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Free Balawaristan - Old secret documents
P.S. - Amir-ul-Mulk asked me to-day what he should do in the event of Muhammad Wali turning up in the Ghizr valley. I replied that being un-acquainted with the feedings of the people, of that district; I was not in a posi¬tion to offer advice. I added that he himself (Amir-ul-Mulk) would know best whether he could rely on the people to support him.
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No. 4, dated Chitral, the 12th January 1895 (demi-official),
From – Lieutenant B.E.M. Gurdon, Political Officer, Chitral,
To – Surgeon – Major G.S. Robertson, C.S.I.
I did not write yesterday as there was nothing of importance to communicate, and I have decided to write now every second day unless there is any very urgent news. I am afraid there is very little chance of my hearing from Mr. Udny yet a while as Umra Khan has given strict orders to Akram Jan not to let any messengers pass. I hope, however Mr. Udny may be able to put pressure on Umra Khan eventually. Since, the Mehtar’s murder, I have sent two letters to Mr. Udny. I here that one letter has been stopped by Akram Jan, and there is no news so far of the other messenger. Mir-ul-Mulk has declared in Darbar that Umra Khan in his friend and he says he has sent messages to the Khan, asking him to reinforce his garrisons in Dir and Narsat, so that he may come to his. (Amir-ul-Mulk) assistance, if necessary. Umra Khan is probably delighted that Nizam-ul-Mulk; has been killed, but, at the same time, if I am not mistaken, he la too clever to assist Amir-ul-Mulk openly. Amir-ul-Mulk, by way I suppose of shewing me his power, sent me a letter which he had received from Akram Jan congratulating him on his accession, and stating that Umra Khan was ready to assist him. I took the letter very coolly. I said I was glad to see that Amir-ul-Mulk and the Khan's officials were such good friends. I added, however, that I wondered why Umra Khan had not written himself. Amir-ul-Mulk spends the grater part of the day in giving away people's houses and property to his friends. He has not, however, so far as I have been able to ascertain killed any one with the exception of Nayab. I cautioned him at the outset that we would not tolerate wholesale murdering and so far this warning has, I believe, been the means of saving many lives. Since the arrival of the detachment of the Sikhs the people generally have become less anxious. They feared before that my small party might be attacked, and that the Sarkar would take a terrible revenge. Now that the Sikhs have arrived, they know that no one will dare to annoy me, and those who were formerly is terror of their lives feel comparatively safe. Such is our prestige that I am convinced that the whole country will acquiesce in our plans as to the Mehtarship without striking a blow whether they approve of them or not. I am afraid Government will be both to accept the responsibility of making little Shuja-ul-Mulk Mehtar, but I do not see what other course we can pursue. If Amir-ul-Mulk is recognised, we shall be obliged to keep a Political Officer herewith an escort to restrain the boy from killing our friends. Whether we like it or not, we shall be obliged to interfere more or less in the internal affairs of the country, and I am sure it is the better policy in the long run to recognise this at once and bring up. Shuja-ul-Mulk as our nominee. A prince who has been literally seated on the throne by ourselves is much more likely to be loyal than a youth who has started by killing our best friends and who as soon as we have recognised him will no doubt listen to the advise of our enemies and gradually accustom himself to the idea that he is absolutely independent. Amir-ul-Mulk's advisers are all of the faction opposed to ns, and we pursue a weak policy now you may be sure that our friends and the country generally will have a bad time, and what is worse, our prestige on the whole of this frontier will be very considerably depreciated. It would, perhaps be more satisfactory in some ways to put up Sher Afzal as Mehtar, but I am inclined to think Shuja-ul-Mulk would be a more popular selection. Shah Afzal is a weak individual, and is not respected by any one as far as I can't make out. Had he possessed any, force of character, he might have been in the fort ere this. I am still of the opinion that we can with safety pursue any line of policy we wish without moving up large quantities of troops. If we reinforce Mastaj with 100 rifles and hold 200 at Chashi in support, and you come up with some local levies we do not want any more. The moment we announce that we will not support Amir-ul-Mulk the boy will probably fly with as much loot as he can lay hands on. The poorer classes are probably with us to a man, as it is, and we have only to announce that we intend to support Shuja-ul-Mulk and the followers of Afzul-ul-Mulk, and Nizam-ul-Mulk will be with us also if they are not so already. Thanks to the efforts of Aksakul Fatteh Ali Shah and his brother Bahadur supplies are coming in fairly rapidly. I am trying to collect here six months. P. S. - Harley will have told you the news in the Mastuj district. All letters should, I think, be sent through him under flying seal, so that he may be acquainted with all that goes on and that we may work together.
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No. 12, dated Chitral, the 14th January 1895 (demi-official).
From - LIEUTENANT B. R. M. GURDON, Political Officer, Chitral,
To - SURGEON-MAJOR G. S. ROBERTSON, C.S.I.
Your demi-official No. 250 of the 8th instant reached me this morning. It is very good of you to write so kindly, and it is a great help to me to feel that you have confidence in me. My strength here at present is-
2 Native Officers (including Rab Nawaz Khan)
53 Sepoys.
1 Bugler.
The have 170 rounds of ammunition per man, and I hope in a couple of days more to have collected five months' supplies. As far as wheat it concerned. I do not anticipate any difficulty, but I may have some trouble in getting ghee and dall.
I do not quite understand from your letter whether you wish me to bring down the remaining 40 Sikhs from Mastuj. I do not think this is advisable at present as we are a bit cramped for room. In one way it would be a good thing to bring the Sikhs down, as the climate of Chitral is milder than Mastuj, and I understand from Harley that the health of his detachment is not very good. As far as defending this house goes 50 men are-ample. The position is excel¬lent and the Sikhs are very fit, and we will teach the Chitralis a severe lesson if they have the temerity to attack us. Any way I will await your further instructions before getting the other 40 men down. I should of course like to have another British officer with me, but for a few days it will be as well for Harley to remain at Mastuj so as to tell Gough about the people. Harley has, J. think shewn considerable tact in his intercourse with the Adamzadas assembled at Mastuj. As I have said before I don't think this, is likely. Even in the event of Sher Afzal turning up the Chitralis are so convinced of our strength ' that they will make no effort to dislodge me. Amir-ul-Mulk visited me again to-day. He had heard of the movement of the troops from Gupis and was very nervous*in consequence. I reassured the Darbar and told the headmen that it was a hard-and-fast rule with us to move no detachments in support of one another when a country was in a disturbed state. I added that I had written reassuring letters to you, and that they need not fear that a large force was corning, though men would undoubtedly be kept ready to descend on Chitral should the people stow the least signs, of hostility towards my Government. As before Kokan Beg and his son, Muhammad Afzal Beg, were the principal speakers at the Darbar. I make a point of most polite to these gentlemen, and the scoundrel who shot poor Nizam is entertained with tea. This man is now got up in the most gorgeous apparel, and he carries Amir-ul-Mulk's shoes and handkerchief. He also invariably has a loaded rifle, and my only fear is that some day he will let it off by accident. Amir-ul-Mulk continues to give away house, but he refrains from killing people though he is trying his best to lure Ghulam Dastgir away from Mr. Udny camp. I have advised the latter in reply to a message he sent me to remain, where he is until the horizon becomes clearer. Amir-ul-Mulk has a personal ..... against Ghulam and would kill him at all cost and afterwards explain to me that one of the latter's numerous enemies had killed him, and that; he had no hand in the murder. It is no doubt a fact that Ghulam has many enemies, and it is better that he should remain where he is. Inayat Khan has arrived here and is in a great fright as Amir-ul-Mulk abused him for being so tardy in coming to salaam to him. I have run out of rupees, but Inayat Khan has promised to lend mo Es. 2,000 as soon as he gets an opportunity of visiting the hill where he has hidden his treasure; he truly says that the money is much safer in my hands than anywhere else. There is plenty of money at Mastuj also, and have asked Harley to send me some, as it is important that I should pay for supplies promptly.
As regards helping Mastuj with supplies I hope to be able to send there about 100 rounds of wheat from Drasan, and perhaps another 50 maunds from Reshun; but I cannot say anything for certain yet. Of course 1 will do my best in the matter, but I must collect supplies quietly, otherwise these people will get alarmed. I had a long letter from Mr. Udny on the 12th which I will send on to you tomorrow : I have not had time to get it copied yet. Mr. Udny has got in a jirga from Umra Khan and my letters are not likely to be interrupted any more. I have taken the opportunity to telegraph to Colonel Durand, as if your letters are delayed and the wire is broken, Government may get anxious about the position here. Colonel Durand will be able to reassure the Viceroy and Mr. Cunningham. I enclose copy of my telegram for your information. There are rumours abroad that Sher Afzal is near at hand, but I don't believe it.
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P.S. - I will, of course, be very careful about my personal safety.
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Telegram No. 10, dated the 14th January 1895.
From - LIEUTENANT B. E. M. GURDON, Political Officer, Chitral,
To - COLONEL A. DURAND, C.B., Military Secretary to His Excellency the Viceroy, Calcutta. Incase your advice, should be asked regarding the situation in Chitral, I wire to let you know that no anxiety need be felt regarding the safety of my party. I have fifty men of 14th Sikhs with 170 rounds per man. I have already collected two months' rations and hope to get another two months supplies within a week. The house I occupy is a miniature fort, well suited for defence and situated on the bank of a nullah the water of which cannot be diverted by an enemy. As you know', the Chitralis are not likely to attack me under these cir¬cumstances especially as my position cannot be commanded. My one objects, since the murder of the Mehtar; has been to strengthen my own position and remain neutal until the orders of Government are received at Gilgit. Amir-ul-Mulk is at present on his good behaviour in the hope of being recognised by us. Affairs are likely to remain quiet unless Sher Afzal turns up and even then my position is perfectly safe as I shall maintain a neutral attitude until I receive orders. I heard from Mr. Robertson today, Mastuj is to be reinforced by 100 rifles under end moves up to Ghizr with 200 rifles; Gough will probably reach Mastuj tomorrow the 15th. Amir-ul-Mulk was primarily instigated to murder Nizam by Umra Khan, and Sher Afzal's adherents of course willingly jumped at the opportunity of removing another obstacle to their patron's success. Amir-ul-Mulk is a mere puppet in the bands of the Sher Afzal faction. I am sending copy of this telegram to Resident, Sialkot. My object in wiring direct, is to reassure Government regarding my position as I understand that the Gilgit wire is broken and that the post is working badly.
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No. 13 D.O., dated Chitral, the 15th January 1895 (demi-official).
From – LIEUTENANT B.E.M. GURDON, Political Officer, Chitral,
To – SURGEON MAJOR G.S. ROBERTSON C.S.I.
In continuation of my demi-official No. 12, dated the 14th January. I alluded in my demi-official No. 5 of the 12th instant to Townshend to a report that Muhammad Wall had been murdered. Townshend does not, how¬ ever, make any allusion to this rumour in his letters to me .I am inclined, therefore, to doubt the truth of it. Muhammad Ran and Shahid-ul-Aman were present at my Darbar yesterday, and I noticed that they looked very gloomy when I mentioned that we had moved up troops to Ghizr. These gentlemen evidently hoped that Muhammad Wall would arrive on the scene before we had had time to move up troops.
