| Pakistani Secret letters since 1947 |
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From Gilgit on 27.2.49, Col Jilani writes to Brigadier Sher Khan “ The Raja of Punial yesterday plainly told the PA and myself that the Mir of Hunza is responsible for all the trouble. He told me later in private that the Mir is in constant communication with the Indian Counsel General at Kashgar”. Also in the same letter “ The Mir of Nagar came for private talk. He admitted that the Mir of Hunza had told him last year to retain the best men for himself instead of sending them to the Scouts. He also told me that the Mir of Hunza has a lot to do with the present troubles. Both he and the Raja of Punial stressed the necessity for a strong administration and stationing of troops in Hunza near the Chinese border”. MESSAGE From:- - - - - To:- PAK MINDEF KARACHI 21046/Ops Plans ( . ) SECRET ( . ) FROM MacCAY TO ISKANDER MIRZA ( . ) Consider Mirs of HUNZA and NAGARS services should be appreciated ( .) Would be a good thing if Prime Minister could give them interviews during his visit to Pindi ( . ) Can arrange to have them flown down if suggestion accepted by Govt PRIORITY From:- Brig. M. SHER KHAN, D.O. NO. 4027/24/MO. M.C. RAWALPINDI, Dec. 1948. Dear 1. Please refer to my signal No. 20875/MO dated 24 Nov and No. 20922/MO dated 4 Dec asking for sanction for granting the 5 commissions to the JCOs of GILGIT Scouts. I hope you will obtain this sanction very soon and communicate it to me so that the names be gazetted. You will appreciate that the sooner we can do o the better it will be for the morale of the SCOUT force which has suffered rather hard knocks in the ZOJILA DARAS and KARGIL battles. Col. A.S.B. SHAH, Secretary Ministry of States & Frontier Regions, KARACHI. ADDENDUM TO NOTES OF A MEETING HELD IN HPM’S RESIDENCE AT 1100 HOURS ON 4 MARCH 1949 TO DIS- CUSS THE GILGIT SITUATION. The following should be added as additional paragraphs. POSITION OF HUNZA AND NAGAR. 11. It was decided that no action should be taken to notify to UNCIP the accession of the Mirs of Hunza and Nagar as it was hoped to include them in the plebiscite area. VISIT OF UNCIP TO GILGIT. 12. It was decided that no objection should be raised to UNCIP or a Sub-Commission therefore visiting Gilgit if they so wished. DISTRIBUTION:- MAJOR GENERAL, Secretary JSCC, Copy No. 1 HPM & HMD (W.J. CAWTHORN). 2 HM FA & CR. 5-3-1949. 3 Secy, Ministry of States. 4 Air Commander. 5-8 Secy JSCC. 9 DMO, GHQ. 10-11 UNCLO (Mr. Ayub) 12 C-in-C Pakarmy. 13 Def Secy. HANDING OVER NOTES. 1.INTRODUCTION. Realizing that you are new to this country, its people and the condition prevailing here, I have tried to make these notes as comprehensive as possible. I shall first give you briefly an account of the “Revolution” here. Then I shall deal with the events of importance leading Copy of a letter dated 12 Dec 1948 from Shivji Raina, Hustuwala, Karanagar, Srinagar to Miss Macqueen Govt. house, Lahore. I enclose herewith a cutting from the Hindustan Times ‘New Delhi’ dated 10.12.48 which reveals the true facts of the murder of Dr. Sarwanand Raina, late medical officer of Khaplu (Skardu District). The tragic story given in the paper is from the deceased doctors funerals servant who was an eye witness to all the atrocities of the scene for 7 days. The version that the doctor was killed by an unknown person, as stated in your letters seems an effort of the administrator of Khaplu to hide his inhumane and cold blooded murder. I do nor also believe that the wife of Doctor is missing as stated in your letter. She must be somewhere in the custody of Pakistani raiders. I therefore appeal you in the name of Lord Christ to trace out the unfortunate woman and restore her to me. She is an emblem to me of my deceased son. Hope to hear soon from you in return. UNVEILING FALSIFICATIONS ABOUT GILGIT-BALTISTAN The term falsification is used in the subject to disprove those quack statements and assertions used by the establishment in Pakistan for the last fifty six years to simply disfigure the thousands years proven identity of Gilgit-Baltistan ; so as to keep them enslaved by using the latest +Machiavellianised techniques. This is being done in a pure spirit of enmity resulting from created gulf of total distrust; engineered by the departing Imperialist powers at the time of assuming new identities by the nations of Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan i.e 1947-48. The undermentioned verisimilitude amply proves that in the entire history of Gilgit-Baltistan, the reign of the Pakistani colonial rule for the last fifty-six years has been the worst beyond any doubt. The preceding Dogra rule was comparatively much better as they never ever resorted to the ugly sectarian divide to prolong and strengthen their rule, as frequently done by Pakistani colonial masters. To :- MINDEF KARACHI For Infrm. DCOS KARACHI 21260/Ops (.) TOP SECRET (.) FOR ISKANDER MIRZA FROM McCAY (.) collective insubordination in Gilgit Scouts (.) 