Ty. A. Temporary allowance …. 1,101 …. 1,101 …. ….
D.A. Dearness …. 7,884 …. 7,884 …. ….
Total…. …. 10,289 …. 10,289 …. ….
T.A. Cont. Travelling allowance to Levy Munshi
Contingencies for Chilas Levies …. 276 …. 276 …. ….
General contingencies …. 2,000 …. 2,000 …. ….
Alteration for rounding …. -12 …. 8 20 ….
Total Civil Levies 203 36,299 203 36,299 20 60
Grand Total 931 91,600 931 94,000 2,460 60

G 12 – POLITICAL- MISCELLENIOUS
Province Detailed
Head
Particulars of charge
Or
Kind of expenditure
1984-85
1985-86
Increase
Decrease
No. Amount No. Amount
Rasad and Entertainments Rasad and Entertainments of Chiefs … …
3,000 … 3,000 … … Total … … 3,000 … 3,000 … …
Traveling Allowance Traveling Allowance to Vakils … … 500 … 500 … …
Total … … 500 … 500 … …
Miscellaneous Durbar Present … … 3,500 … 3,500 … …
Total … … 3,500 … 3,500 … …
Ferry. Jamadar … 1 120 1 120 … … Raftsmen at Rs. S per mensem each
… 4 384 4
384 … … Cantingencies … … 240 … 240 … …
Renewal of the ferry boatat Chilas … … …… …
*1,200 1,200 … Total … 5 744 5 1,944 1,200 …
L.A. Local allowance … … 302 … 302 … … D.A. Dearness allowance … … 192 … 192 … …
By. A. Temporary allowance … … 126 … 126 … …
Total … … 620 … 620 … …
Grand Total … 5 8.364 5 9,564 1,200 …
N.R. Subject to Sanction of His Highness the Maharaja Bahadur.

G 14 – MINOR DEPARTMENTS- AGENCY GARDENS.
District of
Province Detailed
Head
Particulars of charge
Or
Kind of expenditure
1984-85
1985-86
Increase
Decrease
No. Amount No. Amount
Gilgit. Establishments Head Gardener at Rs. 16 p.m. … 1 192 1 192 …
… Coolies at Rs. 9 p.m each … 2 216 2 216 … … ,, ,, 8 ,, ,, … 4 384 4 384
… … Total … 7 792 7 792 … …
Cont. Contingencies … … 100 … 100 … …
L.A. Local allowance for the above gardener and Coolies
…
…
475 …
*475 … … D.A. Dearness allowance … … 264 … 264 … …
Ty.A. Temporary allowance … … 198 … 198 … …
Grand Total … 7 1,829 7 1,829 … …
*The Local Allowance for the Garden Staff is to be met from the provision of Rs, 763 made in the Budget G,-14 the Local Allowance to Garden Staff, No separate provision is made.

Details of expenditure adopted in the estimate 1985- 86 chargeable to Capital Account.
Major Heads. Amount. Remarks.
G.3.-FORESTS … 1,53,000 Worming Plans
Roads and Bridge (new Projects)
Compensation of land rights … 30,700
… 1,18,100
… 4,430
Total … 1,53,230
G.4- TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE 85,000 Telegraph lines to Bhadarwah and Kishtwar.
30,000 Telegraph lines to Pahlgam … 16,885
Telephone connections … 25,000
Installation of 3rd position Switch Board in Central Battery Exchange.
13,219
Total … 85,104
G.16.- SERICULTURM … 1,69,000 Thermo ventilators for Filature No.2 …
8.500
Settling tanks … 5,900
Italian Basin for Filature No.3 … 1,50,000
Machinery for above … 5,000 Total … 1,69,400 G.23.- PUBLIC WORKS … 4,08,000 Roads and Buildings … 43,653
Irrigation … 1,90,820
Electric … 1,73,054
Total … 4,07,527

ABSTRACT OF BUDGET ESTIMATE
Page Head. Receipts. Actuals Budget
1984-85 Revised
1984-85 Budget
1985-86
Rs. Rs. Rs. Rs. Rs. Rs. Opening Balance Cash 70,48,892 60,58,265 77,89,492 70,50,000,
83,39,000 91,69,000 Investment 74,65,3000 75,05,300 75,59,300 75,59,000
75,59,000 80,59,000 7 I Land Revenue .. 53,18,843 54.69,640 21,75,875 53,60,000
54,92.000 53,20,000 7 II Customs .. 39,17,593 39,88,978 22,30,199 40,25,000
46,55,000 48,00,000 7 III Grazing Fees .. 7,17,085 9,72,293 3,00,107 8,00,000
7,75,000 6,75,000 8 IV Excise .. 3,90,688 3,83,245 1,92,859 3,59,000
3,90,000 4,00,000 8 V Property in British India .. 93,671 77,181 2,60,931 70,000 84,000
1,86,000 8 VI Stamps .. 5,55,274 5,31,845 2,71,529 5,48,000
5,18,000 5,30,000 9 VII Courts of Low .. 1,03,599 1,05,216 47,176 1,03,000
88,000 1,05,000
9 VIII Jails .. 43,115 50,951 31,418 49,000 52,000 47,000 9 IX Telegraph and Telephone .. 89,773 70,428 40,094 79,000 68,000 74,000 10 X Scientific Departments .. 52,861 55,206 42,942 84,000 1,03,000 2,15,000 10-11 XI Minor Departments .. 4,11,921 3,67,049 2,14,863
3,55,000 3,50,000 2,37,000 11 XII Sericulture .. 27,96,529 21,29,051 15,35,473 28,00,000
28,85,000 29,00,000 11 XIII Interest .. 4,47,842 4,65,118 2,19,270 4,00,000
4,31,000 4,50,000 12 XIV Forest .. 66,75,243 71,24,002 28,30,144 72,50,000
77,56,000 76,00,000 13 XV Miscellaneous .. 3,83,096 4,97,647 1,65,860 3,26,000
4,73,000 3,42,000 14 XVI Military .. 1,98,346 1,55,791 93,671 2,00,000
1,97,000 2,02,000 14 XVII Public Works .. 10,55,753 10,08,405 4,49,290 11,03,000
11,19,000 10,43,000 Total Budget .. 2,32,71,232 2,34,52,046 1,11,01,701 2,39,11,000
2,54,36,000 2,51,26,000 Net Result of Debt and Remittance Heads. Debt