You may rely on me not to retire on Mastuj. I fully realise that my safest plan is to remain where I am besides a retrograde movement would be attributed to fear, and we must be most careful that our prestige does not suffer in any way. Also it would, not be fair on the people for me to withdraw. Amir-ul-Mulk is a mere boy without much character, and he is, as you say, the tool of abler men. The men in question are of the faction opposed to us, and any one who may have assisted me during the last fortnight would have a warm time of it if I were to withdraw. Whatever policy Government pursue regarding the Mehtarship we shall he obliged to interfere more than we have done hitherto in the internal affairs of Chitral. It would be a great stroke of policy to have a telegraph line to Chitral. The presence of a Political Officer at Chitral itself with an escort of, say, 100 rifles with a maxim gun in a strong position would suffice to keep the country quiet. Another 100 men at Mastuj and the telegraph line would be sufficient support. I am averse to posting many men at Mastuj itself, because the cold there is so intense and firewood is not procurable close at hand and consequently a great deal of Kar Begar is entailed. The Adamzadas of course would like to see us out of the country altogether, and failing this they prefer our being in Mastuj to our having troops in Chitral .itself. The poorer classes, however, would be glad if our men were divided between the two places, as the burden on them would thus be more equally divided. Amir-ul-Mulk is said to be in a more despondent frame of mind this morning. The dak runners from Mastuj and Gupis bring in all sorts of absurd rumours and Amir-ul-Mulk's spirits rise and fall according to the news they bring. Men of all parties visit the Jemadar all day with a view to professing their loyalty to the Sarkar; and the people are evidently very doubtful about our accepting Amir-ul-Mulk as Mehtar. I did my best yesterday to reassure the headmen, but it is difficult to make them believe anything in their present excited state. However, they will probably quiet down in the next few days. Amir-ul-Mulk himself seems to be absolutely devoid of courage; and such is his anxiety now that I should not be surprised to hear any day that he had fled. Bahadur, brother of Aksakal Fateh Ali Shah, has just brought in 100 maunds of wheat from Shogot. This man has done excellent service in procuring supplies for us.
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No. 586-D.O., dated Gilgit, the 8th January 1895 (demi-official).
From - CAPTAIN W. STEWART, Assistant British Agent, Gilgit,
To – H.S. Barnrs, Esq., Resident in Kashmir.
I forward the marginally noted correspondence in original in continuation of my telegram of this date.
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P.S. – I hope we may be supplies with copies when printed.
No. 23-D.O., dated Chitral, the 21st January 1895 (demi-official).
From – Lieutenant B.E.M. Gurdon, Political Officer, Chitral.
To – Surgeon-Major G.S. Robertson, C.S.I.
The Chitralis have been in a state of intense excitement since this morning owing to a report that Umra Khan with a large force had arrived at Ashreth. I deferred writing to you until this evening as I did not believe the rumour at first. There seems to be no doubt, however, that there is a certain amount of truth in the rumour. Umra Khan himself is still on the far side of the Lawarai pass, hut a consider¬able number of his retainers under the leadership of Majid Khan of Shahi have actually arrived at Ashreth. Early in the morning Amir-ul-Mulk sent me a couple of letters which he had received from Umra Khan, one being addressed to himself and the other to Kohkan Beg, the Governor of Drosh. These letters appeared to be genuine, so I took the precaution of taking copies of them, and I now enclose for your information English translations. Amir-ul-Mulk informed the Jemadar whom I had sent to the fort for the purpose of arranging for supplies for your escort that he feared Umra Khan intended to attack Drosh, and he asked him to obtain my advice as to what should be done I replied that he would be wise to take measures to strengthen the garrison of Drosh and also to occupy any suitable Darband there might be so as to oppose Umra Khan's advance should that Chief shew signs of marching on Chitral. I added that did not believe that Umra Khan would invade Chitral, but that I would myself write him a letter with a view to ascertaining his intentions. I enclose a copy of the letter which I have written to Umra Khan, and I hope you will approve of the wording of it. I cannot be certain of course, but I have reason to believe that Amir-ul-Mulk in the first instance asked the Khan to come to his assistance against us. Now that Umra Khan is near at hand, and Amir-ul-Mulk sees that all the Chitralis of experience are opposed to the scheme of allowing Umra Khan to advance into the country, he appears to/have changed his mind, and he has despatched all the available men in Chitral to garrison Drosh. The men of Lutkho, Murikho, Turikho and Mastuj have also been summoned to oppose the invader and further Amir-ul-Mulk has despatched his mother to parley with Umra Khan. It is possible; however, that Amir-ul-Mulk still intends to act in concert with Umra Khan, and all these preparations may have been made with a view to set at rest my suspicions. Anyhow it is always best to be on the safe side, and as in any case you are coming here with a strong escort it may perhaps he as well if you hasten your departure from Ghizr. I do not think it advisable for any troops to move on here until you arrived. At Mastuj, as if Amir-ul-Mulk intends treachery it would not be safe for a small body of sepoys to march along the Chitral road. The most important point now is for you and your escort to reach Mastuj with¬out delay. Ghlzr also should be strongly held, as it is possible that Muhammad Wali may make an effort to cut, our communications if he is still in the land of the living. I mention Muhammad Wali again as Umra Khan is said to have sent directions to him that he should make a descent on Yasen and that he himself (e.g. Umra Khan) would attack Chitral and thus divide our attentions. The Chitralis generally are well aware of the ability of Umra may turn up here and know that if he enters their country it will only be with the object of acquiring another slice of territory. They are, consequently even if Amir-ul-Mulk really intends treachery he will probably be unable to carry out his schemes.
At the same time it is always possible that Umra Khan may turn up here and after closing the road above Chitral attack my party. Mind you I do not think his is probable as I give Umra Khan the credit of being too clever to be so foolish as to give himself away so entirely. Umra Khan and his followers are, however, said to have sworn a jehad over the grave of the Baba Sahib and it is just possible that they may mean business. It should also be remembered that Mr. Udny is entirely in the hands of an Afghan- escort, and though the Sipah Salar will probably recognise that it is to his advantage to oppose Umra Khan one can never be certain what may happen. All things considered I think it most desirable, that you should hasten your march to Mastuj. I have informed Amir-ul-Mulk that he should counter¬mand his orders to the Mastuj men, and that they should remain where they are so as to be able Co help you with carriage. I have also stipulated that the Adamzadas and villagers along the left bank of the river between Mastuj and this place should stand fast for similar reasons. Amir-ul-Mulk promised the Jemadar that he would make every effort to assist you, Stewart's demi-official of the 14th January stating that you would leave Gilgit on the 16th or 16th, reached are yesterday. Now that all the people are being called in to oppose Umra Khan the difficulty of obtaining supplies is, of course, greater than ever, and I cannot promise definitely that I shall have any particular amount in hand on a given date. I shall of course leave no stone unturned to collect supplies, but delay is inevitable in the present disturbed state of the country. By the time, however, that you reach Mastuj, Umra Khan will probably have retired, and I ought then to be able to collect supplies fairly rapidly. If you bring on with you 100-Kashniir troops, as well as the 40 Sikhs at Mastuj, our strength here will ha 200 and we shall want a large quantity of grain. If, however, as Stewart says, you desired to overawe the people of Lower Chitral in case your decisions should prove unpalatable to them, 200 men is none too many, and we must get the supplies at all costs. I enclose a statement of the supplies in hand here on the 20th January. Nothing has come in since. I suggest you should hasten your departure from Ghizr, as Stewart in his letter to me gives me the impression that you intend to halt there. There is no necessity to make double marches.
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P.S. - Inayat Khan is most anxious that I and my party should accom¬pany him to Mastuj. He urges that I cannot possibly resist the attack of thousands. The Chitralis are certainly the most chicken-hearted race on the face of the earth, and I think you would agree with me if you had been so much behind these scenes as I have during the last three weeks. My friend Aziz Beg, son of Mehtarjao Muhammad Ali Beg, as is his practice when any event of importance is about to occur, spent the greater part of the evening concealed among the graves near the Masjid, and when it became dark he approached me as I was returning from a walk and warned me against possible treachery. He said he had from the first advised, me to summon a strong force from Gilgit, and he regretted that I had not listened to his advice. As I have mentioned before I am of opinion that this gentleman visits me with the object of extracting information. He did not get any change out of me though I was of course most polite and thanked him warmly for his kindness in coming to me
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No. 22, dated the 21st January 1895.
From – Lieutenant B. E. M. GURDON, Political Officer, Chitral,
To – Umra Khan of Jandol.
After compliments. – have received information from the people of Chitral that you have assembled a large force in the vicinity of the Lawarai pass with the object of attacking and possessing yourself of the District of Drosh or some other portion of Chitral territory. In March 1894 you invaded Chitral territory, and on that occasion the Government of India advised you in a friendly manner not to repeat such conduct. Since the occasion to which I refer (e.g. the invasion of March1894) you have shown yourself to be the friend of the Government of India by refraining from aggression on Chitral. For some years past also the relations between yourself and the Government of India have been of a friendly nature and the results thereof have no doubt been advantageous to both parties. I cannot therefore believe that the information I have received as to your plans can be correct, and I shall be glad if you will yourself write to me and inform me of your intentions. I cannot credit for a moment that you intend to attack Chitral territory and thus act contrary to the advice given to you by the Government of India. I trust that this will find you in good health and that you will accept the assurance of my kind regard and my sincere wishes for your welfare.
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Free translation of a letter, dated 22nd Rajab 1313 Hijri = 19th January 1895, from Umra KHAN of Jandol, to MEHTARJAO KOHRAN BEG, the Governor of Drosh.
After compliments.—I have received your letter in which you have men¬tioned about Amir-ul-Mulk's kitting has brother and proclaiming himself Ruler of Chitral. I have started on a jehad and it is proper that Amir-ul-Mulk's, whom I look upon in the light of a son, should come to Ashreth to receive me. He must not listen to the advice of enemies and he must join me in punishing the Ka6rs. I have no intention of interfering in his country—my only object is to make a jehad. If ho does not accept my advice, I shall nevertheless be obliged to start in that direction.
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Free translation of a letter, dated the 22nd Rajab 1313, Hijri = 19th January 1895, from UMRA KHAN of Jandol, to AMIR-UL-MULK.
After compliments.—I have received your friendly letter about your gain¬ing the throne of your father. It should be known to you that I have decided to make a jehad against the Kafirs and I have started in that direction. It is proper and advisable for you to come to Ashreth to receive me, so that we may join in making the jehad. If any evil-wisher or enemy should suggest to you that I have hostile intentions towards Chitral, you should not believe him, as I have no intention of interfering in your country. Jehad is my only object. I look upon you as my beloved son, and therefore you need have no fear. Do not listen to the advice of enemies. If you listen to their advice and do not come to meet me, the fault will undoubtedly be on your part and no blame should be attached to me, on account of anything I may do hereafter. I am sending Imam Khan and Gulzar Beg. Please believe what they say.
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Statement showing the Commissariat Supplies in hand at Chitral on tie 20th January 1695. No. Name of Articles Quantity Estimate of present strength Sufficient up to the period for present strength REMARKS Mds. s.ch. m. d. 1. Wheat and atta 219 5 0 Eighty men Sufficient up to 15th June 1895 (4 26) Including servants and followers.