600 Scouts at Gilgit refuse to go on duty (.) Preliminary reports indicate this is result of duel control political greviences and intrigues (.) Danger of this spreading to others (.) Sher Khan flying to Gilgit tomorrow to investigate sort out the trouble if possible and submit full report (.) Consider time has come when Govt will have to make up its mind as regards setting up a firm administration in Gilgit and putting Scouts under IGFC or Army. (By Order of Brig Plans) SECRET NO. G-8 (11) / 51 GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN MINISTRY OF KASHMIR AFFAIRS. “Shahzada Kothi” Rawalpindi the 22nd Sept. 1951 M_E_M_O_R_A_N_D_U_M Subject :- ROLE OF NORTHERN SCOUTS AND GILGIT SCOUTS IN PEACE AND WAR. The undersigned is directed to enclose an extract from Weekly Diary No. 35, dated the 27th August, 1951, of the Resignation Bureau, Gilgit, along with a copy of H.M Kashmir Affairs minute there on for information and to request that the comments of the Ministry of Defence may be forwarded to this Ministry for further action. (M.Fahim) Under Secretary to the Govt. of Pakistan. To THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE , (D-1) GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, RAWALPINDI. TOP SECRET. No. 798-99 /A. H.Q., Northern scouts, C/O H.Q., Frontier Corps, NWF. Peshawar, Dt 27 Oct’51. To G.H.Q., M.O., Plans Rawalpindi. Subject:- LOYALTY-NORTHERN SCOUTS. Reference your letter No.4059/210/MO Plans dated 27th Sep’1951. 2. A detailed report is enclosed herewith. 3. Please Ack receipt. Lt.-Col Commandant, Northern Scouts. (Mohd Sharif Khan) Copy to:- Brigadier K.A. Rahim Khan, Inspector General and Secretary Frontier Corps, N.W.F. Peshawar. ~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~ Subject :- LOYALTY NORTHERN SCOUTS. DEPENDENCE ON BALTI AND GILGITI CIVIL AND MILITARY OFFICERS : FOR GUIDANCE. 2. There is no question of this Corps depending on Balti or Gilgiti civil officials for guidance , in purely military matters. Where guidance may be required in connection with the routine civil or political matters, the Political Agent only will be consulted , and his advice sought. CONCISE GENERAL NOTE ON NORTHERN REGIONS. 14. (a) The people are primitive, and easily misguided. (b) They are ruled by Mirs, Rajas, Wazirs, Kachus, Fachus, Aghas and Akhuns, who to safeguard their own very corrupt and immoral interests can easily mislead them. (C) There are at least three different religious sects:- (1) MAULAIS (2) SHIAS (3) SUNNIS An officer military or civil therefore has to be extremely careful in dealing their people. (d) They are generally, (especially in BALTISTAN) immoral. (e) They have been oppressed by the Mirs, Rajas etc and now expect to be relieved From their misrule. (f) Generally, they are extremely lazy and would much rather carry a load for 20 miles than plough their fields. (g) The Mir of Hunza is an intelligent and in many ways capable person. At the same time he is highly ambitious. Reports appear to indicate that his loyalty to Pakistan is questionable. It is said that he is intimately connected with most of the internal troubles in this Agency. (h) The Mir of Nagar is daily taking some action against his uncles, who own large Jagirs in his state. He is reported to be taking steps to make life generally very unpleasant for them. It is reliably reported that his uncles who are:- (1) KB MEHBOOB ALI KHAN- Governor of YASIN (2) Capt BABAR KHAN- Northern Scouts. (3) ZAFAR KHAN-Sub Maj, Northern Scouts. (4) MUZAFFARUDDIN SHAH- Sub Maj, Gilgit Scouts. (5) KARIM KHAN-ASO, Ministry of Kashmir Affairs are very disturbed and are capable of very great trouble for the Mir in his State, but are at the moment biding their time, because they feel that any action against the Mir may very easily and quickly wash away their services in the War of Liberation, in which they were the foremost leaders, against the expressed wishes and aspirations of the Mir, their nephew. (i) It is said that Mirs and most