Heads Investments 4,98,315 7,37,745 8,24,4,78 1,75,000 .........
........ 40,000 54,000 ...... ...... 5.00.000 ...... GRAND TOTAL .. 3,83,23,739 3,78,07,356 2,72,74,971 3,86,95,000
4,18,34,000 4,23,54,000

VIL- COURTS OF LAW.
ESTAMATES ACTUALS
1985-86 1984-85 First 6 Months 1984 1983. 1982.
Rs. Rs. Rs. Rs. Rs.
Fines under Shali Regulation .. 200 200 .... 24 671
Magisterial and Judicial Fines .. 45,600 40,400 19,259 39,902 38,400
Recoveries in Pauper Suits .. 600 1,100 354 1,864 1,106
Registration Fees .. 55,900 55,200 26,190 61,173 58,668

Miscellaneous .. 2,700 6,100 1,373 2,253 4,754
Total .. 1,05,000 1,03,000 47,176 1,05,216 1,03,599

VILL- JAILS
ESTIMATES. ACTUALS.
1985-86 1984-85 First 6 Months 1984 1983. 1982
Rs. Rs. Rs. Rs. Rs.
Jail Presses .. 31,000 31,000 23,184 31,354 18,911
Jail Manufacture .. 15,500 16,500 7,545 19,286 22,935
Hire of Convicts .. ..... 100 48 14 …..
Miscellanceour .. 500 1,400 641 297 1,269
Total .. 47,000 49,000 31,418 50,951 43,115

IX- TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE.
ESTIMATES. ACTUALS.
1985-86 1984-85 First 6 Months 1984 1983. 1982
Rs. Rs. Rs. Rs. Rs.
Telegraph Stamps .. 23,000 23,000 14,213 23,398 25,465
Service Telegrams .. 40,000 47,000 23,924 46,392 63,325
Telephone receipts .. 10,000 8,000 100 ...... .....
Miscellancous .. 1,000 1,000 1,857 638 985
Total .. 74,000 79,000 40,000 70,429 88,773

XV- MISCELLANEOUS
ESTIMATES. ACTUALS.
1985-86 1984-85 First 6 Months 1984 1983. 1982
Rs. Rs. Rs. Rs. Rs.
Bazars and Fairs .. .. 1,100 .. .. .. Boat Tax .. .. .. 11,879 13,062 10,520
Brick Kiln Licenses .. 1,200 1,200 869 1,130 962
Cattle pounds .. 16,400 16,300 10,909 16,092 17,362
College Receipts .. 19,200 19,600 11,489 20,447 21,710
Commission Share of Pensionable Sericulture Employees .. 1,500 1,500 398
1.308 2,259 Contracts Miscellaneous .. 17,500 18,500 16,378 26,955 22,738
Contribution from Education Cess Fund .. 40,000 40,000 .. 40,000 45,000
Cost of Message from Government Observatory Department .. 1,400 1,400 ..
1,365 1,365 Cost of paper realized from sale of forms .. 400 .. 92 342 ..
Fees Miscellaneous .. 20,000 18,000 9,818 16,811 16,540
Gain on Exchange .. 200 .. .. .. ..
Gold Exchange .. 100 100 50 1,157 15
Industrial Education .. 8,700 8,200 5,137 7,664 4,629
Lapsed Deposits .. 55,000 42,000 6,766 75,549 41,085
Leper Hospital Receipts .. .. 100 .. 50 27
Miscellaneous .. 5,000 12,000 21,401 9,514 24,432
Motor Registration and License Fees .. 40,000 7,600 8,233 6,989 4,919
Offering at Shrines .. 100 100 .. .. ..
Pensionary Contribution .. 5,500 7,000 3,478 7,482 18,610
Premium on Hundies .. 100 100 43 533 71
Recoveries of Arrear Service Payment .. 60,500 60,500 27,036 1,04,973
49,010 Sale proceeds of old Stores and Materials .. 3,000 6,000 1,443 4,642