2. Dall 10 0 0 Do. Sufficient up to 1st March (1 10)
3. Ghee 5 30 0 Do. Sufficient up to 20th March (1 28)
4. Salt 5 2 8 Do. Sufficient up to 15th May (3 2)
5. Goor 2 30 0 Do. Sufficient up to 28th February (1 9)
6. Tea 0 2 12 Do. Issued up to 31st January 1895
7. Firewood 263 0 Do. Sufficient up to 18th February (29 days)
8. Turmeric 10 2 0 Do. Sufficient up to 12th February (23 days)
9. Chillies 0 3 8 Do. Issued up to 31st January 1895
10. Grass 1 10 0
11. Earley 1 10 0
12. Rum 8 gallons Do. Sufficient to 31st January 1895
(Sd.) B.K.M. Gurdon, Lieutenant
....................... ................

No. 110.
FROM H. C. FANSHAWE, Esquire,
Offg. Chief Secretary to Government,
Punjab and its Dependencies,
To
THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OP INDIA,
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.
Dated Lahore, 2nd February 1895.
Foreign.
Frontier.
SIR,
WITH reference to Commissioner Peshawar's telegram No. 83, dated 14th January 1895, which was repeated to the Government of India by that officer, I am directed to submit, for information, a copy of a letter No. 18 C., dated 17th idem, from Mr. Cunningham, and of its enclosure, being a note by the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar of statements made to him by traders from Bajaur in regard to Umra Khan's movements after the recent murder of the late Mehtar of Chitral. I have the honor to be,
SIR,
Your most obedient Servant,
H. C. FANSHAWE,
Offg. Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab

[Confidential.]
No. , dated Camp Charsadda, 29th January 1895.
From - F. D. CUNNINGILAM, Esquire, C.S., C.I.E., Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, To - The Offg. Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab. IN continuation of my No. of 27th instant, I have the honor to state that a servant of the Mian's of Abazai just returned from Dir corrobo¬rates previous reports as to Umra Khan having crossed the Lowari Kotal on his way to Ashreth on or about the 20th instant, but- gives a different account of the new Mehtar's attitude towards this invasion of Chitral. According to this information, Amir-ul-Mulk sent a present of some guns to Umra Khan, and begged him not to march on Chitral, to which Umra Khan replied that he was going on a crusade against the Kafirs, and had no designs against Muhammadans. At one point above the river bank the road is carried past a steep cliff on a wooden platform. It is said that if the Mehtar dismantles this and commands the road, he can effectually check Umra Khan's advance. This is probably the "bad pari" mentioned in route No. 13, Gazetteer, Eastern Hindu Kush, as being miles below Drosh; but the point at which the road can be blocked may be the spur between Drosh and Broz (above Drosh),—see route No. 59. Drosh being only 12 miles or so from Ashreth, Umra Khan will probably have anticipated any attempt to destroy the road at either place, 2. It seems certain that Umra Khan connived at the murder of Nizam-ul-Mulk, and hoped to make a tool of the new Mehtar, but the earlier reports of his having been invited by Amir-ul-Mulk to bring a force to Chitral may be wrong. If the present Mehtar can maintain himself in power, it is unlikely he would hazard his popularity by bringing in Umra Khan and a lashkar of Pathans. Several of Umra Khan's men were sent back to Dir in doolis, crippled by frost bite in crossing the Lahori Pass. It is said he has taken his best men with him, leaving newly raised levies to hold the Banshi Fort .against any attack from Asmar.

[DEMI-OFFICIAL]
No. 3 D.O.,* dated Chitral, the 11th February 1895 (Confidential.)
From - G. S. ROBERTSON, Esq., C.SJ., British Agent at Gilgit,
To - R. UDNY, Esq., C.S.T.
Your messengers got here safely yesterday evening and will start back for your camp this morning. Our telegraph wire has once more broken down, so that your letter quoting Foreign Office telegram of the 31st ultimo, gave us useful information and I at once sent off a letter to Umra Khan making a formal demand for an explanation of his behaviour in the terms of the telegram. On the 24th of January I sent him a letter of strong protest against his conduct in violating Chitral territories, and I have some reason for believing that he returned some answer in explanation, but that Mehtar Amir-ul-Mulk disapproving of the contents caused it to be destroyed. The intrigues going on in Chitral at the present moment are more complicated, more subterranean and more ignoble than I should have thought possible even with my knowledge of Chitrali potentialities in that direction. It is a waste of time discussing them, as it is valueless, tracking them through all their windings. The present Mehtar is an almost hopeless young savage whose character is made up of cruelty and cowardice in almost equal proportion. If not exactly derided, he is not considered even in his own Darbar, the speakers warning him into silence if ever he interrupts them with a remark. He has perhaps four or at most five really staunch adherents, all of whom are placemen of course. The reason he is supported by the upper, the noble, class, called the Adam-Zadas and by the Mullas and Moglai Pir, is because they hope he will act as place warmer for Sher Afzal, the refugee at Kabul. Nizam-ul-Mulk got himself detested, and there is general contentment at his death. Amir-ul-Mulk has undoubtedly made himself some sort of popularity by murdering the obnoxious Nizam-ul-Mulk. The latter was hated for many reasons, not the least of which was his habit of carousing with Englishmen. Our excessive friendliness did that unlucky Prince much harm. Concerning the relations which exist between Amir-ul-Mulk and Umra Khan, their mutual rascalities and distrust, their false swearing, their intrigues together or against each other, there is little to say except that they are more unblushing and cynical than usual. This instant Amir-ul-Mulk has sent me Umra Khan's reply to my first letter, a copy of which. I enclose. The Mehtar makes excuses for detaining the letter—a delay which cost him his fort at Chitral. I enclose a copy of my last telegram to Government in which, in view of the absolute military weakness of Chitral and of her entire inability to hold any part of Narsat by her own unaided strength, I recommend that the Sipah Salar be permitted to take Narsat as far as Birkot on the right bank and the Arnuigol on the left bank. I am convinced that the only interest we have in the Kunar valley below – say the Damirgast* – is to keep out of it. Neither the Chitralis, the Kafirs, nor Umra Khan deserve more than strict justice at our hands. The Amir's troops will at least keep order and prevent blood shed until at any rate their master dies, when all will no doubt become chaotic again; but against that contingency we may now make such arrangements that, we cannot be mixed up with the paltry squabble and fighting which will then probably ensure. I shall be greatly obliged if you will send on the letter, with its enclosures, to the Foreign Office, I hope you and your party are keeping well and suffer less than we do from the deadly monotony of waiting and watching event.
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Telegram, dated the 10th February 1895 (Confidential),
From - G. S. ROBERTSON, Esq., C.S.I., British Agent at Gilgit, Chitral,
To - The Resident in Kashmir, Kila Drosh was occupied by Umra Khan last night. It was surrendered to him by the Chitralis, who are now concentrating at Gairat. It is nearly certain Kila Drosh was given up by arrangement, one hundred or more rifles forming part of the compact. There are rumours that the Chitralis may try au attack on us to take this fort. This is as improbable as its accomplishment would be impossible, but the Chitralis of Chitral proper are certainly less well affected to us than they were two years ago. The point is to see what Umra Khan will now do, if he will remain quiet at Kila Drosh or if he will attack Gairat, the Darband, which covers Chitral, but is turnable on the right bank; As the Chitralis are not only hopelessly treacherous and divided, but also impotent, for fighting, I advise that the Sipah Salar be permitted to occupy Birkot on the right bank and the Arnuigol on the left bank, in short all the country, he lays claim to according to Udny's letters. This will involve the Bashgal valley being eventually controlled by the Amir, but I do not see that we have any real interest in the Kunar valley, but merely in the direct Chitral. Peshawar road over the Lawari if the Sipah Salar were allowed to take the district I have mentioned, the hint might be sufficient for Umra Khan. At present I hold the Chitral fort which is very strong, and supplies; are still earn¬ing in. Many men of Upper Chitral are leaving Gairat and returning to their homos.
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Translation of a letter from UMRA KHAN, to be British Agent, dated the 6th Shahan, e.g 2nd February 1895.
After compliments.— I have received your letter in which you complain about my behaving in an unfriendly manner towards the Government. I have understood its meaning perfectly, as you know I meant to make a jehad on the present occasion. The sons of the Badshah (e.g., Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk) had not friendship with me. They had friendship with the Kafirs, and day and night they helped them. I was under the impression that Amir-ul-Mulk was my friend. I expected him to join me in a jehad; Amir-ul-Mulk paid no attention to the fact that he was a relative and friend of mine, and he declined, to comply with my request and thus I had to act in a hostile manner towards him. I do not mean to interfere in any way in the affairs of, the Government of India. Up to this time there has been no break in the friendly relations, between the Government of India and myself, and, God willing, there will be no change hereafter.
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P.S. – I had sent my servant Imam Khan, to the Government (e.g. British, Officer in Chitral). If the letter which I sent by the hand of Imam Khan was approved, please send an answer to it. In any case Imam Khan should be sent. I do not know whether Imam Khan is with you or not. SEALED BY UMRA KHAN

No. 14 C., dated 14th February 1895.
From - Major H. A. DEANE, Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar,
To - The Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division.
I have the honor to forward enclosed translations of letters from Umar Khitab to Sardar Sultan Ibrahim, dated, respectively, the 10th and 11th Shaban A.H. 1312 (= 6th and 7th February 1895), in continuation of this office letter No. 11. C., dated the 9th February U95. 2. Badshah Jan by verbal message gives information that Umra Khan has closed all roads to Drosh with the exception of one, viz, that towards the river, and that if he close this road, the garrison must surrender.
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Translation of letter, dated 10th Shaban A. H. 1312 (= 6th February 1895), from Numda to SARDAR SULTAN IBRAHIM, Khan Bahadur, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Peshawar. UMRA KHAN has taken possession of Ashret and Kalkatak, and has entered Chitral territory. He has also invested Drosh.
On the 2nd February Amir-ul-Mulk's mother went to Umra Khan, and informed him that her son had murdered the Mehtar, and that they were now subservient to him, but that his assistance was not required; further that he should return to his country and they would give him 50 horses and 50 breach-loading- rifles. Umra Khan replied that he would do §o if the Chitralis pave him 600 rifles, 600 horses and fort Drosh ; farther that he would keep open the Kojar Pass known as Shushai. Khair Muhammad, one of Umra Khan's officers, attacked fort Drosh on the 8th February 1885, and three men of Umra Khan were killed. The loss on the other side was not known. A letter was received from Umra Khan's Manshi to Nowsher who is in charge of the Munda Fort, from which it appears that a small fort is being built at the month of the Shashai Pass and at Kalkatak, in order to prevent intercourse with the Kafirs. Umra Khan invaded the Shusbai Pass and carried way cattle and goods belonging to the Kafirs. Two letters — one to Deputy Commissioner and the other to Shahzada Sultan, Ibrahim —have been intercepted by the officer in charge of Kunater, who has forwarded them to Nowsher, officer in charge of Munda. Nowsher consulted the Kazi of the place about punish¬ing Sahibzada Badshah Jan. The Kazi recommended that copies of the letters be sent to Umra Khan and the originals be detained by Nowsher. These letters conveyed the following information:- "Umra Khan's advance his been stopped by the snow. The Sipah Salar, with European officers, European the village of Binshai. Jandol is unoccupied, and Government could take possession of it, if they withed, with a small force."
