| Viceroy, Nehru and Jinnah on Kashmir |
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VICEROY, NEHRU, GANDHI, PATEL, KAK AND MAHARAJA KASHMIR – JUST BEFORE THE START OF DISPUTE Extract from Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 15 – dated 1st August 1947. 25. Ever since I arrived out Nehru has been hankering after a visit to Kashmir. He is obviously still suffering from an emotional upset consequent upon being recalled by Congress after being arrested in Kashmir during the time of the Cabinet Mission’s meetings last year. In the first instance I offered to go myself and discuss the future of Kashmir with the Maharaja, but Nehru was dissatisfied with the result of my visit and asked me to let him go himself. Gandhi came to the rescue and offered to go in Nehru’s place. I telegraphed to Kashmir but the Maharaja begged that no leader should be allowed to come, at all events before the 15th August, since they had so far avoided having bloodshed in Kashmir and Jammu, although they could see people killing each other across the borders in the Punjab. I managed to delay Gandhi’s visit until the Prime Minister, Kak, had come to Delhi for my meeting with the States representatives. 26. I arranged a meeting between Kak and Gandhi on the 24th July and warned Kak against dissuading Gandhi from coming to Kashmir, unless they were prepared for Nehru to take his place. Kak failed to take my advice, and succeeded in stopping Gandhi, with the result that the moment Kak had returned to Kashmir, Nehru wrote and said that he must now go to Kashmir himself. ………………………. ………………………. ……………………….. 33. I have reason to believe that when Patel had tried to reason with Nehru the night before our meeting, Nehru had broken down and wept, explaining that Kashmir meant more to him at the moment than anything else. Patel found it impossible to deal with him and told a friend after our meeting that I had probably saved Nehru’s political career, and thus the chance of Congress making good on the transfer of power. MR. JINNAH NEVER EXCLUDED INDEPENDENT OPTION FOR THE FORMER STATE OF THREE IDENTITIES / PROVINCES EXTRACT FROM INDIA NEWS DATED 17TH JULY 1947 9. MR. JINNAH ON KASHMIR SITUATION Govt. of India, New Delhi, 13.7.47 Mr. Jinnah in a statement on the Kashmir situation says that the question engaging the Kashmir Muslims attention is whether Kashmir is going to join the Constituent Assembly of Hindustan or Pakistan. Stating that he has made it clear more than once that the Indian States are free to join either Assembly or remain Independent, Mr. Jinnah says “I have no doubt that the Maharaja and Kashmir Government will give their closest attention and consideration to this matter and realize the interests not only of the Ruler but also of his people”. - Those States who wish to join the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, Mr. Jinnah adds, “will find us ready and willing to negotiate with them an agreement of mutual advantage to both”. Referring to the detention of Muslim Conference Leaders in Kashmir Mr. Jinnah says that there is no justification for their continued detention. “I hope”, he goes on, “the Maharaja and the Prime Minister of Kashmir will realize the fast changing circumstances. Wisdom demands that feelings and sentiments of the Muslims who form 80 per cent of the population should not be ignored, much less hurt”. TOP SECRET Note of a talk with Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan at Lahore on 1/11/47: 12.30 to 1.15 p.m. Having made the excuse of Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan’s illness to enable me to take Pandit Nehru to Lahore for a Joint Defence Council meeting, I felt it was essential that part of the J.D.C. meeting should take place in Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan’s presence. On arrival at Lahore, however, I discovered that he was still too ill to come to Government House. I therefore got rid of 24 of the 26 items on the agenda with Mr Nishtar as the Pakistan Government’s representative, and then the whole JDC moved down to the Pakistan Prime Minister’s House and continued the meeting in his bedroom. Liaqat was sitting up with a rug round his knees, still looking very ill. After the two controversial items had been disposed of everyone left the room excepting Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan, Lord Ismay and myself. I began by giving him the statement by the India Chiefs of Staff on the sequence of events in Kashmir (copy attached) which I took back from him after he had read it. I then proceeded to explain the position as I saw it, beginning with the accession of Junagadh and going on through the whole history of the Kashmir situation. As so much of this is the same as I was later to repeat to Mr. Jinnah, it is not recorded here at length. The burden of Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan’s contention was that the Maharaja had categorically refused any form of negotiation or even discussions with Pakistan and that he had brought about a serious situation by allowing his Hindus and in particular his State forces, to massacre Muslims in the Poonch and Mirpur areas and across the border of Jammu. This had been more than the tribes could stand and this was the origin of their raid on Srinagar. I asked him whether he expected us to believe that Afridis and Mahsuds could have come from beyond Peshawar in motor transport without the Government of Pakistan being at least aware of this. He did not deny knowledge of the movement but defend himself by saying that if they had made any attempt to interfere with the movement of tribes in their own buses; this would have precipitated trouble with the rest of the tribes on the Frontier. I told him that my Government were quite sincere in their offer of a plebiscite, and showed him the draft formula which would also cover Junagadh. Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan appeared to be very depressed and almost disinclined to make any further effort to avoid war. Lord Ismay and I did our best to cheer him up, the former pointing out that, if the leaders on their side abandoned hope of peace, all was indeed lost. As time was getting on and as Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan looked very tired, we said we would go back to lunch with Mr. Jinnah at Government House and after discussions with him, we would, if he wished, come back and continue our conversation with the Prime Minister. This he gladly accepted and bade us a very friendly au revoir. Note” Owing to the great length of the discussion with Mr. Jinnah time did not permit of our returning to see his Prime Minister, but we sent a message excusing ourselves.
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