5,385 Sale proceeds of Stores purchased in connection with Rajtilak Celebrations
.. ..
1800 798 2,887 ..
Sale of service and Character Books .. 300 100 96 188 139
Schools Fees .. 17,000 12,800 8,123 14,663 13,566
State Presents or Nazarana .. 6,600 10,200 10,252 95,051 11,988
Tambols .. .. .. .. 7 10,307
Tolls from Government Ferries .. 8,100 10,600 10,168 25,496 24,207
Do. Joint Bride and Ferries .. 14,000 29,000 .. 3,057 34,213
Tribute from Poonch .. 200 200 .. 233 233
Ubclaimed Hundies .. .. .. 1,003 .. 1,604
Total .. 3,26,000 3,26,000 1,65,860 4,97,647 3,83,096

DETAIL OF GRANT 5- MAHARAJA AND COURT- (concluded)
NUMBERS. ESTAMATE ACTUALS.
1985-86 1984-85 1985-86 1984-85 First 6 Months 1984 1983 1982
DEMISE OF HIS LATE HIGHNESS MAHARAJA SIR PRATAP SINGH BAHADUR Rs. Rs.
Rs. Rs. Rs. Charsali of His Highness .. .. .. 1,67,000 .. .. .. .. Coffins .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 29,975
First day Expenses .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 5,23,442
Tenth day Expreses .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 586
Daily Sharads and Samagris .. .. .. .. .. .. 198 ..
Entertainment Charges .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 15,312
General Transport .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2,584
Despatch of Asties .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,924
Kirya Expenses .. .. .. .. .. .. 27,765 79,292
Dispatch of Chhai .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 47,406
Miscellaneous .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 15,532
Barkhi .. .. .. .. .. .. 36,502 ..
Total .. .. .. 1,67000 .. .. 64,465 7,16,053
MISCELLANEOUS
Debt of late Raja Sir Ram Singh Sahib .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 28,762
Badast-i-Khas .. .. .. 25,000 25,000 1,000 24,243 20,383
Celebration of His Highness Brithday .. .. .. 25,000 25,000 19,457 22,954
1,326
Tambols .. .. .. 9,000 9,000 49,966 25,916 16,500
Khillats .. .. .. 17,600 17,600 3,690 7,635 14,826
Births .. .. .. 2,000 2,000 .. .. 16,058
Marriages .. .. .. 1,000 1,000 .. .. 3,059
Deaths .. .. .. 5,000 5,000 22,360 2,528 715
Religious Ceremonies .. .. .. 21,416 19,353 12,751 6,368 5,089
Miscellaneous Donations .. .. .. 33,650 33,650 26,601 40,259 29,975
Newspapers .. .. .. .. .. 6 838 128
Conveyance of Inner Deorhi .. .. .. 15,000 15,000 .. 2,712 8,910
Electric Lighting Palaces .. .. .. 94,722 2,00,485 29,384 67,621
41,490
Postage and Telegrams .. .. .. 3,612 3,612 756 3,296 13,475
Furnishing of Palaces .. .. .. 75,000 1,75,000 8,028 1,16,654
3,344
Repairs to Palaces Furniture .. .. .. 1,900 1900 .. 169
.. Tour and Visits of His Highness .. .. .. 1,00,000 1,00,000 19,766
76,369 1,068
.. .. .. 4,29,900 6,33,600 1,93,600 3,97,562

2,05,108 DETAIL OF GRANT6 - ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC DEPARTMENTS- (concluded)
NUMBERS. ESTAMATE ACTUALS.
1985-86 1984-85 1985-86 1984-85 First 6 Months 1984 1983 1982
Rs. Rs. Rs. Rs. Rs.
Salary .. 1 1 6,760 7,200 3,600 6,365 6,485
Establishment .. 28 35 21,144 22,551 10,289 16,553 15,103
Traveling Allowance .. .. .. 5,450 4,930 2,302 4,465 4,166
Dearness ,, .. .. .. 1,632 1,632 737 1,634 1,512
Temporary ,, .. .. .. 5,286 5,638 2,206 4,111 3,723
Contingencies .. .. .. 976 1,021 284 1,099 1,366
Postage and Telegrams .. .. .. 312 308 187 218 203
Total .. 29 36 41,590 43,300 19,605 34,445 32,558
Total Account Office .. 211 216 2,28,100 2,25,300 1,00,591
2,03,426 2,02,835
GOVERNORS- Salaries .. 6 6 27,330 37,810 18,399 35,454 38,631
Establishment .. 130 130 35,580 36,211 18,414 35,729 36,844
General Record-keepers .. 39 39 12,858 12,647 5,849 12,120 12,625
Traveling Allowance .. .. .. 7,750 7,750 2,227 6,529 5,265
Dearness ,, .. .. .. 7,176 7,176 3,784 7,703 7,040
Temporary ,, .. .. .. 9,907 9,907 4,830 10,611 10,043
Contingencies .. .. .. 5,033 4,833 1,300 5,689 5,193
Postage and Telegrams .. .. .. 10,666 10,666 2,067 5,566 8,992
Tot
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