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Translation of a letter dated the 11th Shaban A. H. 1312 ( = 7th February 1896), from UMAR KHITAB, from Miss Killi, to Sardar SULTAN IBHABIM. Khan Bahadur, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Peshawar. IT is rumoured in Bajaur that Umra Khan has taken possession of Drosh. It is also said that heliographic communications have been started in Fort Drosh. In the day there is quite in the fort, but at might Umra Khan's men shell the fort. Umra Khan writes to say that he has invested Fort Drosh and has closed three roads leading thereto. Only one road towards the river bag not been closed. If this road be closed, the fort will be taken.
The Usa Khel and Mansarab Din Khel, who have been expelled from the banks of the Panjkora river by Umra Khan, number 100 men. They came as a jirga to Mauza Kotu to Sahibzada Badshah Jan. The jirga said that they had 100 rifles, and that these with 100 more from the Sahibzada were enough to re-take the villages on the banks of the Punjkora, from which they had been driven out. The jirga also asked the Sahiibzada to send for Muhammad sharif Khan from Swat and reinstate him in Dir. If this is true, many men will be expelled from the village of Kota. It is further rumoured that Umra Khan is in communication with the Mehtar of Chitral with the object if making peace with him; but up to the present nothing has been settled they have not come to terms.
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Endorsement by the Commissioner and Superintendent Peshawar Division.
.....................................................................................................
K. F.
D. No. 563 F.
Translation of a letter from His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies, to the address of His Excellency the Viceroy, dated the 28th of Ramzan, corresponding to the 26th of March 1895.
After compliments.— I have received Your Excellency's friendly letter, dated the 19th of March 1895 (corresponding to the 21st of Ramzan 1 12 H.), and understood what was written therein to the following effect :— Your Highness has doubtless received from Sipah Salar Ghulam Haidar Khan news of Umra Khan's audacious invasion of Southern Chitral. Umra Khan is acting in direct opposition to the repeatedly expressed injunctions of the Government of India. He has attacked the Chitralis in the vicinity of Darosh, has seized the fort of that name, and has neglected to obey the orders which my officers sent to him to withdraw to his own territory. He protests his friendship towards the British Government, hut his actions are not consistent with his words. Sher Afzal, who fled to Tour Highness's territory two years ago, and who I understood was kept under close surveillance by Your Highness, has joined Umra Khan. I have now caused a final warning to be conveyed to Umra Khan that, unless he retires from Chitral territory by the 1st of April, he will be expelled by force; and I have issued orders to assemble on the Peshawar border a force of sufficient strength to overcome all resistance and to .march through Umra Khan's territory towards Chitral. The object of the intended advance, if it becomes necessary, will be to put an end to the present, and prevent any future unlawful aggression on Chitral territory. "I take this early opportunity of announcing to Your Highness in a friendly manner the decision of my Government. Mr. Udny will no doubt have already informed Sipah Salar Ghulam Haidar of the matter." Umra is the same Umra about whose misconduct I had repeatedly written, and the high officials of the Government did not accept what was written. This, same Umra has also beguiled Sher Afzal and made him abscond from Kabul. Sher Afzal was not kept bound in chains. He was by himself living "free with his family at a place called Nanaehi, well-known as Afshars, which was granted to him. He fled from this place at the instigation of the foolish Umra, and went to him in the direction of Bajaur, and has commenced the present mischief. But both these persons are foolish, and nothing will be gained by them but repentance.

K.F.
D. No. 560 F.
No. 167 C., dated Peshawar, the 13th April 1895 (Confidential).
From - F.D. CUNNINGHAM, Esq., Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, To - The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.
In continuation of my letter No. 163 of 11th instant and telegram No. 054 of yesterday's date, I have the honour forward copy of a letter, No. 166 of this day's date, to the Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, regarding the English Officers, now prisoners with Umra Khan.
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No. 166 C., dated Peshawar, the 13th April 1895 (Confidential).
From– F.D. CUNNINGHAM, Esq., Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division,
To - H. C. FANSHAWE, Esq., Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab.
In continuation of my letter No. 162 C. of 11th instant, I have the honour to forward copy of a further statement by Jamadar Lal Khan, whom I again questioned to see whether any clue could be found to the man whom Umra Khan's Mistri called his brother, and who was said to be in jail in India, as it seemed to me that, among many contingencies that are possible, there is one chance that this matter might be worked so as to secure some one interested in helping the English Officers who are in Umra Khan's hands.
A man named Syad Ahmad of Mayar in Bajaur, reported to be a servant or agent of Umra Khan, was lately found in Peshawar taking over a large consignment of what is supposed to be machinery or materials for manufacture of rifles. He was arrested and is under trial under Section 19 of the Arms Act.
I have sent for this man, but he stoutly denies that either he or any brother of his is in Umra Khan's service, and he has persisted in this denial after, hearing that a Mistri with Umra Khan had been reported to have asked the Khan to detain a prisoner in order to exchange him for the Mistri's brother now in jail in India. Although this man, Syad Ahmad, denies being in Umra Khan's service, he has command of some money, more than his own status would seem, to account for: he employed an English Barrister to defend him, and his Counsel offered bail up to Rs. 10,000 and then up to Rs. 20,000. Unless this, which is stated on authority of a letter from the Deputy Commissioner, was merely a form of speech, it would seem that the man has rich people behind him. At the same time he does not appear to be the man of whom Umra's Mistri spoke. Other Bajauris, servants of Umra Khan, have not doubt been sentenced to imprisonment in India for offences against the Arms Act; there was such a case in Hazara in 1893. Government can best judge whether it is worth while to pursue enquiries further. I merely report the matter so as to leave nothing undone which might offer even a remote chance of helping the prisoners.
2. It has taken a long time to record the whole of the Jemadar's tale in the form of an intelligible consecutive narrative. I have been much struck with the modest and straightforward way in which he has told his story. I have given only the plain uncoloured facts, but I may be allowed to say that the Jemadar speaks with admiration of the bravery of the two English officers – now they encouraged their small party to hold the little hamlet by Reshun for days against enormous odds, how, as the enemy's sangar commanded their water-supply, night Lieutenant Fowler led a sally in which, under cover of darkness, they drove the Chitralis from the breast-work at the point of the bayonet, while others following filled the water vessels. The enemy, ignorant of the object of these attacks, asked the survivors how they got water, and told them afterwards that, finding the garrison was not to be beaten, they had recourse to treachery. It appears that the Englishmen were deceived partly by Muhammad Isa Khan's position, partly by his assurances that Sher Afzal had become Mehtar and had accepted the suzerainty of the British Government, that conse¬quently there was peace, and partly by the fact that after the white flag was put up and fighting ceased, the people round allowed the garrison to get water without molestation, brought in supplies, and showed no sign of hostility. It may also be said that it seems unlikely they could have held their position at Reshun by force until relief could reach them. The Jemadar has said little of his own hardships, but though it is easy to overrate any display of feeling by an oriental, I could not help noticing that he can scarcely speak without strong emotion of the sufferings of his officers, for whom he seems to have learned real admiration and genuine affection. So far we have only his own account of it, and some points may seem obscure; but. I can well believe that he carried himself with gallantry; lie told me that Lieutenant Fowler thanked him for his conduct at Reshun and said he would bring it to notice. In fact, a' report was written by Lieutenant Edwardes, but all their papers were of course destroyed.
The whole story is a painful one of a brave fight stoutly maintained for days against superior odds, to be lost in the end by treachery and false pro¬mises. It illustrates the difficulties of holding a place like Chitral -with such means of communication as the Gilgit-Mastuj road, whenever the season is adverse and the people of the country rise at the sudden call of some popular pretender. 3. A. copy of this has been sent direct to the Foreign Office.
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12th April 1895.
Jemadar Lall Khan states :—
1. As to Umra Khan's officials and the treatment of the prisoners: Saiyid Ghulam, who deceived us at Roshan and falsely swore to me on the Koran that no treachery was meant, had been a sepoy in the 1st Biloch Regiment; he understood Hindustani; he is a resident of the Maidan of Bajaur; he is called Jemadar and gets Rs. 9 a month. Painda, deserter from a Biloch Regiment, is now Subadar on Rs. 10 per mensem. He was in command of the guard that took us from Roshan, to Chitral. At Chitral we were put under a guard commanded by a man whom Umra Khan has made Colonel. He gets Rs. 12 a month. He went to Bajaur to recruit for his Regiment, the 6th Punjab Infantry or Bengal Infantry, and stayed there – said he was forced by Umra Khan to do so.
While at Chitral, we were rather better treated than on the road from Roshan, especially while negotiations were going on about Dr. Robertson's retirement; but when he finally refused Umra Khan's demands his people became very angry and abused the Colonel Sahib (i.e. Dr. Robertson). After that they treated us more harshly; Sahib Khan told me we should all be killed that night. From Chitral to Drosh they gave us fairly good food and he Sahibs got fowls and wheaten flour the rest of us had Makai (Indian corn). Beyond Drosh we suffered much; at Ashreth they gave us only a little Makai unground. We parched it over a fire, but the Sahibs could not eat it. Next morning they started us off at 5 A.M. towards Dir, giving us some goat's flesh which we tried to cook, but had to eat half-raw. Edwardes Sahib was already ill with cold, exposure and bad food; crossing the Ashreth pass be was in great pain, and could hardly walk. Our men helped to carry him. He was suffering so much that we thought it would be better to take our own lives had we any means of doing so. I remonstrated privately with a man, who seemed of some rank against their treating English Officers in such a way, and I told him how L knew the British Government and Englishmen treated their prisoners of war. At last, on this side of the Ashreth Poss, horses were brought for the Sahibs to ride on.
2. At the jirga at Barwa, where Muhammad Shah Khan pleaded for our release, a man in Umra Khan's service as Mistri urged the Khan to keep us, because his brother was in prison in India. I saw this man's workshop close by, where he was making cartridges or putting caps on cartridges. The Sahibs heard of this and asked to be allowed to speak to me. Umra Khan agreed to a letter being written to Peshawar; the men on guard over the Sahibs let me go to them. Edwardes Sahib then asked me to write a letter in vernacular. At their dictation I wrote— "Lieutenant Edwardes, 2nd Bombay Grenadiers, Lieutenant Fowler, R. E., and some sappers are prisoners with Umra Khan the Khan Sahib has treated us very kindly. His Mistri has a brother who is in prison in Peshawar or British territory. If he is released, we may be exchanged for him. We beg the Commissioner of Pesha¬war to make some arrangement of this kind." In the same letter they made me write to ask for jerseys and for hats of a certain size, , * and tobacco. They had no hats and felt the sun, wearing such puggrees as they could get. That letter was taken to Umra Khan. Afterwards I asked if it had been sent on. My guard said: "No, the Khan tore it up." I said, "Why ?" They replied, "The Khan said the letter was a "complaint against him." I do not know the name of the Mistri, nor his brother's name, nor when or where that brother was imprisoned.
Taken by me,
F. D. CUNNINGHAM,
Commissioner & Supdt., Peshawar Division.

K. F. D.
No. 687
No. 192 C., dated Peshawar, the 25th April 1895 (Confidential).
From - F. D. CUNNINGHAM, Esq., Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division,
To - The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.