of the Rajas not only totally abstained from taking part in the war of liberation, but tried their utmost to prevent the leaders from taking the action they did. Later, when they realized that the Dogra Regime was really and truly at an end and a Pakistani officer had taken effective control at Gilgit as P.A., they came bounding along to offer their services. LOYALTY OF THE NORTHERN SCOUTS 15 . There may be a deal of truth in what the political authorities say regarding the loyalty of the Northern Scouts, inspite of the assurance of my officers otherwise and my own observation, but it would appear that if such were the case then not only the Northern Area would be involved. This would require the attention of the Govt at very high level. It is for this reason that I give a concise account of several incidents in this Agency during the last two years, in the subsequent paragraphs. ASTOR AND MINIMARG-FOOD SHORTAGE (c) Every year famine conditions of extreme nature prevail in these areas. On every occasion the civil authorities have failed to cope with the situation on account of obvious limitations. In 1950 the serious shortage of food grains led to a serious riot in Astor and resulted in the burning of Astor jail by the mobs, and attack on the police. (d) In 1951 again, the food situation has been extremely serious although the precedence in 1950 should have led to forward planning by the civil administration. It is a fact, that the people of these areas have been living on grass during the short age period with a bleak Winter ahead of them. EFFECT ON THE PEOPLE (a) In 1950 some of the people of these areas actually migrated over to Indian occupied Kashmir and some to Astor and Chilas. In 1951, no cases of migration to India have Been reported. (b) Apart from the possibilities of another exodus to the Kashmir Valley if this situation carries on, it is naturally to be concluded that in time the people of these areas will not have any deep rooted patriotic sentiments for Pakistan left in them. On the contrary, even a verbal promise of supply of food grains from the other side will affect their loyalty as they know that the source of supply is there to back such a promise. Pakistan has not given any such assurance so far. 18. PUNIAL INCIDENT. Ever since the Liberation Movement the people of Punial have been openly airing their grievances against the Raja of Punial. Their demands pertained to the revision of the existing revenue rates with a view to lowering them. Various representations were made to the P.A. Gilgit and enquiries were ordered by him- first by A.P.A. Gilgit and later by APA Chilas. 19. The Punialis, however, did not wait for the results of the enquiries in Jun 51,/ a mob which insisted on marching onto Gilgit to see the P.A. had to fired upon when it became unruly. Confidential. D.O.No.D.276-P(Camp)/41. Political Department, Simla, May 1941. Status of Hunza, Nagir, Chilas, Koh Ghizar, Ishoman and Yasin vis-à-vis The Kashmir State. My dear Colonel With reference to the correspondence resting with your demi-official letter No.F.25-C(2)/38 dated the 31st August 1939, I am desired to inform you that notwithstanding the authoritative pronouncement which have been made in the past, the position has been fully reexamined in the light of all the material available. The Crown Representative regrets that he is unable to agree with all the conclusions reached in the note of the Kashmir Government forwarded with your letter and has been pleased to decide as follows:- (i) Hunza and Nagir:- Though these are under the suzerainty of the Kashmir State, they are not part of Kashmir but are separate States. (ii) Chilas, Koh Ghizar, Ishkoman and Yasin:- Though these too are under the Suzerainty of the Kashmir State, they are not part of Kashmir but are tribal areas. Lt.-Col. D. de M.S. Fraser, C.I.E., Resident in Kashmir. MESSAGE FORM TO GILGIT INFO CHIEF SECRETARY NORWAF ( . ) SECRET ( . ) From Sher Khan to Mohd Alam ( . ) Non Prime Minister intends visiting Pindi on 25 Jan ( . ) Will be pleased to meet the Mirs of HUNZA and NAGAR at Pindi on above date as mark of appreciation for their help ( . ) Please signal date that the Mirs may be flown down from GILGIT IMPORTANT ----------------------------------------------- GILGIT-BALTISTAN: HISTORICAL LEGAL PROOFS :- (12) On 8 Jan 1949, Pak Army writes to Ministry Of Def. “From Gen Maccay to Sikander Mirza . Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas is arranging for exchange of some political prisoners in Kashmir with Brig Ghansara Singh, his staff, Col Majeed and few militiamen through Dr Wingar. (13) Frontier Constabulary and Additional Police:- Behaved in a cowardly and atrocious manner. They put up no fight and at the first sign of Indian Army bolted. (9) Govt House NWFP 7 July 1948. Sir Ambrose Dundas writes from Govt. House Nathia Gali,NWFP toGen Sir Doughlas Gracey.“On the whole I think it will be best if you continued “meddling”. The Gilgit Agency has not been put under the NWFP, though it always refers to us when in difficulty. (14) Lt Gen (Chief of staff) on Director Military Operation’s (DMO) appreciation writes that the Govt. of Pakistan must simply declare recognition of Gilgit so that the position and status of the administration and forces are thus regularized. He further writes that the administration should be under the Governor of the NWFP as it use to be. It is essential to come into the open about Gilgit and face the music in order to ensure good administration and properly led and balanced forces. The case is very much on a parallel with that of Junagadh (8) Defence Secretary Iskander Mirza on 20/9/48 writes “ The C in C was most emphatic on the question of a military Governor. I do not agree and before leaving Rawalpindi I told Gen McCay that I would not be able to support the C in C on this issue. The Gilgitis req careful handling and political experience is necessary in order to do this. (7) In Addendum to notes of a meeting held in Prime Minister’s Residence at 1100 hrs on 4 March 1949 to discuss the Gilgit situation. Maj Gen secretary JSCC (W.J.CAWTHORN) on 5-3-1949 writes that the following should be added as additional paragraphs.Position of Hunza and Nagar paragraph no. 11. It was decided that no action should be taken to notify to UNCIP the accession of the Mirs of Hunza and Nagar as it was hoped to include them in the plebiscite area. (3) On 23 Dec 1947, from Gracey (Pak Army) to Iskander Mirza (Mindef). What is policy regarding Gilgit. Is Govt. accepting accession? If not what is position of additional personnel already enlisted in Scouts. On 27 Dec 1947 from Iskander Mirza and also Foreign Karachi to Gen Gracey. Question of accession Gilgit can only be decided when there is overall Kashmir settlement but we must remain in defector charge. (2) Maj Brown on being relieved by Maj Aslam alias Col Pasha states in a letter Complaining that although in a conf in Rwp on 3 Dec 1947, at which the premier of Pakistan presided it was decided that the entire territory of the Gilgit Agency will be held by Pakistan but Maj Aslam after taking over the charge declared that he had come to Gilgit as a representative of the Azad Kashmir Govt. This may have unfortunate repercussions. (5) From Parep, Newyork to foreign Karachi No 4419 dated 26 (received 28) Jan For Ikram ullah from Mohammad Ali. Please telegraph text of telegraphs from Hunza and Nagir asking for accession to Pakistan including second telegram stating that if Pakistan does not accept accession they will go elsewhere. Also repeat copies of telegrams from provisional Govt of Gilgit asking for union with Pakistan. (4) From Pak Army To Foreign Karachi No 10014/ops dated 24th(received 25th) January 1948.Ref GHQ to Mindef repeated to Joint Secy Foreign. For Prime Minister’s information, Col ABS Shah from Col Akbar. Subject Gilgit. 1.On Dec 27th understood that Pakistan not accepting the accession of Gilgit but leaving it as part of AK.On Dec 28th I issued following orders to Maj Aslam,copy to Political Agent.“Generally speaking we want local people and chiefs under impression that Gilgit Agency is coming under Pakistan which will produce better cooperation. In fact however, Gilgit Agency now under Azad Govt. The Pol Agent and Officer Incharge Troops being the officers lent by Pak to AK Govt. 2. Some confusion now arisen regarding position of Gilgit as Peshawar is sending signals to the Pol Agent contrary to our instrs from here. Request position be clarified immediately as it is holding up ops.Suggest Frontier Govt.and Political Dept be told that Gilgit is part of Azad territory and PA & Maj Aslam our offrs lent to Azad Govt.That all instructions will be issued by Azad Govt in future who will seek advice of Frontier Govt in matters of Policy. (9) 1 Jul 48. Gilgit to GHQ. One of the main causes of Gurez disaster was Habib Gul Commander Constabulary (.) Request permission to be shot (.) please send Hassan urgently. 