I have the honour to forward, for information, copy of a letter No. 191 C. of this day's dale to the Chief Secretary Government, Punjab, and its enclo¬sures, regarding trans, bolder affairs connected with Bajaur and Chitral.
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No. 191 C., dated Peshawar, the 25th April 1895 (Confidential).
From - F. D, CUNNINGHAM, Esq., Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division,
To – H. C. FANSHAWE, Esq., Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab.
I have the honour to submit, for the information of Government, two statements of reports regarding trans-border affairs connected with Bajaur and Chitral. The paper marked I is a translation of a statement given, to me by Colonel Muhammad Aslam Khan, Commandant Khyber Rifles—he considers it, trustworthy ; and it accords generally with other reports regarding dealings, between the Sipah Salar Ghulam Haidar Khan and Umra Khan. 2. Statement No. II regarding visits of Afghan news writers or employees to Chitral in March with a remittance of money for Sher Afzal is given for what it is worth. It is probably impossible to investigate it here, but it may perhaps be verified or disproved by facts known to our officials in Chitral. I can only say that the story of the Almond Agent's Mukhbir or spy is in part borne out by the statement of the Halimzai Mohmand who is said to have accompanied Mufti Nur Ahmad. 3. A copy of this letter is being sent direct to, the Foreign Secretary to the Government of Indi
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STATEMENT I.
(Furnished by Colonel Aslam Khan, Commandant Khyber Rifles.) On the 21st April 1895, Ghulam Haidar Khan, Sipah Salar, received a letter from Colonel Bahawul Khan who is in Asmar. The Sipah Salar gave it to his Munshi to read: It is stated that Umra Khan, had come to Asmar with his family, and that houses had been provided for their accommodation and that many officers and soldiers (Nizami Naukar) of the God given Government showed sympathy for Umra Khan, and said they would not surrender him either to the Amir or to the British Government. 2. In reply to this the Sipah Salar wrote to Colonel Bahawul Khan: - I am going tomorrow to Gulai and Peshbulak (in Ningrahar west of Dakka) and by the grace of God will start for Asmar in two or three days. I hope to get a reply from the Amir to the petition which I have addressed to him, and I will earn what should be done for these people." 3. Meanwhile another letter from Colonel Bahawul Khan came to the following effect:- "Umra Khan says that the Muhammadans have lost Bajaur which is now in possession of the enemy. "Umra Khan complains of his brother, Muhammad Shah Khan, that, while outwardly siding with the Muhammadans, he was really carrying on intrigues against them with the English, and that he is the cause of the injury to Islam." Soon after this reached the Sipah Salar he was riding on the road from Dakka, and heard drums and music. He asked what it was, and was told it was a marriage procession. He became very angry and said :— "Bajaur has been lost to Islam. Is this a time to make merry?" He then made his men stop the music of the wedding procession. 4. Mulla Najam-ud-din, Akhundzada who had gone for a holy war, has returned to his home in Jarobi owing to the flight of Umra Khan, the disloyalty of Muhammad Shah Khan, and the defection of Safdar Khan. Sixty-three of his followers were killed. Of the wounded some have been carried home, and some left in Bajaur.
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NOTE.
Mulla Najam-ud-din, though formerly expelled from the Jalalabad district by the Amir, seems to have been instigated by some, one to assist Sher Afzal. It has been reported from several quarters in Peshawar that, when Sher Afzal on his way from Kabul to Chitral reached Nawagai, Safdar Khan had a mind to stop him, but Mulla Najam-ud-din threatened Safdar Khan with his dis¬pleasure if he interfered. On this Safdar Khan let Sher Afzal pass. Mr. Hastings tells me this was known also to our officers in Asmar.
P. D. C.
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STATEMENT II.
1. A Mukhbir (informer) of Naib Saiyar Khan, the Amir's Almond Agent (Badami) at Peshawar, states that two or three weeks before the assembly of the Chitral Relief Force, Naib Saiyar Khan, under orders from the Amir, sent 6,000 gold "tilas" by hand of Mufti Ahmad Nur, a relation of Mufti Fida Muhammad*, Barrister of Peshawar, to Sher Afzal by the Ali kandao and Nawagai route. Khalid Khan, Halimzai, and Nur Ahmad, Murcha Khel Mohamed, accompanied Mufti Nur Ahmad and the latter returned to Peshawar -when trans¬port was being collected here for the expedition. 2. Khalid Khan, Halimzai Mohmand (above mentioned), states:— "I used to supply news to Colonel Warburton; then Muhammad Akbar Khan, Badami, employed me for some time to watch that no fruit was export¬ed from Afghanistan to Peshawar by any route except the Khyber Pass. I am not now in the Amir's service, but visit Khwaja Miran, Postmaster, occasionally do not know Naib Saiyar, Badami. "Mufti Nur Muhammad, resident of Peshawar City, and Nur Muhammad, Murcha Khel, resident of Khan Mahi in the Charsadda Tahsil, are in the Amir's service. Nur Muhammad can read and write, and when he went to Bajaur, &c., to make maps (for the Amir), I informed Colonel Warburton. About 20 days before the 'Lam' (Chitral expedition), Nur Muhammad: and, Amir, Durba Khel Halimzai of Gurgur Killin Gandab went towards Swat and returned vid Nawagai and Gandab about the 15th Ramazan (=13th March1895). Nur Muhammad said that he had gone to Drosh for I saw him in the Amir's Post Office at Peshawar on the day he returned. He held three letters – one of them was forwarded to the Amir, and the other two were kept by Khwaja Miran. I will enquire from Amir, Halimzai (above referred to), what those letters were. The Sipah Salar has directed that a juga of 12 men of each of the four Hilimzai 'Tappas' should wait on him at Jalalabad. "I am also going with the jirga and hope to return to Peshawar in 15 days."

K. F.
D. No. 636 F.
Telegram, No. 613, dated the 24th April 1895.
From - The General Officer Commanding, Chitral Belief Force, Camp Dengarai vid Janbatai, To - The Foreign Secretary, Simla.
The Government of India -will shortly have to consider various questions with reference to Chitral and the maintenance of our interest there, the communication with it, and how such communication should be dealt with. As regards the warlike tribes on both sides of any permanent road we may establish from India to Chitral via the Malakand Pass, Swat, and Dir, I would say that in all such considerations the holding by our own troops of the Malakand pass may be regarded as a point which is settled and a sine qua non. By holding the pass we establish peace on the whole of our northern border; so long as we hold it, we dominate and split up all the tribes which collectively are formidable but singly are insignificant. The Swatis would acquiesce, they cannot help it; by holding the pass the Buners can be attacked from front and rear and are powerless; the same as regards the Mohmands, the same also as regards Nawagai, whether friendly, as at I present, or hostile, and also- Dir, whether it is friendly or hostile. The posses¬sion of the pass dominates and secures the situation in all future dealings. As regards the results of this expedition, I urge that the main point should be that we hold in future the Malakand Pass. I make this report as I think the value of holding the pass, penetrating as it does the very centre of the tribes, is of the first importance and is the key of the situation. If the pass is not held and garrisoned by us, we are at any time liable to a combination of the tribes which might be of formidable dimensions. Repeated to Commander-in-Chief.

K. F.
D. No. 642 F.
Telegram, No. 614, dated the 24 April From - The General Officer Commanding Chitral Relief Force, Camp Dingarai vid Janbatai,
To - The Foreign Secretary, Simla.
General Officer Commanding, 2nd Brigade, from Mian Kilai reports, on good authority, Umra Khan is prisoner in hands of officer in charge Amir's troops at Dangarmu, and reports say information has been sent to Kabul for orders. Ends. In event of Amir's representative making any communication on the point to me, I propose saying that Government of India are indifferent as to whether he keeps or releases him.

K. F.
D. No. 699 F.
No. 616, dated Camp Bandai Baranl Valley, the 24th April 1896. From - LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR R. Low, K.C.B., General Officer Commanding Chitral Relief Force, To - The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department I have the honour to forward, by post, herewith, the extracts from the Diary of the British Agent, Chitral which were received with his telegram, dated Chitral, 20th April 1895, which was despatched to you by my telegram No. 615 to-day.
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Extracts from the diary of the British Agent, Gilgit. 13th February.—(1) Muhammad Akbar Khan (Reza of Chapari) and Kahmat Zarin (Zundra) visited the British Agent. They said they; had come on behalf of the Khushwakti headmen to inform the British. Agent that they did not intend to remain any longer under the rule of the Katurs, and that they wished to he governed directly by the English. The British Agent replied that he was pleased to hear that the Khushwakti headmen were so loyally disposed towards his Government, and asked the deputation to come and see him again in the evening after he had had an opportunity of discussing affairs with the Mehtar.
(2) About 3 P.M., Mehtar Amir-ul-Mulk, accompanied by Mehtar Jao Kokand Beg, Bahadur Shah Lall and other headmen, visited the British Agent. Amir-ul-Mulk affected to be much depressed owing to the occupation of the fort and his family having been turned out of the fort. As regards the occupation of the fort, the British Agent informed the Mehtar that it was entirely owing to the mistake of himself and his advisers in detaining Umra Khan's letter to the British Agent. The British Agent said that, owing to the detention of the letter, he had been kept in ignorance of Umra Khan's intentions; he had also been led to suspect treachery on the part of the people of Lower Chitral. For these reasons he had been obliged much against his will to occupy the fort, so as to prevent it falling into the hands of an enemy. The British Agent continued that it was now necessary to -make proper arrangements to-prevent the advance of Umra Khan on Chitral he said; that it was evident that Amir-ul-Mulk had very little authority over the people, and he proposed, therefore, to strengthen his hands by sending a British officer to Ghairat, and thus show the people that Amir-ul-Mulk and himself were acting together for the good of Chitral. The British Agent added that he would take these measures on the understanding that Amir-ul-Mulk would remain in the fort at Chitral with him. After some further discussion it was decided that the Mehtar should be given a short time to consider the British Agent's proposals and the Darbar then broke up. (3) Later in the day nearly all the headmen of the Khushwakti country visited the British Agent. They were in open rebellion against Amir-ul-Mulk and had abandoned their part of the Ghairat Darband, and said that their only desire was to serve the British Government. The British Agent replied that he was much pleased to hear that the headmen were so loyally disposed Amir-ul-Mulk, and said that, if a British officer went to Ghairat, he would like the Khushwakti headmen of accompany him, as he had perfect faith in their loyalty. The British Agent added that he would be responsible that the Khushwakti headmen did not suffer hereafter for any service they might now under him he concluded his harangue by asking the headmen to retire and consider his proposals quietly and inform him of their answer in the morning.