7 Jul 48. SEVEN TEMPESTS BOMBED AND STRAFFED Gilgit from 08:00 to 08:30 hrs this morning (.) scouts living in complete ruins (.) Hassan arrived safely. (15) There were some people who informed about the secret meetings and sessions of Hassan and Babar to Maj Brown, a British officer and Comdt of Scouts. He in turn kept Mohd Babar Khan away from HQ sending him on Gashts as far as possible. Subedar Jan Alam of Nagar, was discharged, for his playing an active part in this. (1) Brig M Aslam Khan’s Handing over notes. Hassan Khan got himself recognized as the Mil dictator of Gilgit. He setup a cabnet of local riff raffs. The cabinet found difficult to work smoothly and Pak Govt was requested to send their rep. On 16 Nov, Sardar M Alam Khan was apptd PA and flown to Gilgit. The Cabinet was dissolved, Maj Brown and Capt Mathieson, who had been arrested released again arrested by the Cabinet were put in charge of the scouts and Hassan Khan- who by this time had assumed the rank of Maj Gen was sent to command the Bunji Astore area, with the rank of Mountain Marshal. (10) Express Ltr to POL GILGIT dated 3 and 11 Dec 1947 signed by Mohammad Ali for premier Pakistan Govt. Capt Brown is returning to Gilgit. He has been authorized by Pakistan Govt to give Pakistan commissions to a few deserving officers; to order concentration of the Muslim Kashmiri Troops with their officers at Bunji. These troops must not enter Gilgit Agency Jurisdiction unless called upon to do so by you. The Pakistan Govt hope you will give your cooperation and help to Capt Brown. (16) The contents of a report Suby Loyalty Northern Scouts (NS) send by Lt Col Mohammad Sharif Khan, Comdt NS to GHQ dated 27 Oct 51- The people are primitive and easily misguided. They are ruled by Mirs, Rajas, Wazirs, Kachus, Fachus, Aghas and Akuns, who to safeguard their own very corrupt and immoral interests can easily mislead them. - They are generally (especially in Baltistan) immoral. -Generally, they are extremely lazy and would much rather carry a load of 20 miles then plough their fields. -I do agree however that the Govt should not depend entirely on the people of Northern Area in the event of war. They have revolted successfully once, they are capable of doing so again. -Some arrangements should be made for rect of non Gilgiti personnel in the ranks of this corps. This will give us a number of men whose loyalty will be beyond questions. (6) 31 Jan 1958. GHQ designated official historian Chalks down these pts as notes during talk with Col Bacon (Sugar Mills, Mardan). a. Ghansara Singh, Military man 31 Jul – Resident wilfy Webb (?Now in Africa) b. Ismaili’s very well informed -Bangest, DD.Intelligence, Peshawar, might Have some stuff c. W.A Brown (I.C.I) – Jaffar, Radio Pakistan, Pindi, was a clerk in Gilgit all Through – d. P.A.Khayber may have papers (Arbab Nur Mohammad). – Capt Baber (of Nager) works on the airfield, Pindi, was in Scouts, under Brown, Northern Scouts. e. Maj Hassan Khan, Kashmir State forces, was pro Pakistani and the man Probably behind the Gilgit Coup. (Rawalpindi Conspiracy case after). f. Kazi Abdul Majeed, Supt. P.A’s office, Gilgit, 1915-47. (He was with us Throughout the talk. Told Bunji story vividly) (11) As per Acting chief of the General Staff C.I.Jerrard report of 8 Sep 48 the,Fol prisoners of war have to be evacuated from Gilgit. Mil :- officers 11 JCOs 13 Ors 539 Total:- 563 Civ:- Some 250 including women and children -------------------------------------------------------------- Copy of a letter dated 12 Dec 1948 from Shivji Raina, Hustuwala, Karanagar, Srinagar to Miss Macqueen Govt. house, Lah I enclose herewith a cutting from the Hindustan Times ‘New Delhi’mdated 10.12.48 which reveals the true facts of the murder of Dr. SarwanandmRaina, late medical officer of Khaplu (Skardu District). The tragic storymgiven in the paper is from the deceased doctors funerals servant who was an eye witness to all the atrocities of the scene for 7 days. The version that the doctor was killed by an unknown person, as stated in your letters seems an effort of the administrator of Khaplu to hide his inhumane and cold blooded murder. I do nor also believe that the wife of Doctor is missing as stated in your letter. She must be somewhere in the custody of Pakistani raiders. I therefore appeal you in the name of Lord Christ to trace out the unfortunate woman and restore her to me. She is an emblem to me of my deceased son. Hope to hear soon from you in return.
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