(4) The British Agent sent Muhammad Rafi a private message to inform him that for the present he wished, him to continue as Hakim of Laspur, and that he would pay him Rs. 100 per mensem. It was carefully explained to Muhammad Ran that this was only a temporary arrangement and subject to the approval of the Government of India. 14th February. - At 10 A.M. Amir-ul-Mulk, accompanied by a number of Adamzadas of Lower Chitral visited the British Agent. The Khushwakti headmen also came to the Darbar at the invitation of Mr. Robertson. The British Agent reiterated the proposal he had made on the previous evening, and added that for the present he would be responsible for the Khushwakti people, as it was evident that Amir-ul-Mulk had no authority over them. He explained carefully that he was obliged to take this measure in view of the invasion of Umra Khan; he added that he did not pledge his Government to any particular line of action; that the measures he was now taking were of a temporary nature; and that any arrangements he might make were subject to confirmation by higher authority. The British Agent also said that he wished Mehtar Jao Kokand Beg, to remain in the fort with Amir-ul-Mulk. The Mehtar and the Katur headmen, on hearing what the British Agent proposed, at first demurred fearing the Government intended to annex the whole country. The British Agent reassured the Darbar on this score, and the Darbar then broke up. During the proceedings the leading Khushwakti headmen present openly repudiated the Mehtar's authority. (2) Later in the morning it was decided that Captain Townshend with an escort should march for Ghairat on the morning of the 15th. It was also arranged that Mr. Gurdon should proceed at once to Ayun, also with a view to obtaining information. The Mehtar and the Katurs were delighted on' hearing this, and openly expressed the satisfaction they felt. (3) The Khushwakti headmen were informed that the British Agent wished them to continue to look upon Mehtar Jao Bahadur Khan as their Governor. The headmen appeared to be much pleased at hearing this, and the Katur party also became/more contented. The British Agent privately informed Mehtar Jao Bahadur Khan that he would pay him Rs. 100 for the present in return for his services as Governor of Mastuj. It was carefully explained to the Mehtar Jao that this was only a temporary measure. (4) Amir-ul-Mulk subsequently asked for an interview with the British Agent and formally thanked him for continuing Mehtar Jao Bahadur Khan as Governor of Mastuj. He accepted gladly all the arrangements which had been made and undertook to send responsible men to bring in a detachment marching from Mastuj as soon as it arrived at Barenas, the Khushwakt frontier village.
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Extract from British Agent's Diary.
2nd March 1895:— A deputation consisting of Mian Rabat Shah, Bahadur Shah Lall, Mehtar Jao Bahadur Khan; and Mehtar Jao Kokand Beg, was sent by Mehtar Amir-ul-Mulk to the British Agent, with the message that his advisers and he himself, thought it advisable to make peace with Sher-Afzal. The latter to be the Mehtar of Chitral and Amir-ul-Mulk to behave himself like a son. The Mehtar, Bad also asked Munshi Amir Ali Khan to come and see him. Munshi Amir Ali Khan saw the deputation outside the quarters occupied by Amir-ul-Mulk. On seeing Munshi Amir Ali Khan, they returned with him to the Mehtar. The Mehtar at first saw Munshi Amir Ali Khan in the presence of the following persons. Abdul Rahman Khan his foster brother; Mehtar Jao Bahadur Khan his uncle and Wafadar Khan the Dewan Begi. The Mehtar said the country being in a disturbed state, all the people having gone over and joined Sher Afzal he found himself and the British Agent in a very critical position, and for this reason, he wished the British Agent to make peace with Sher Afzal. All the bridges and bad pieces of road having been knocked down by the Sher Afzalites our getting reinforcements was doubtful. If the British Agent was expecting lots of reinforcement from Gilgit soon, the second plan was to hold the fort, but this was a very, hard task and did not seem feasible. The third plan was for the British Agent and him to go to Mastuj. This also was not feasible, as there was-no hope of getting any transport while the bridges and roads were broken and held by Sher Afzalites. The fourth plan was for the British Agent to leave some of his troops with him in the Chitral Fort and go himself with some troops to Mastuj to strengthen himself and again come to Chitral. The fifth plan was for the British Agent to go with at the troops to Mastuj, but this the British Agent could not do without first making peace with Sher Afzal. Considering the points of the above argument, the Mehtar said that the British Agent had better make peace with Sher Afzal, that he (Amir-ul-Mulk) would behave himself like a son to Sher Afzal. Then the other members of the deputation referred to above came into the Mehtar's room. Mian Rabat Shah showed two letters—one to himself and. one to his daughter from Sher Afzal. In both the letters it was mentioned that the relations of Chitral with Government would be the same as they were in the time of Aman-ul-Mulk. They all said that, considering the disturbed state of the country, peace should be made with Sher Afzal, and, as Amir-ul-Mulk agreed to the arrangement, Sher Afzal should be recognised Mehtar. Sher Afzal would treat Amir-ul-Mulk as his son, as he had no legitimate son of his own.
Mehtar Amir-ul-Mulk asked Munshi Amir AH Khan to give his messages to the British Agent, and to ask the British Agent to listen to the words of the deputation. Kokand Beg, Muhammad Ali Beg, Abdur Rahmari, foster-brother to Amir-ul-Mulk, and Mian Rabat Shah, Kaka Khel, was the chief movers in this, but all the other headmen concurred. Amir-ul-Mulk, who is himself convinced of his inability to remain Mehtar, also concurred. The suggestions made by Amir-ul-Mulk and his advisers were as impossible as they were treacherous. The roads were interrupted and Amir-ul-Mulk, to regain the friendship of Umra Khan, had secretly written that be was prepared to attack the British Agent, as he marched back at the Baitaripari, which is just this side of Kari. At 12 o'clock Mehtar Amir-ul-Mulk, his advisers, Mehtar Jao Shuja-ul-Mulk and his Mutabirs were received by the British Agent. The British Agent-told Mehtar Amir-ul-Mulk, his uncles, Mehtar Jaos Kokand Beg and -Bahadur Khan (the Governor of Mastuj), Mehtar Jao Afrasiah, Wazir Inayat Khan, Wafadar Khan, Mian Rabat Shah and Nasab Ali Khan that he was acquainted with what the deputation was going to represent and the views, of Mehtar, Amir-ul-Mulk in connection with the present state of affairs. That as Sher Afzal was in alliance with Umra Khan, and as he had not behaved, himself as desired by the, British Agent therefore he mast be considered as hostile to Government. Amir-ul-Mulk had been given all possible chances to prove himself worthy of holding his country as its Mehtar. He was encouraged in every way and had been provisionally recognised as Mehtar, subject to the approval of Government. But as it is clear that Amir-ul-Mulk cannot hold the country, as he had ever since been a prey to the promptings of ill advisers, and as he had now resigned the Mehatarship himself, therefore, the British Agent now recognises his younger brother, Shuja-ul-Mehtar of Chitral. The Darbaris and Amir-ul-Mulk acquiesced and formally acknowledged Shuja-ul-Mulk as their temporary Mehtar. The British Agent said that as their Mehtar was very young, he would want able advisers, and that his uncles would make his best advisers to him also that Mehtar Jao Amir-ul-Mulk should remain inside the fort as his life was not considered state outside.
Telegram from the British Agent, Gilgit, Camp Chitral Fort, to the Resident in Kashmir, under flying seal to Officer Commanding, Mastuj, dated Chitral, the 3rd March. 1896. News came this afternoon that a hostile force was advancing on Chitral. Captain Campbell made a reconnaissance with two hundred, men. The enemy was found posted in a hamlet a mile or so from the fort. A sharp fight ensued, Eventually our force was overlapped on both flanks, and was forced to retire, A charge gallantly led by Captain Townshend. General Baj Singh and Major Bhikram Singh could not be carried home, and we had to retire into the fort at Chitral. Casualties: General Baj Singh and Major Bhikram Singh killed on each side of Captain Townshend in the charge above mentioned. Captain Campbell severely wounded in the knee. Captain Baird fearfully wounded; was at first reported, missing along with Surgeon-Captain Whitchurch; was subsequently carried, in by Surgeon-Captain Whitchurch and a few Gurkhas under circumstances of the most extraordinary gallantry. The little party came along the river bank, and although it was being fired at the whole I way and lost nearly half its original number, no single man attempted to leave I his officers. Baird is dying I fear. Characteristically, he has urged me not to forget Whitchurch, and has told me how Whitchurch had to charge walls and small sangars on the road. On one occasion the party was surrounded and must have been cut to pieces, Baird says, but for a splendid charge by Whitchurch who lost four of his own men in hand to hand fighting; but inflicted such loss on the enemy that they did not again come within reach of the bayonets. It is difficult to write temperately about Whitchurli. Nearly all his party were wounded. Poor Baird received a third wound close by the fort. Captain Campbell, though shot through the knee, refused to leave the field, mounted a horse, rallied his men and came on with Townshend and the rear guard. Captain Camphell's arrangements were most excellent, hut he had the bad luck to find the enemy in overwhelming force. The retreat was managed by Townshend admirably, and although there was a charge of ghazis and it had got quite dark, he brought in his men in excellent order. We are all now safe in the fort with three months provisions and a sufficient number of sepoys. Jemadar Rab Nawaz Khan was severely wounded by a rush of swordsmen. We must now wait for reinforcements which will have to come by Drasan.
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Telegram from the British Agent to the Resident in Kashmir, under flying seal to the Officer Commanding, Mastuj, dated Chitral Fort, the 4th March 1895. Our total casualties yesterday were fifty-four. Killed, General Baj Singh, Major Bhikram Singh, Hospital Assistant Bhowani Dass and twenty-one non¬commissioned officers and sepoys and one kahar killed or missing. Wounded, Captain Campbell, Central India Horse (severely); Captain Baird, 24th Punjab Infantry (died this afternoon); and twenty-seven non-commissioned officers and sepoys. Captain Campbell and the other wounded men are; doing well. A very large number of Chitralis have joined Sher Afzal. He has some Kabulis with him, but none of Umra Khan's men it is said. Our heavy Ioss, fifty-four casualties .out of 200 men engaged, was mainly due to the excellent shooting of Sher Afzal's men and the wonderful celerity of their movements combined with their superior number. As we fell back, every house and every wall in front and behind of on our flanks concealed marksmen. None of the 14th Sikhs were engaged. The enemy's loss is not known as yet. Sher Afzal's force is well armed. Half of the wounded were hit by Martinition. We have withdrawn our guard from the bridge and the two towers commanding it, which are now occupied by the enemy, who also holds Danin village, a thousand yards to the north and on the opposite side of the river. The relieving force must be reasonably strong and should first take and hold Drasan, and then advance with caution. It should contain all the levies. It is impossible to say how many men Sher Afzal has with him, but certainly not less than a thousand. He is making overtures to the Khushwaktis and has invited Muhammad Wali to join in a jehad and attack Yasen. The Indus Valley and Yasen must not be denuded of troops. All foregoing orders concerning the movements of troops may be now considered merely as hints and suggestions; the senior combatant officer must act on his own discretion and responsibility. Everyone seems greatly surprised at Sher Afzal's bold advance and declares he is fanatic, but the Katur Chitralis have become very embittered against us during the last two years, probably .owing to their dislike to Nizam-ul-Mulk. Very many have joined Sher Afzal, because they believe he is armed and secretly supported by Kabul, and that he will probably win in the end, while, if he does not, they know they will be leniently treated by us, as soon as they submit. They are thus safe whatever happens. Unless Sher Afzal is captured and kept in custody by us—an unlikely contingency—Chitral will never be quiet; while, if be is Mehtar, he will cause us great trouble and expense. Perhaps it is not premature to hint that Chitral proper under the direct rule of the Amir and the Khushwakt country under us—our frontier meeting, and the line being decided by, the present most eastern point of the Amir's Wakhan outpost—would be a satisfactory way of keeping this frontier quiet and secure. I have bad to put aside Amir-ul-Mulk, as he is half, an idiot and wholly treacherous, and have provisionally put Shuja-ul-Mulk in his place, but no permanency can be hoped from such an arrangement. It has merely been done to secure the support of the only Katurs upon whom we can rely at all, namely, the followers of the late Afzal-ul-Mulk and Nizam-ul-Mulk. Amir-ul-Mulk had no real following except a couple of ambitious but youthful Adamzadas all the rest were Sher. Afzalites. There is in fact no one of the Katur family who can rule Chitral except Sher Afzal now he is at large, unless we support our nominee by force of arms and at great expense. It is a knowledge of this and also something else which I cannot fully understand which has made Sher Afzal so truculent. Some of his own friends hint that he knows he cannot ultimately succeed and remain Mehtar by his present proceedings. He has already made overtures to the Punyalis with me, and has promised Sipat Bahadur a large district, if he will join in a jehad against the Government of India and induce his brother, Raja Akbar Khan, to do the same. Umra Khan as sent one of his headmen to me. He is pretending to play the part of a neutral friendly to us and hostile to Sher Afzal. He still occupies Kila Drosh.
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Copy of a telegram from the British Agent, to the Resident in Kashmir, dated Chitral Fort the 5th March 1895.
There is now no doubt that Majid Khan of Shina, Abdul Ghani Khan of Shahi and Ghulam Sarwar Khan of Maidan are with Sher Afzal. Their following is numbered at a thousand, of whom 200 are said to be properly trained soldiers and armed with rifles.
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Copy of ft telegram from the British Agent, to the Resident in Kashmir dated Chitral Fort the6th March 1895.
All is well. The enemy keep up a hottish fire all round. Only one man wounded since the 3rd. Relieving force must be most cautions in advancing. Bridges many be expected to be broken, roads to be interrupted, and little or no transport will be available. Umra Khan has sent me his Diwan to say that Umra Khan is my friend and that he is ready to show his friendship by giving me a sale conduct to Gilgit or Asmar, and he will account to Government all my treasure, rifles, &c. He also warns me that; Cavagnari was killed for the want to just such a friend as he offers to be. It is possibly that we shall shortly receive a desperate attack from Umra Khan, Sher Afzal & Company.
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From G. S. ROBERTSON, Esq., C.S.I., British Agent, Gilgit, to any British Officer, dated
........
Chitral, the 28th March 1895.
All is well. Rationed up to end of May. Many Jandolis appear to have gone towards Mastuj. Edwardes and Fowler induced to leave their entrenchment at Reshun on simple pretext were made prisoners, are now in Umra Khan's hands with 12 sepoys. Their escort cut to pieces, it is believed, with exception of twelve men. We have no outside news. Efforts to obtain Edwardes and Fowler failed. Closely invested; sangars within 100 yards of first. Enemy armed with Martinis and Sniders; are admirable marksmen. Ten casualties since 3rd. Campbell and other wounded doing well. Fort commanded on all sides, but all kinds of cover been devised. Much, simple sickness from bad food and exposure to wet. Only fresh food is horse flesh. Ammunition sufficient. Messenger to be given five hundred rupees. Abdul Majid Khan of Shina and Abdul Ghani Khan of Shahi are commanding against us at Chitral. Sher Afzal is entirely in their hands.
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P. S.—Total casualties up to date—exclusive of Edwards's party—killed or since died from wounds: Captain Baird, General Baj Singh, Major Bhikram Singh, Hospital Assistant Bhowani Dass and twenty-six others. Wounded: Campbell, Rab Nawaz Khan and thirty-seven others. Edwards's party fifty killed or missing. Fowler slightly wounded, reported as recovered. Despatched from Chitral fort on night of 29th March 1895.
_______________ Telegram from the British Agent, to the Resident in Kashmir, through the Officering the Force advancing from Mastuj, dated the 19th April 1895. The Jandolis under Abdul Majid Khan and Abdul Ghani Khan and also, Sher Afzal fled from Chitrallast night with a large; folio wing for Kila None of the enemy are in arms, at Chitral Casualty list enclosed, wounded doing well. Kindly send on to Gilgit marked urgent.

K. F.
No. 710-F.
No. 623, dated Camp, Dir, the 25th April 1895.
From - The General Officer Commanding Chitral Relief Force,
To - The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department. I have the honour to forward the weekly Political Diary of the Force under my command for the week ending 22nd April 1895.
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Political Diary for the week ending 22nd April 1895.
15rth April 1895.— I would note with reference to the above that Umra Khan's questions were replied to as he opened negotiations through Lieutenant Edwardes. The advantage of replying to him seemed to be that a better chance was given for saving Lieutenant Fowler, who is undoubtedly in a very precarious position. He is surrounded by a crowd of fanatics whom Umra Khan is utterly powerless to control, though he could doubtless control the majority of the tribesmen collected. This morning further telegrams were received on the subject from the Commander-in Chief and later from His Excellency the Viceroy, being as follows : — "Clear the line. Your 564, Camp Sado, 14th. Take any opportunity offered by delay on the part of Umra Khan to cancel the terms you have offered as they are not acceptable to the Government. Refer here before making any further offers. Insist on the safe delivery of the prisoners as essential preliminary to any discussion of the terms as already instructed." On receipt of this a letter as follows was addressed to Umra Khan: — "As you have now delayed so long in accepting the terms laid before you by the General Officer Commanding Chitral Relief Force, I write by his directions to inform you that he now cancels those terms, and that until Lieutenant Fowler and the other prisoners are delivered safe into his hands he will hold no further intercourse with you, and the imposition of terms will now rest entirely with the Government of India."
This letter was despatched about 9 A.M. Shortly after I received a letter from Lieutenant Fowler saying the Khan had sent him a verbal message asking him to say that the Khan is willing to parley and wants armistice while terms are being discussed, provided building of bridge is stopped and no offensive action is taken. On his part he undertakes to refrain from offensive action. A note was sent to Fowler telling him of last letter sent to Umra Khan. Sardar Sultan Ibrahim also received a letter from the Khan, asking him for time and for him and Badshah; Jan to visit Khan. I told the Sardar to reply that he could not correspond with, the Khan. I saw his letter written accordingly. Later in the day, a letter came to my address from Umra Khan suggesting we should use river route to Chitral, also practically admitting inability to control tribesmen and wanting guarantee of restoration of his country to him on our return from Chitral. Under these circumstances he would temporarily clear out of his country. The messenger who brought in the letter was simply dismissed without reply. During day following telegram was received from Foreign:— " 1483-F. Your letter to Umra Khan cancelled. Government terms are unconditional submission and ultimately must depend on his surrendering all his prisoners safely, and if so Umra Khan's life will be spared on our ascertaining through Robertson how far Umra Khan responsible for and participated in events at Chitral, whither advance must not be delayed." General Officer Commanding replied in OL Special: - "I assume risk to Fowler duly considered by your procedure, as Umra Khan has no control over gathering round him and unless he has some hope of not being utterly crushed and of retaining Jandol, Fowler's chance small. Pressure may be put on Umra Khan through his brother Muhammad Shah Khan and family through Dir men but cannot be guaranteed. We must fight gathering and then greatest danger will be to Fowler." Umra Khan has, so far as I can learn, some 300 or 400 of his men; these are roughly drilled by impressed men of our regiments and are distinguished by being dressed in khaki. They have good rifles. Supply of ammunition not known, but I hear a great deal of his ammunition is at Dir. The gathering round him consists at the present time of 4,000 Mamunds and 2,000 Salarzais, his especial partizan tribesmen whom he assisted against Sipah Salar at Shostan, 1,500 Mohmands, and about 1,000 Mullas and Talibs who have come from all over the country. It is these latter that he is powerless to control. The number of men, who came over from Asmar, Kunar, &c., subjects of the Amir, was about 1,000. As no mention is now made of these being present, they may have gone to their homes. The gathering is at present divided into two parties, one at Sohsani, 3 miles this side of Mundar on the right of our road, and the other at Mundar on the left of the road. The disposition of these has been made by Umra Khan himself. They are posted in view of each other. I am told there is a bye road by which that on the right can be approached without being seen by either party. This will depend on how long it is before we attack. The gatherings on the right are not well acquainted with the country. The disposition is a very favourable one for attack. It must be expected that with this unfortunate delay in crossing the river we shall have tribesmen collecting against us. At the same time many of them are anxious to be off to their crops. Umra Khan may possibly send in the prisoners. But the chances are far greater that being desperate he will make a short stand and then bolt towards Miskin or Burshi, leaving Fowler in the lurch; by these roads it seems not unlikely he will get shelter in Afghanistan. The native opinion is that Umra Khan has been deliberately encouraged by Sipah Salar to his action with a view to making his ruin certain. Lieutenant Edwardes tells me that Umra Khan accuses Lieutenant Gurdon of having first commenced hostilities with him. Doubtless Umra Khan has some long story to tell. Also another view to justify Sher Afzal's action that will be put forward is that Sher Afzal went to meet Dr. Robertson and discuss matters with him, with a view, I suppose, of Dr. Robertson assisting Sher Afzal in being recognised as Mehtar that Dr. Robertson fired on Sher Afzal and his men for a whole day, and Sher Afzal, finding he could not approach Dr. Robertson, then replied to the fire and assumed the offensive. Umra Khan was too late to recall his men from Chitral. There are still some 300 or 400 of them in Drosh and with Sher Afzal. Abdul Majid, Umra Khan's brother in Chitral, is said to be anxious to get away. It is also said that he has taken money from Dr. Robertson to withdraw. This was started abroad by the Dir Khan having captured Rs. 4000 belonging to Abdul Majid which he was sending down to Jandol. Reports are that the Chitral fort is being approached by mines, that the garrison is much pressed for food, that the assailants lately succeeded in setting fire to one of the towers, but the garrison got the fire under, and have now loopholed the tower. I cannot get any estimate of what the food supply in the fort is. Lieutenant Edwardes says that Umra Khan's men were all on short rations, and Umra Khan apologised for not feeding him and Fowler better, as Dr. Robertson-had got-the supplies from the surrounding country into the fort. With reference to the burning of villages in Talash valley, there appears to have been some mistake in report sent from 3rd Brigade. I referred to the Jirga, who say they have no complaint to make and that no damage has been done. People about this part much surprised at being paid for damage done to crops.
Suggestion made to General Officer commanding re collection of supplies. Proper foraging parties to be told off for Panjkora, Talash, and Adinazai valleys to go out with money and pay for supplies obtained. Complete list of villages and people from whom supplies can be obtained furnished. There are 87 mills in this valley which could be usefully employed in grinding wheat. Suggested that Commanding office working with Political Staff should arrange for buying up present rabi crop, which will soon be reaped. It would furnish a large amount of grain and bhoosa. General Officer Commanding 3rd Brigade came over about supplies. Suggested foraging party up to Rahat, where a large quantity of grain belonging to Umra Khan can be obtained from the fort. The supply from Khungai and Lundai forts has already been brought in. I hear that some of our late enemy in Upper Swat have gone to assist Dir Khan. All the country we have come through is well cultivated. Not much wheat to be obtained, as a steady export of the known Bajauri wheat is carried on to Peshawar. The Lower and Upper Swat valleys are very rich and fertile, with considerable irrigation. Can be compared with Sholgira lands in Hushtnagar. The rain-crops in the higher lands are magnificent, and in the Peshawar district I have only seen them equaled in the Maira lands in Utman Nama along the banks of the Indus in a good season. The country we have seen so far would bear, roughly speaking, revenue as follows: - Lower Ranizai valley about Rs. 20,000; Lower and Upper Swat valley Rs. 3,00,000; Adinazai valley Rs. 12,000; Talash valley up to where we are now, viz., Sado, about Rs. 3,000 or 4,000. The Jandol valley from here appears to be very fertile. If under steady rule, the greater part of the Upper and Lower Swat valleys would be equal to the richest lands about Peshawar. As the Adinazai people remarked to me passing through Uch, under Government rule the whole valley would be a garden. 16th April 1895. - Heavy rain all last night. It began with a heavy storm, the night before, which went on more or less all yesterday. Rapid rise in river, which has made crossing by rafts unsafe. Last night, about 11 P.M., Edwardes sent me up a note he had received from Fowler, from which it appears Umra Khan cannot control fanatics about him, and he has apparently had an anxious time. I also received a message from Badshah Jan, who is at Mundar to be on the look out for Fowler, who would probably be sent to us at night. I fancy the heavy rain must have prevented all chance of his crossing by road over hills, and direct road is not safe. News received this morning that some 6,000 of the gathering have gone off to their homes, and that gathering now consists of 1,500 Mamunds, 200 Salarzais, So men from Asmar and Kunar, and 800 Mullas and Talibs. Umra Khan's own men deserting him and going off with their rifles. I also hear that the leading men in the fight on the I3th were Utman Khels from Aurang, &c; that they alone lost 100 men. These were doubtless the men who have been visiting the Manki Mulla at Spankharra. They were a turbulent and fanatical lot. No Shamozai Utman Khels were present, and the Jirga of that section are now asking if they may come in. I have told them they may, provided none of their tribe are gathered against us. Re Chitral. Mirza Nazir, Munshi of Umra Khan, captured by Dir Khan, sends message that the Ashgum people have assisted the Mastuj officers (probably Colonel Kelly), and that combination against British is accordingly weakened and that road, is open to the Mastuj force. About midday Lieutenant Fowler and the remaining four prisoners with Umra Khan arrived safely. Umra Khan sent with them a letter as follows: -
"Your note informing me that Government troops had arrived at my boundaries and that if I wished to save my life and property from ruin I should make over to you the two English officers and should submit to whatever conditions the Government of India might impose. I have now acted according to this writing. One of the two officers had already been sent in, and the other, whom I had kept only to advice, I now send in with the Sahibzada. The conditions you note in your Second letter. I have accepted, and I have recalled my force from Chitral. I present in the fight of Ranikai (that of 13th April). On the strength of former services rendered by me I ask that the Government troops may go to Chitral some other road, because Jandol is near to other tribes. If anyone should show hostility I shall get into trouble. I shall be obliged by your granting this. If Government comes by Jandol I shall with draw from Jandol, and when the Government troops have returned to Peshawar I will return to Jandol. You may trust whatever the Sahibzada may tell you I ask to be informed of such as is agreed to." – Ends. The following reply was sent to the above:—" I am glad that you have sent to me Lieutenant Fowler and the remaining prisoners. I have also received your letter in which you say that you have accepted the terms laid down for you. But you are aware 'that I informed you by letter yesterday that the conditions laid down by General Officer Commanding Chitral Relief Force were cancelled owing to your delay in accepting them, and I can now only inform you that I have sent your letter to the Government of India for their consideration and for such orders as they may see fit to give." These two letters were wired to Government. General Officer Commanding asked to be informed what reply, if any, should be sent, remarking that "Umra Khan has treated his prisoners well and handed them over safely, which could hardly have been expect If he is deprived of his hereditary position and property, Jandol will be a bone of contention between Nawagai, Dir, and others, rendering maintenance of road to Chitral impracticable except by our annexing the country. If no farther reply is given him he will probably abscond. I would suggest that Government assume as proved his responsibility for affairs in Chitral and instruct me definitely what terms are to be imposed, rather than leave him on our flanks and rear in a state of uncertainty, and possibly to hostility, as he is unlikely to surrender on guarantee of his Life only. His remaining hostile with¬out surrender may lead us indefinitely into expedition against Mamunds, Salarzais, and others. I advance towards Miankili tomorrow." Umra Khan shows by his letter that there is not the smallest chance of our not being opposed passing through his country. This in itself would free us from the terms offered and which are not approved by Government, even if Government were not already freed by the letter sent him. Umra Khan does not know what to do. I now learn that the news of his recalling his men from Chitral was not true that he only sent definite orders to them to return three days ago. Their presence at Drosh will, if they oppose the Dir men reported to be on their way to assist Dr. Robertson, prevent the Dir men doing anything much to help him. Umra Khan sent me a message asking for Muhammad Shah Khan, his brother and family to be protected. I have sent the Dir Khan orders about this in return for Umra Khan's treatment of our officers. Camp moved to near bridge. 17th April.— Crossed Panjkora and moved up to Ghohanai in Jandol valley. This is about the border between Yusafzais and Torkalanais; and the country up to this formerly belonged to Dir. On right bank of Anshivi or Jandol river is Matakai Bajauri country. It was formerly Utman Khel. About midday portion of 3rd Brigade advanced against miscellaneous gathering which crossed river, they having come down from Miankili. They were driven back, and from the respect¬ful distance they maintained, I doubt if much loss was inflicted. Umra Khan apparently not present, though his men said to be so. Badshah Jan confided to me that Umra Khan had said he would attack at night if we come to his country. Certain information that 18 men of Asmar and Kunar were killed in right on 13th. Loss of actual killed of Mamunds, Salarzais,. Asmaris, and Kunarwals on 13th was 124 from account made up by themselves after fight. Utman Khels lost 160 in addition. Estimate of 406 killed and wounded is not excessive. Information also that Umra Khan has received help in ammunition from Sipah Salar. If operations against Miankili and Mundar are entirely successful, we shall find the proof both of correspondence with Sipah Salar and of ammunition in that village in the house of Sahibzada Muharrimad Shah. The Sipah Salar not having occupied Nari, Narsat, &c., has left open to Umra-Khan a line by which his men can withdraw from Chitral without meeting us, and it also leaves open to Umra Khan a line of retreat. That the position of Miankili and Mundar is hot a good one for defence is shown by the gathering today coming out on to the hills across the river. Report received that Dir Khan has found his men unwilling to move in any numbers to Chitral. This is due to some of Umra Khan's men still being in Dir fort, in regard to which Dir Khan reported incorrectly that he had finally captured it, though he has surrounded it. Two hundred to Umra Khan's men said to be still in Drosh.
As we have now been opposed in Umra Khan's own territory, I think any question of terms with Umra Khan must be dropped until we see what the results of our movements are. At the same time I think our troubles for the future are added to by not coming to a distinct understanding with Umra Khan at once.
The Nawagai Khan has to-day sent me letters with great professions of friendship and khidmat. I hold the view that having made the promise we have to him, it must rest with him to perform services without further incentive or order to render him entitled to the reward guaranteed. As a matter of fact, his position hitherto can only be described as neutral. He writes that he has restrained his factionists amongst Mamunds, Salarzais and Shamazais from opposing us. I have told him that we do not want professions of friend¬ship without performance. He says that when we get to Mundar we shall see what he can do. When we have got to Mundar we shall have disposed of our own difficulties as regards opposition. It may be useful to give Safdar Khan an allowance, but as to giving him anything like a large present of arms is out of the question. Like most of these men he seems to think that writing letters professing friendship and blowing his own trumpet as to khidmat is sufficient to entitle him to high consideration. The letter sent to him was plain enough to prevent any misunderstanding. He will of course excuse himself on ground that too many people were collected against us, and that he could not face the Mullas. So much the greater was the opportunity for him to show what his friendship was worth. As in Swat, our endeavour should be here to let the Pathan see that he and not any scoundrelly Sheikh or Mulla that Iikes to set himself up must be able to manage his own country before we can consider him a man worth dealing with. Badshah Jan and natives tell me there will be no more fighting. This depends on whether Umra Khan stands or absconds to-night. If he stands, to-day's fighting has not been sufficient to dispose of opposition. Though on the part of enemy to-day's performance was seen to be very half-hearted, politically it is unfortunate that circumstances passed on to-day's fight instead of our being able to leave matters to be thoroughly disposed of by giving the enemy the lesson they want. 18th April 1895.— News received the first thing in the morning that Umra Khan made off last night to Miskin. This is part of Asmar hill. He has a small fort there called Shahi, to which he lately sent his family for safety. The gathering has split up and not a sign of a man left. From which my estimation: of the Adda Mullah with all his talk being a man who would rather not fight? Headquarters advance with troops to Mundar, a large fort in which one 12-pounder and one 18-pounder brass guns mounted on heavy carriages were found. Miankili is a large village, some 1,500 houses, on opposite bank. Mundar fort is untenable from rifle fire alone from opposite side. The inhabitants have all; cleared out with exception of baniahs and a few old men and village servants left to look after things. I have had the houses of the Sahibzada Muhammad Said and his brothers searched. It will be seen later if there is anything of importance amongst papers found. Muhammad Said has gone to Amankot in Nawagai, and has probably taken important papers with him. The Mundar fort had been looted of its grain and a good deal of it is in Miankili. Plenty of wood found which has been collected for bridge over Parijkora. Jandol valley most fertile, well watered magnificent crops is about 12 miles long by 3 miles broad. Hills are cultivated carefully, slopes being well terraced. Sent word to the people to; return 4 to their homes. Sahibzada Muhammad Said wants to enter into correspondence with me. This I decline to encourage, and leave him to return quietly to his home or not as he likes. People from different villages commenced coming in at once offering to furnish supplies. This is the furthest point at which we shall get much in the way of supplies, and I have sent for Muhammad Shah Khan, ex Khan of Lalpura, to purchase for us from Salarzai, Mamund, and Kawagai tracts, with which he is well acquainted. Umra Khan wrote to me asking me to make over to him, in addition to Muhammad shah Khan and family, any arms and ammunition which Dir Khan may have captured. No reply sent him. In afternoon moved on with General Gataire with The Buffs 4th Gurkhas, Derajat Mountain Battery No. 2, and half company Sappers to a small village 3 miles from Barwa. This force is to push on as quickly as possible to Dir. My going is necessary to work up Dir Khan and to make him provide a coolie, corps for us to carry supplies into Chitral. Obtained from near Maiyar two Buddhist inscriptions. An old road appears to have gone this way over into Asmar, but no time to examine taken from some old building. Will have it copied later. I hear that Umra Khan wrote, when we were at Dargai, to Sher Afzal to send his (Umra Khan's) men back from Chitral. Sher Afzal replied that if he did this his Chitralis would desert him. Umra Khan then sent orders to his own men, but Sher Afzal has intercepted all his orders and Umra Khan's men have been kept in ignorance of our advance. Abdul Majid Khan and Ghani Khan, cousin of Umra Khan, have been his officers with Sher Afzal. Report received that Muhammad Shah Khan and some 40 men have escaped from Atou, where Dir Khan had surrounded them. One hundred and two rifles and 1,000 rounds ammunition belonging to Umra Khan captured in Dir fort. One of Umra Khan's Mohtabir who accompanied him to Shahi has returned and says Umra Khan has joined Sipah Salar. This I do not believe. He would hardly be such a fool as to trust him.
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